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Summary Contempt Power
Introduction
The judiciary's inherent power to punish affronts to its authority as
criminal contempt1 rests on the premise that courts must have the
ability to vindicate their authority by ensuring obedience to 'their
orders and respect for their processes.2 Traditionally, criminal con-
tempts have been characterized as sui generis, 3 and even today federal
contempts are not considered "crimes" or "criminal prosecutions"
within the meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Con-
stitution.4 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that "crim-
inal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect."3 Unless the
conduct being punished occurs in open court and in the immediate
view of the judge, a contemnor is entitled, as a matter of due process,
to most of the procedural protections available to defendants in
ordinary criminal prosecutions.0 At least some criminal contempts that
occur in the immediate view of the judge, however, may be punished
1. Courts also have inherent power to impose civil contempt sanctions. See pp. 81, 91
infra.
2. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S.
42, 65-66 (1924); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04 (1888). On the contempt power gen-
erally, see J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMtPr OF COURT (1927); R. GOLDFARB, THE CoN-
TEMPT POWER (1963); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971).
3. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194
U.S. 324, 326 (1904); In re Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 248, 402 F. Supp. 725, 736
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
4. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960); Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 184-85 (1958).
5. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); see Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S.
604, 610 (1914).
6. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (usual procedural due process requirements must
be afforded if conduct not in open court and not in immediate presence of judge); Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (usual procedural due process requirements must be
afforded if conduct not in open court).
The "usual" procedural due process requirements include the rights to prior notice,
counsel, and a hearing at which the contemnor may present evidence and examine wit-
nesses, id. at 537; the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); the right not
to testify, id.; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273, 275 (1948); the right to a public trial, id. at 266-73; the right to an impartial
judge, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-03 (1974); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212,
215-16 (1971) (per curiam); and the right to a jury trial, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968).
The due process right to a jury trial is not applicable to petty offenses, whether
ordinary crimes or criminal contempts. See p. 58 infra. Similarly, just as an ordinary
criminal defendant in a state court proceeding has no due process right to a grand jury
indictment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), a criminal contemnor has no right
to such an indictment, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-85 (1956).
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summarily-without affording the contemnor even the minimal pro-
cedural guarantees of prior notice and a hearing.
7
The Supreme Court has offered a twofold rationale for the exercise
of this extraordinary summary power. First, since the judge is person-
ally aware of the relevant facts, there may be no need for a hearing,8
Second, punishment without the delay inherent in notice and a hear-
ing may be necessary to vindicate the court's authority or to prevent
obstructions of justice." The Court has rarely questioned the first
rationale10 and has not dealt satisfactorily with the nature of the
"necessity" that satisfies the second rationale." Indeed, it is unclear to
what extent necessity limits the power to punish summarily contempts
observed by the judge.' 2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a)
specifically incorporates only the first rationale; it provides that "[a]
criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court."'13 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court, particularly in recent years, has been sensitive to the
potential abuses of a power that permits the same individual, acting as
prosecutor, judge, and jury, to impose criminal penalties summarily
for affronts, if not to his personal dignity, at least to the institution
that he represents. For example, Harris v. United States,'4 decided in
1965, reversed the Rule 42(a) summary contempt conviction of a wit-
ness who, after receiving immunity, refused to obey a judge's order to
testify before a grand jury.15 The Court noted that the "[d]elay neces-
7. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289
(1888).
The term "summary" has sometimes been used to refer to contempt proceedings in
which the defendant is afforded notice and a hearing, but not a jury trial. E.g., United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692 (1964); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 179 (1958).
In this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, the term is used to describe only
those contempts punished without prior notice and a hearing. On the summary contempt
power generally, see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE CouRT 220-30, 232-38
(1973); Sedler, The Sunnary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from
Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1976).
8. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
534-36 (1925).
9. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517, 534-36 (1925).
10. But see Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963), discussed at p. 51 infra (per
curiam) (full hearing required on issue of contemnor's mental competence).
11. See pp. 70-99 infra.
12. See pp. 89-90 & note 307 infra (discussing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309
(1975)).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Rule 42(b) provides that an) prosecution for contemlt not
covered by Rule 42(a) must )roceed b) notice and hearing.
14. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
15. Harris makes no reference to due process, and it is unclear whether its litnitation
on the summary contempt power is applicable to the states. See 1966 Dur L.J. 814, 823-24.
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sary for a hearing would not imperil the grand jury proceedings,"'16
and in dictum the Court observed that "Rule 42(a) was reserved 'for
exceptional circumstances' . . . such as threatening the judge or dis-
rupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings."' 7
Subsequent to Harris, the Court reversed summary contempt con-
victions, on either procedural18 or substantive'19 grounds, in every case
that it decided with a written opinion 20 except the most recent one,
16. 382 U.S. at 164.
17. Id. (citation omitted). Harris overruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959),
which had upheld the summary conviction of a recalcitrant grand jury witness. In both
cases the requirement that the contempt occur in the immediate view of tile judge was
supposedly satisfied when the grand jury was convened in the judge's presence and the
witness was asked the same questions that he had previously refused to answer in the
grand jury room. Harris characterized the "real contempt" as having occurred outside the
judge's presence, and it viewed the repetition of the contempt before tile judge as merely
a device to avoid affording the contemnor prior notice and a hearing. 382 U.S. at 164-65.
Brown, on the other hand, characterized the judge's personal involvement in the matter
as a laudable attempt to encourage the witness to testify. The Court suggested that a
judge whose sole objective was punitive might well have proceeded with notice and a
hearing. 359 U.S. at 50.
In both cases the witnesses' counsel were present at the proceedings before the judge,
and it is not clear whether spectators were removed from the courtroom. The exclusion
of both counsel and spectators, if not the exclusion only of spectators, would probably
violate a witness's due process right to a public trial. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S.
610, 619 (1960) (suggesting counsel must be present); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73, 278
(1948) (right to public trial extends to summary contempt adjudications and "an accused
is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present" as part of
that right). Yet the presence of counsel or spectators during a grand jury proceeding is
inconsistent with the requirement of grand jury secrecy. See FED. R. CRINI. P. 6(d), (e).
Neither Brown nor Harris discussed this problem.
18. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (summary adjudication at end of trial
denied contemnor due process because judge had become personally embroiled in con-
troversy with contemnor and because contemnor had not been given prior notice and
opportunity to be heard); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (adjudication by
judge involved in conflict with contemnor on unrelated matter denied contemnor due
process); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (summary adjudication at end of
trial denied contemnor due process because judge and contemnor had become personally
embroiled in controversy); cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (summary contempt
conviction imposed by state legislature two days after disruptive incident denied con-
temnor due process because all legislators voting on contempt resolution may not have
observed the incident and because contemnor was not given prior notice and opportunity
to be heard).
19. See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), discussed at pp. 67-69 infra (per curiam)
(pro se defendant's overzealous advocacy did not constitute contempt). In one other con-
tempt case, Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974) (per curiam), it is unclear whether
the defendant received an adjudicatory hearing and an adequate opportunity to prepare
a defense. See note 43 infra. The Court's opinion describes the contempt action as having
been initiated by information, 415 U.S. at 697, and an excerpt from the transcript of the
proceedings leading to the contempt charge indicates that the defendant had until the
next day to show cause why he should not be held in contempt, id. at 703 (Rehnquist, J..
dissenting). This may not have been an adequate time to prepare a defense, however, and
there is no reference to the nature of the proceeding on the following day. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion refers to the contempt penalty as a "summary remedy," id. at 701, but
does not indicate in what sense the proceedings were summary. See note 7 supra ("sum-
marg" may refer to lack of jury trial as well as to lack of notice and hearing).
20. In Howell v. Jones, 414 U.S. 803 (1973), the Supieme Court, without an opinion,
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question a defendant's appeal fom a state court
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United States v. Wilson.21 The defendants in Wilson were summarily
convicted for their refusals, after grants of immunity, to testify during
a criminal trial. The Court noted that the contempts fell "within the
express language of Rule 42(a),"' 22 and distinguished Harris on the
ground that trial courts, unlike grand juries, do not have the flexibility
"easily [to] suspend action on any one [case], and turn to another"
while the contemnor is granted notice and a hearing.
23
Parts I and II of this article will analyze the development and in-
adequacies of the pre-Wilson limitations on the summary criminal
contempt power in terms of the two rationales for its exercise: (1) the
lack of need for procedural protections due to the judge's personal ob-
servation of the contempt and (2) the necessity for action without the
delay that would result from granting procedural safeguards to the
contemnor. 24 Part III will argue that Wilson, despite the breadth of
some of its language, suggests for the first time a narrow, acceptable
basis for the exercise of summary contempt power. Building upon that
suggestion, the analysis will then consider factors that should limit
the use of summary punishment. 25 Finally, Part IV will offer two
summary contempt conviction for refusing to answer questions during a trial. See Ex Parte
Howell, 488 S.A.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). A decision on this ground is a holding on
the merits of an appellant's claims. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). The
contemnor, however, did not raise the questions of (I) whether summary procedures were
appropriate or (2) whether his conduct fell outside the constitutionally permissible scope
of the judiciary's contempt power. Instead, he based his appeal on the grounds that the
state contempt statute was facially unconstitutional and that the state appellate court did
not give proper consideration to his claims. Howell v. Jones, 42 U.S.L.W. 3013 (U.S. July
10, 1973) (docket summary); see Howell v. Jones, 516 F.2d 53, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (rejection of some of contemnor's procedural and substantive
claims in subsequent habeas corpus proceeding). But see id. at 59 ("In upholding the con-
tempt convictions . . . . the Supreme Court implicitly rejected Howell's constitutional
argument that summary contempt cannot be imposed for the orderly refusal to answer
questions.")
In In re Spencer, 397 U.S. 817 (1970), the Court by an equally divided vote affirmed an
attorney's criminal contempt conviction based on his statements in a motion to disqualify
a judge. See In re Spencer, 38 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1969) (docket summary). It is
unclear whether the contemnor was convicted without notice and a hearing. There is no
Supreme Court or lower court opinion, and the issues presented to the Court on appeal
were substantive, not procedural. See id.
21. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
22. Id. at 314-15 (footnote omitted).
23. Id. at 318.
24. Procedural requirements for and statutory definitions of contempt vary somewhat
among jurisdictions. See Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for
the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73 Mic. L. REV. 483, 486 & n.14 (1975). Since this
article is concerned with generally applicable limits on the summary contempt power,
Supreme Court cases dealing with due process restrictions on the exercise of that power
will be a focal point. Where constitutional issues are in doubt, the analysis will be re-
stricted primarily to lower federal courts' interpretations of the due process clause and
nonconstitutional restrictions that have been imposed on the federal contempt power.
25. The proposals in this article for limiting the summary contempt power go well
beyond the Supreme Court's approach to the summary contempt power. Nonetheless, the
limitations suggested here can be readily adopted under existing law by trial and ap-
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modest proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the summary contempt
power and to minimize the harm resulting from wrongful summary
adjudications.
I. The Need for Procedural Safeguards
The judiciary's failure to deal adequately with the summary con-
tempt power may be attributable in part to the two-fold justification
for the exercise of that power. If one begins with the premise that there
is an overriding necessity for summary punishment, the extent to
which a contemnor would benefit from particular procedural safe-
guards is likely to be at best a secondary concern. At the same time, the
claim that a judge's personal observation of allegedly contumacious
behavior obviates the need for notice and a hearing may discourage
careful consideration of whether the necessity for summary action
actually exists. Before turning in Parts II and III to the question of
the necessity for summary punishment, the analysis here will examine
the extent to which procedural safeguards have been and should be
considered important in summary contempt proceedings.
A. Prior Warning
The absence of an adjudicatory hearing in summary contempt
cases20 obviates any need for prior notice of the charge to ensure the
defendant an opportunity to prepare a defense.2 7 Requiring a judge to
warn an individual that his conduct is considered contumacious, how-
ever, may have the salutary effect of restraining oversensitive judges
from acting immediately to impose contempt sentences for relatively
minor incidents of misconduct. Moreover, prior warning may be
necessary in some cases in order to permit an individual to conform
his conduct to expected courtroom norms or to ensure that the
elements of the offense have been established.2 8
Unlike Harris and Wilson, which involved violations of specific
court orders,20 most summary contempt convictions are based on some
pellate courts without endangering their ability to function fairly and efficiently. See
note 367 infra.
26. See pp. 49-54 infra.
27. The summarily convicted contemnor may have the right to address the court and
present mitigating circumstances prior to sentencing. See pp. 55-57 infra. If the precise
basis for the conviction is not clear, the contemnor may not be able to exercise this right
effectively. The problem, however, can be solved by informing the contemnor of the basis
for the judgment after the finding of contempt has been made.
28. The following discussion is also applicable to nonsummary contempts. Prior warn-
ing that will permit an individual to avoid contumacious behavior or ensure that he has
the requisite mens rea is no less important merely because there will be an opportunity to
defend against the charge.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976) (contempt includes "[djisobedience or resistance to
[court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command").
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type of disruptive or indecorous behavior.30 The substantive defini-
tion and scope of the power to treat such activity as contempt set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) is typical; it provides that contempt of court in-
cludes "[m]isbehavior of any person in [the court's] presence or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."31 "Misbe-
havior" includes physicaP 2 and verbal 3  disruption of proceedings,
failure to rise at the commencement and close of proceedings,34 failure
to appear on time for a scheduled hearing,3 5 and overzealous advocacy
by counsel. 3
6
Given the broad definition of contempt and the judicial discretion
30. See, e.g., notes 32-36 infra (citing cases).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1976). Although the court's contempt power is inherent and not
dependent upon legislative action, see p. 39 & note 2 supra, the Supreme Court has
approved legislative regulation of the power. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-52
(1941); Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-67
(1924); see Kuhns, supra note 24, at 486-87.
Nye held that the phrase "in the presence of or so near thereto" limits the scope of
§ 401(1) to conduct that occurs in the physical proximity of the court. 313 U.S. at 48-49.
It is important to distinguish this substantive restriction on the federal contempt power
from the procedural rule limiting summary punishment to those contempts that occur in
the "actual presence" or "immediate view" of the judge. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517, 534-36 (1925); see Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 213 (1st Cir. 1954); FED. It.
Cum. P. 42(a), quoted at p. 42 supra.
32. E.g., Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 276-78 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (defendant in
criminal trial summarily convicted of contempt for throwing water pitcher at prosecutor;
case remanded for consideration of mental capacity issues); United States v. Bentvena, 304
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (affirmance of unreported criminal contempt judg-
ment for throwing chair at prosecutor; facts giving rise to contempt citation are set forth
in Mirra v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 361, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
33. E.g., United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 73-76 (2d Cir. 1972) (continuing to speak
after repeated orders from judge to stop); United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163, 165-69 (2(1
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949) (shouting at judge in loud, angry voices); In re
Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1312-14 (N.D. Il. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (series of remarks interrupting proceedings by defendants
in criminal trial).
34. E.g., United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1027 (1975); United States ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969) (sentence
but not judgment of contempt vacated); cf. Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128,
1130-31 (9th Cir. 1969) (contempt conviction for failure to rise and approach bench after
order to do so). But see note 79 infra.
In both Abascal and Comstock the trial judge had ordered the contemnors to rise, but
the Ninth Circuit viewed the refusals as a violation of § 401(1) ("misconduct .. . (that]
obstructs] the administration of justice") rather than § 401(3) (violation of a court order).
35. E.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); In re Gates, 478 F.2d 998, 999-
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But cf. In re Niblack, 476 F.2d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 909 (1973) (emphasizing that conviction was based on violation of specific order to
appear rather than finding that failure to appear constituted "misconduct in the presence
of the court").
Most courts have held that the failure to appear cannot be punished summarily. E.g.,
United States v. Dalahanty, 488 F.2d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Lamson, 468 F.2d
551, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (collecting authorities). Contra, In re Niblack, 476
F.2d 930, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973).
36. E.g., United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1003 (1966); In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1965).
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to decide whether to invoke the contempt power,. 7 prior warning
would be desirable in order to permit an individual to conform his
conduct to the judge's expectations of proper behavior. In the absence
of a warning, it may be unclear prior to summary adjudication whether
the judge views the conduct as contumacious. The problem is par-
ticularly acute for attorneys, who must tread the fine line between
vigorous advocacy and obstruction of justice.38
Although a concern about fair warning is one of the considerations
underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine,3 9 the Supreme Court has
never suggested that the federal contempt statute is unduly vague, nor
has it held that prior warning is a prerequisite to summary punish-
ment. 40 At least one state court, however, has held that a warning is
required in some situations,41 and several other courts have suggested
that prior warning would be desirable in summary contempt cases.
42
37. One significant difference between ordinary criminal prosecutions and criminal
contempts is that the court, as opposed to the public prosecutor, has the discretion to
decide whether to initiate contempt proceedings. See Kuhns, supra note 24, at 494-95.
38. See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1970); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 397,
401 (7th Cir. 1972); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 139-40; Schwartz, Judges as
Tyrants, 7 CRIM. L.B. 129, 134-35 (1971); Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use
of the Sunnary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L. REV. 945, 949-52,
956-65 (1975); 1971 Wis. L. REV. 329, 342-43.
39. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Brautigam, Constitutional
Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEo. L.J. 1513, 1527 (1972).
In addition to ensuring fair warning, the void-for-vagueness doctrine has been invoked
to invalidate statutes that by virtue of their vagueness may have a chilling effect on the
exercise of constitutional rights. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948);
see Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
75-85 (1960). Exercise of the broadly defined contempt power can have the same effect on
constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court has expressed concern about this potential
chilling impact in cases involving overzealous advocacy. For example, in In re McConnell,
370 U.S. 230 (1962), an attorney had been summarily held in contempt for his unfulfilled
threat to continue a line of questioning "unless some bailiff stops us." Id. at 235. Holding
that this conduct did not constitute misbehavior that obstructs the administration of
justice within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), the Court observed:
An independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable
parts of our system of justice. To preserve the kind of trials that our system envisages,
Congress has limited the summary contempt power vested in courts to the least
possible power adequate to prevent actual obstruction of justice, and we think that
that power did not extend to this case.
370 U.S. at 236. When the potential chilling effect of the contempt power is urged as the
basis for reversal, the fact that the contemnor received prior warning should not save an
otherwise invalid conviction. Indeed, giving the warning may increase the chilling impact
of the contempt power. For the proposition that § 401(1) should be held unconstitutionally
Vague, see Brautigam, supra, at 1526-33.
40. But cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970) ("circumstances" under which
removal of disruptive defendant did not result in unconstitutional denial of his right
to be present at his own trial included repeated warnings by trial judge that defendant
"would be removed . . . if he persisted in his unruly conduct").
41. Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 428-29 (Alaska 1977).
42. See United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1027 (1975) (failure to give warning that conduct may be contumacious not reversible
error, but such warning may be appropriate); United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 95
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Moreover, the failure to give such a warning may partially explain at
least one Supreme Court decision reversing a contempt conviction on
the ground that, as a matter of substantive law, the conduct was not
contumacious.
43
Prior warning may also be necessary in some contempt cases to
ensure that the elements of the offense have been established. It is
well settled that each element of a criminal contempt, including the
requisite mental state, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.44
While courts have taken different and inconsistent approaches in de-
fining the mental state that must accompany contumacious misbe-
havior,45 it seems clear that the mens rea requirement is not eliminated
or reduced, at least theoretically,4" merely because summary procedures
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966) (warning "generally desirable" but not
essential where conduct clearly contumacious).
43. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974) (per curiam).
In Eaton, a trial witness, the victim of an assault, referred to the defendant as a
"chicken-shit." Id. at 698. The Court held that "this single isolated usage of street vernacu-
lar, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support
the conviction of criminal contempt." Id. at 698. In a concurring opinion Justice Powell
stated:
[Tjhe controlling fact, in my view, and one that should be emphasized, is that
petitioner received no prior warning or caution from the trial judge with respect to
court etiquette ....
I place a high premium on the importance of maintaining civility and good order
in the courtroom. But before there is resort to the summary remedy of criminal con-
tempt, the court at least owes the party concerned some sort of notice or warning. No
doubt there are circumstances in which a courtroom outburst is so egregious as to
justify a summary response by the judge without specific warning, but this is surely
not such a case.
Id. at 700-01. But see id. at 701 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Even the Court appears to
shy away from a flat rule, analogous to the hoary doctrine of the law of torts that every
dog is entitled to one bite, to the effect that every witness is entitled to one free con-
tumacious or other impermissible remark.")
On the question whether the contempt in Eaton was "summary" in the sense of there
being an inadequate opportunity to prepare and present a defense, see note 19 supra.
44. E.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Patterson, 219
F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1955).
45. See United States v. Smith, 555 F.2d 249, 252 (9th Cir. 1977) ("formulations of the
requisite intent cannot be expected to be uniform in all contexts"); N. DORSEN & L. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 7, at 108-11; Dobbs, supra note 2, at 263-65. Compare Offutt v. United
States, 232 F.2d 60, 72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956) (no wrongful intent
required if conduct is "clearly blameworthy") with United States v. Scale, 461 F.2d 345,
367-69 (7th Cir. 1972) (wrongful intent always required; acts punishable only if contemnor
"knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful") and Sykes v. United
States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (intent may be inferred when lawyer's conduct
showed "reckless disregard for his professional duty").
For a discussion of the mens rea requirement when a contempt charge is based oil
violation of a court order rather than on misbehavior that obstructs justice, see Dobbs,
supra note 2, at 261-63; Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 780, 793-96 (1943).
46. Courts seldom articulate the precise nature of the mens rea requirement in non-
summary contempt cases. See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 263-64. Thus it is not possible to
determine whether the requirement has in practice been diluted in summary contempt
cases.
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are invoked.47 The Seventh Circuit has recently defined the "minimal
requisite intent" for summary criminal contempt as "a volitional act
done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct
is wrongful." 48 Under this formula, which has been adopted by several
other courts, 49 it may be possible in some instances to infer beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of the requisite mental state merely
from the actor's conduct. For example, short of any question regard-
ing mental capacity,50 such a finding presumably could be made if an
individual assaulted a judge or bailiff. The same inference, however,
may not be appropriate when the conduct consists solely of vigorous
advocacy that the judge believes exceeds the bounds of propriety. In
this type of case, prior warning may be the additional critical factor
permitting the court to find that the contemnor "should have been
aware" that his conduct was wrongful. At least one court has suggested
in dictum that the absence of such a warning in a borderline case
would be fatal to a summary contempt conviction.
51
B. Opportunity to Respond
1. Evidentiary Hearing
The premise that a judge's personal observation of the contempt
makes an evidentiary hearing unnecessary rests on the assumption that
a judge will accurately perceive all the relevant facts.52 Numerous ex-
periments, however, have demonstrated that individuals often mis-
47. See, e.g., In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversal of summary contempt
conviction because evidence insufficient to support finding beyond reasonable doubt that
defendant had requisite mens rea).
48. United States v. Scale, 461 F.2d 345, 368 (7th Cir. 1972).
49. E.g., United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1977); Pennsylvania v. Local
542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 67
(1977).
50. See p. 51 infra.
51. United States v. Scale, 461 F.2d 345, 366 (7th Cir. 1972); see ABA PROJECr ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 7.2, at 93 (1972) (trial
judge should give "clear warning that the conduct is impermissible" before imposing any
sanction other than censure, unless it is clear that conduct was "wilfully contemptuous").
52. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) ("There is no need of evidence
or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense.")
Ironically, Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888), often cited as the leading case for the
proposition that contempts in the actual presence of the court may be punished without
notice and a hearing, does not rely on the assumption that a trial judge will accurately
perceive all the relevant facts. Rather, in denying Terry's application for a writ of habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court held that its power was limited to determining whether the
trial court had jurisdiction to enter the contempt order and that for this purpose it must
accept as true the findings of the trial court. Id. at 311. Yet the trial court may have
misperceived the facts. See note 54 infra.
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perceive even simple occurrences.53 The shock and spontaneity of most
courtroom disturbances probably increases the margin for error,54 par-
ticularly when several individuals are involved in the same incident.
Moreover, even if the judge accurately perceives the activities in the
courtroom, at least two relevant facts-the defendant's mens rea55 and
his mental capacity56-may be impossible to establish without an
evidentiary hearing.
The extent to which the judge's accurate observation of the events
would be sufficient to permit a finding that the defendant acted with
the requisite mens rea depends in part on the substantive intent re-
quirement for criminal contempts.5 T Some courts have emphasized that
a subjective criminal intent must be shown,55 thereby implying that the
defendant must actually intend to act wrongfully or at least be aware
of the likelihood that his conduct is wrongful. Other courts, as noted
previously, have held that it is sufficient to show that the contemnor
"should reasonably [have been] aware that his conduct [was] wrong-
ful."'5 9 This latter test is an objective one, akin to the Model Penal
53. See, e.g., Chenowith, Police Training Investigates the Fallibility of the Eye Witness,
51 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1960); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 971-80
(1977).
54. See Note, supra note 53, at 979-80 & n.29. Even if a judge's initial perception of the
events is accurate, it may be distorted by subsequent suggestive influences. See id. at 982-85.
This may have occurred in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888), where the trial court, in
its summary contempt order, recited that Terry had assaulted a marshal with a deadly
weapon during a disturbance in the courtroom. Id. at 298. Terry subsequently denied that
he had used a deadly weapon in the courtroom, but he admitted that moments after the
incident (and presumably beyond the view of the court) he drew a small knife at the door
to the marshal's office. Id. at 299-300. If Terry's assertion was true, and if prior to the
contempt order a marshal or spectator informed the court that Terry had brandished a
knife without specifying the location of the incident, the trial court may have assimilated
the knife story with its own perceptions of what happened in the courtroom. See, e.g.,
Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 560 (1975). See
generally Bern, When Saying Is Believing, PsYcH. TODAY, June 1967, at 21.
55. See 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, 347-48.
56. See Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963), discussed at p. 51 infra (per curiam).
57. See Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion that Due Process Re-
quires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, 465
(1966).
58. This type of characterization of the requisite mental state occurs most frequently
in cases in which the contempt charge is based on the violation of a court order. E.g.,
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947); In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1971); see Moskowitz, supra note 45. These cases do not suggest that a different standard
should apply when the contumacious conduct does not involve the violation of a court
order. Since most contempt cases in the latter category do not discuss the mens rea issue,
however, see note 46 supra, one cannot be certain that the same court would apply the
same standard to all types of contempts. See United States v. Smith, 555 F.2d 249, 252 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("formulations of the requisite intent cannot be expected to be uniform in all
contexts").
59. See notes 48 & 49 supra (citing cases).
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Code's definition of negligence.60 The defendant's conduct is evaluated
in terms of what a reasonable person would have been aware of without
regard to the defendant's actual awareness.
Both subjective and objective intent are often inferred from an
actor's conduct, 61 and a trial judge, if he accurately perceives the
relevant conduct, should have little difficulty in applying the objec-
tive test. If the mens rea requirement is subjective, however, the
potential ambiguity in the inference from conduct to actual intent may
preclude finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
with the requisite intent.62
Even if the judge properly perceives the contumacious conduct and
the objective mens rea standard applies, an evidentiary hearing may be
necessary to determine whether the defendant has the capacity to con-
form his conduct to accepted legal norms. In Panico v. United States,6-3
a criminal defendant had been convicted of criminal contempt pur-
suant to Rule 42(a) for his disruptive courtroom behavior. In a brief
per curiam opinion the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
held that Panico was entitled to a hearing on the question of his
criminal responsibility.64 The Court observed that there had been con-
flicting testimony on Panico's capacity to stand trial and that shortly
after the trial he had been committed to a mental hospital. 65
The mental capacity question in Panico and the perception and
mens rea problems discussed previously may arise infrequently.6"
60. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
61. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 202-03 (1972).
62. For example, it may not be clear whether an attorney engaged in overzealous
advocacy actually intends to misbehave in a manner that obstructs justice or is aware that
he is doing so. See Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 988 (1956) (inference of intent from attorney's conduct sufficient to support only one
of two charges of contempt).
63. 375 U.S. 29 (1963) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 30; accord, Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
65. 375 U.S. at 30. The trial judge had specifically found that Panico was sane at the
time of the contumacious conduct. United States v. Panico, 308 F.2d 125, 127 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 29 (1963) (per curiam).
66. An evidentiary hearing will seldom be necessary in a situation involving a witness's
refusal to obey a court order. Such cases are unlikely to present problems of perception,
intent, or mental capacity. But see United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (1973),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) (possible mental capacity defense is one reason for requiring
hearing in case involving recalcitrant witness).
In Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), the Court stated, as an argument for the
reversal of a recalcitrant grand jury witness's summary contempt conviction, that notice
and a hearing would have served "important ends" by allowing the witness to show "ex-
tenuating circumstances." Id. at 166. The only circumstance hypothesized by the Court,
however, was that the witness might have refused to answer because of fear. Id. Since fear
of reprisal is probably not a defense to a charge of contempt, Piemonte v. United States,
367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (dictum); United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (dictum), by establishing this fact, the defendant could only hope to
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When they do arise, however, they share one common characteristic:
they present a situation in which the trial judge's personal observation
of the contumacious conduct is not a completely satisfactory substitute
for an evidentiary hearing. Panico is the only Supreme Court case
holding-or even intimating-that a potential factual dispute may be
the sole basis for prohibiting summary punishment of contumacious
conduct that occurs in the actual presence of the judge. The reference
there to conflicting psychiatric testimony87 suggests that a defendant
must make some showing of the need for a hearing in order to avoid
summary punishment. The Court, however, did not indicate what type
of showing would be sufficient, nor did it indicate what, if any, other
types of factual disputes might be governed by Panico. Moreover, since
the Court based its holding only on the requirements of "the fair
administration of federal criminal justice," 68 it is unclear whether due
process would require the same result in a state court contempt pro-
ceeding.6 9
2. Legal Argument
Regardless of whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve
factual disputes in a particular case, the decision to invoke the summary
contempt power may raise important, unresolved legal issues. A major
shortcoming of the rationale that a judge's personal observation of
contumacious conduct obviates the need for notice and a hearing is its
failure to view the presentation of legal arguments as part of the hear-
ing process.
If a court order to testify is invalid, for example, because it violates
the witness's privilege against self-incrimination, 70 the refusal to answer
affect the severity of his sentence, see id., or perhaps to persuade the judge to exercise his
discretionary power to dismiss the contempt, see United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th
Cir. 1965); Kuhns, supra note 24, at 494-95. An opportunity for the defendant to speak in
mitigation following the summary conviction would be suffficient to protect these in-
terests. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506 n.11 (1972). Both Harris and his attorney
were given such an opportunity. 382 U.S. at 170 n.10 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court in
Harris would have presented a much stronger argument for a hearing if it had emphasized
the need to present legal arguments challenging the order to testify. See pp. 53-55 infra.
67. 375 U.S. at 30.
68. Id.
69. In the past the Court has sometimes first established a right under its supervisory
power over lower federal courts and later elevated that right to constitutional status. See
pp. 63-65 infra (discussion of embroilment doctrine). Compare Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966) (in dictum, Court gave federal criminal contemnors right to jury trial
under Court's supervisory power over lower federal courts) with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968) (Court made right to jury trial for criminal contemnors due process right under
Constitution).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Vol. 88: 39, 1978
Summary Contempt Power
is generally not contempt. 71 Establishing such a defense, however, may
require extensive research and involve intricate analysis.72 Although a
number of courts have been sensitive to this need in cases involving
recalcitrant grand jury witnesses,73 neither the majority nor the dis-
senting opinion in United States v. Wilson7 4 expressed concern that
71. The violation of a court order that is invalid may be punishable as contempt but
only if the court has jurisdiction to issue the order. See Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 313-19 (1967); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509-11 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). But see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147, 436 P.2d
273, 280, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 280 (1968) ("jurisdiction" includes not just personal and
subject matter jurisdiction but also constitutional provisions and rules developed by other
courts).
Courts have not been consistent in distinguishing between a void order, which the
court lacks jurisdiction to issue, and a voidable order, which, although invalid, may
support a contempt judgment. See Cox. The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 86 (1948); Rogers, The Elusive Search for the Void Injunction: Res Judicata
Principles in Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 49 B.U. L. REV. 251 (1969). Indeed, the
question whether a court order is void or merely voidable may itself present a sub-
stantial legal issue that justifies holding a hearing. See Kuhns, suPra note 24, at 504-10.
It is clear, however, that the refusal to testify based on a valid self-incrimination claim
cannot be punished as contempt. E.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). More-
over, in recalcitrant witness contempt cases, courts sometimes assume that the invalidity
of the court order is a defense to the charge without considering whether the order is
void or voidable. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
(reversal of contempt conviction because court order was based on evidence obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment); Kuhns, supra note 24, at 508 n.118.
72. Recently, courts and prosecutors have tended not to challenge a witness's Fifth
Amendment claim. Instead, the witness will be granted immunity. See, e.g., United States
v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 311-13 (1975); United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709, 711 (2d Cir.
1973). As a result, most controversies involving self-incrimination have centered on the
scope and validity of the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). See, e.g.,
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 384-85
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
Even if there is no question regarding the application or scope of immunity, a court
order to testify may raise other difficult legal issues. See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209
(9th Cir. 1977) (attorney-client privilege); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.
1975) (reporter's privilege); In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (Ist Cir. 1974) (marital privilege);
Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972) (sufficiency of government's denial
that grand jury questions were based on information from illegal wiretap).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1973) (in absence
of prior resolution of legal claims, witness should be given at least five days to prepare
for contempt adjudication involving issues of "some complexity," unless there is "com-
pelling reason" for shortening time); United States v. Curcio, 234 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir.
1956), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (noting that contemnor had opportunity
to present legal claims when judge was deciding whether to issue order to testify).
Curcio was a summary criminal contempt case decided before Harris v. United States,
382 U.S. 162 (1965), held that recalcitrant grand jury witnesses charged with criminal
contempt were entitled to the prior notice and hearing requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P.
42(b). Alter was a coercive civil contempt case, but the court held that the requirements of
Rule 42(b) were nonetheless applicable. Other courts have reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 545 F.2d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Sadin, 509
F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Jennings v. United States, 354 A.2d 855 (D.C.
1976) (Rule 42(b) hearing requirement applies only to criminal contempt).
For the distinction between criminal and coercive civil contempt, see pp. 81, 91 infra.
74. 421 U.S. 309 (1975). discussed at p. 44 supra & pp. 89-92 infra.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 39, 1978
the contemnors' request for a continuance to research the legality of
the court order 75 had been denied.
Similarly, courts have not recognized that presenting other types of
legal claims to the trial judge may be important in summary contempt
cases, even though there are a number of ambiguities in the existing
case law about the substantive scope of the contempt power. These
ambiguities include, for example, questions regarding the mens rea
requirement, 76 the relationship between perjury and contempt,7 7 the
power to punish symbolic acts78 such as refusing to rise at the opening
and closing of proceedings, 79 and the extent to which otherwise con-
tumacious conduct must actually obstruct the administration of
justice.80
75. Id. at 312 nA.
76. See pp. 48-51 supra.
77. Despite the fact that perjury can frustrate a proceeding as much as the refusal to
testify, see In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945), a number of courts have held that
perjury is not contempt unless it is accompanied by some further element of obstruction.
E.g., id.; see Dobbs, supra note 2, at 194-98. But the nature of this additional element is
by no means clear. Compare In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) with Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). Some courts have found the additional element of obstruction to
exist if a witness testifies "evasively," e.g., Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745, 751 (9th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d 880, 889
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 650 (1932), a result that is sometimes reached by equating
evasive testimony with a contumacious refusal to testify, see Collins v. United States, 269
F.2d at 750-51; cf. Haimsohn v. United States, 2 F.2d 441, 442 (6th Cir. 1924) (evasive
testimony by defendant supports contempt conviction for failure "to be examined accord-
ing to law" as required by Bankrupcy Act).
The distinction between evasion and mere perjury is not obvious, however. The
characterization of testimony as evasive is usually appended in a conclusory manner to a
quotation from the witness's testimony. The most that can be said is that "evsive"
testimony tends to fall into one of two categories: a witness's response that he does not
recall events that it seems unreasonable for him to have forgotten, see, e.g., Haimsohn v.
United States, 2 F.2d 441, 441-42 (6th Cir. 1924); United States v. Appel, 221 F. 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1913), or contradictory responses during a single course of questioning, see, e.g.,
Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745, 751 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960).
78. See Dobbs, suPra note 2, at 200-04.
79. Most courts have held that the refusal to rise is punishable as contempt. See note
34 supra (citing cases). But see United States v. Snyder, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (re-
fusal is not contempt); In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128, 139 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(only obstruction in case resulted from judge's insistence that contemnor rise). However.
they have differed in their reasons for reaching this conclusion. Compare note 34 supra
(citing cases) (refusal to rise is misconduct that obstructs justice within meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 401(1), quoted at p. 46 sutpra) with In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128, 133, 136 (7th
Cir. 1972) (refusal to rise may not constitute misbehavior that obstructs justice, but since
judge had specifically ordered contemnol to rise, refusal is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3),
quoted in note 29 supra).
80. The Supreme Court has reversed summary convictions for overzealous advocacy
and the use of insulting language, in part because it has concluded that the conduct was
not sufficiently obstructive to constitute contempt. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697,
698 (1974) (insulting language); In re Little, 406 U.S. 533, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (over-
zealous advocacy); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) (overzealous advocacy). In addition,
several circuits have held that misbehavior is not contempt within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 401(1) unless it obstructs justice. See In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949, 960 (2d Cir
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Most of these issues regarding the substantive scope of the contempt
power can be adequately resolved by appellate courts. In the absence
of some overriding necessity, however, a contemnor should not be
placed in the position of suffering a contempt conviction and possible
incarceration pending appeal without having had the opportunity to
address his legal claims to the trial court in the first instance.
3. Allocution
The right of an ordinary criminal defendant to address the court
prior to sentencing-the right to allocution-is firmly established.8' His
manifestation of contrition or suggestion of mitigating circumstances
may persuade the judge to impose a relatively lenient sentence.82 Even
if the defendant adamantly proclaims his innocence or his disdain for
1975); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999,
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But cf. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 764 (1929) ("The
reasonable tendency of the acts done is the proper criterion."); Froelich v. United States,
33 F.2d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1929) (it is sufficient if acts tend to obstruct justice). Although
the extent to which courtroom misbehavior is obstructive will be within the personal
knowledge of the trial judge, the substantive content of "obstruction," as the Seventh
Circuit has candidly admitted, is difficult to define. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345,
369-71 (7th Cir. 1972).
Section 401(3), which provides that the violation of a court order is contempt, makes no
reference to the potentially obstructive impact of the violation. Due process, however, may
require a finding of obstruction to support a summary convicton under this section. See
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498, 509 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 67 (1977) (actual obstruction of justice necessary to replace ordinary
constitutional procedures with summary ones; "deliberate disregard of seven direct and
explicit orders" by trial judge constitutes such obstruction); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973,
980-81 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974) ("[d]ue process requires ... some-
thing more serious than a minor disagreement" to uphold summary contempt citation
for transgressing order restricting scope of possible argument); cf. United States v. Wilson,
421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975) (summary conviction for refusals to testify in response to
court upheld; refusals characterized as "intentional obstructions of court proceedings
that literally disrupted the progress of the trial"); Edmunds v. Chang, 365 F. Supp. 941,
948 (D. Hawaii 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975) (summary punishment for refusal to obey order to sit down denied
contemnor due process because conduct was not obstructive, but unclear whether con-
duct would have been punishable after notice and hearing). But see United States v.
Martin, 525 F.2d 703, 708-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975) (since con-
tempt conviction for refusal to testify at trial was based on violation of § 401(3), finding
of obstruction not necessary; no discussion of whether contempt proceeding was sum-
mary); United States v. Scale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972) (suggestion that defiance
of court order after judge insists on compliance is obstruction per se).
81. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) ("Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address the de-
fendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and
to present any information in mitigation of punishment.") But cf. Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1962) (failure to afford right to defendant is not denial of due
process, at least in absence of showing that failure was prejudicial or not inadvertent). See
generally Barrett, Allocution (pts. 1-2), 9 Mo. L. REV. 115, 232 (1944).
82. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506 n.l1 (1972) ("[m]odification of contempt
penalties is common where the contemnor apologizes or presents matter in mitigation").
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the judicial system, the opportunity to make a public statement before
the trial court serves the important function of affirming his in-
dividuality and freedom of conscience. 3
Although the time taken by granting a summarily convicted con-
temnor the right to allocution would only slightly delay the imposition
of sentence, the necessity for immediate punishment that justifies denial
of notice and a hearing arguably may also require, 4 or at least permit,8s
the denial of this right. On the other hand, the fact that a contemnor
is denied a formal hearing that could establish mitigating circumstances
or even a complete defense augments his need for the minimal pro-
cedural safeguard of allocution.80 In Taylor v. Hayes, 7 the Supreme
Court held that when a summary contempt adjudication is delayed
until the end of a trial, the contemnor has the due process right "to be
heard in his own behalf."88 Weiss v. Burr,89 a Ninth Circuit case
decided one year before Taylor, extended this right to situations in
which the summary adjudication immediately follows the contumacious
incident but sentencing is delayed. The court, however, left open the
question whether the contemnor would have the right to allocution
if the trial judge acted immediately both to convict and to sentence the
contemnor.90 Dictum in United States v. Brannon,91 a Fifth Circuit
case, adopts the American Bar Association's recommendation that a
summarily convicted contemnor should always be afforded the right to
allocution.9
2
83. cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975) (defendant has right to refuse
counsel and defend himself though such course of action may be "ultimately to his own
detriment"); PoIster, The Dilemma of the Perjurious Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoid-
ance, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 3, 14 (1977) (rule permitting criminal defendant to testify
despite tactical advice of counsel would promote important value of client autonomy).
84. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309-10 (1888) (court "not bound to hear any
explanation of [defendant's] motives when satisfied that justice required immediate
action"); United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J., concurring
and dissenting). But see p. 57 infra.
85. See pp. 72-73 infra (absence of necessity for immediate punishment does not
make denial of all procedural safeguards guaranteed to ordinary criminal defendants
violative of due process; however, when summary adjudication delayed until end of trial,
contemnor has minimal due process right to allocution).
86. See Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 987-88 & n.28 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1161 (1974) (right to allocution not constitutionally guaranteed to ordinary criminal de-
fendant because he "has theretofore had a constitutionally guaranteed opportunity to
speak concerning his guilt or innocence either at the time he entered his guilty plea....
or at trial"; summarily convicted contemnor whose sentencing is dclayed, houccr, has
due process right to allocution).
87. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
88. Id. at 499; see p. 72 infra.
89. 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974).
90. Id. at 987-88.
91. 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 1249 (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FuNcrioN
OF THE TRIAL JUME § 7A (1972)).
56
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The Brannon dictum is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Ex parte Terry93 that a judge who immediately imposes sum-
mary punishment is "not bound to hear any explanation of [the con-
temnor's] motives."9 4 Terry's rejection of the right to allocution in this
situation, however, has been undermined by recent Supreme Court
cases stressing the importance of allocution in summary contempt ad-
judications. In Groppi v. Leslie,95 for example, the Court noted with
approval that even when a judge acts immediately to punish con-
tumacious conduct, it is customary to give the defendant the right to
allocution.96
At least some of the previously mentioned problems associated with
the denial of an adjudicatory hearing may be minimized if a summarily
convicted contemnor is given the right to allocution. Allocution, how-
ever, cannot fully remedy the inadequacies inherent in the denial of a
hearing. There may not be sufficient time to prepare legal defenses,
and the contemnor has no right to call or cross-examine witnesses.
Moreover, since the judge will be acting on the premise that the de-
fendant has already been convicted, he may be less inclined to consider
the merits of a contemnor's evidentiary or legal claims than he would
be in an adjudicatory hearing. To the extent that a judge considers
absence of contrition an aggravating factor in sentencing,97 protesta-
tions of innocence or claims of justification may be counterproductive
for the contemnor.
C. Right to Counsel
Gideon v. Wainwright s established that an ordinary criminal de-
fendant has the due process right to counsel whenever charged with a
serious offense, and Argersinger v. Hamlin99 extended this right to any
criminal defendant who is incarcerated, regardless of the seriousness of
the charge. The Supreme Court, however, has never specifically held
that a summarily convicted contemnor is entitled to counsel, nor has
93. 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
94. Id. at 309.
95. 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
96. Id. at 504-05 (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 613-14 (1960); Brown v.
United States, 359 U.S. 41, 52 (1959); United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.
1950), afl'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)); see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498 (1974) (quoting with
approval Groppi's observation that even in cases of immediate summary punishment de-
fendant is usually given right to allocution).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 687-88 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (judge
critical of defendant's lack of remorse); R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 175 (1969).
98. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
99. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
The Yale Law Journal
it repudiated its dictum in Cooke v. United States'00 that counsel is
unnecessary when the judge acts summarily to punish contempts that
occur in his presence.
If the contemnor is not allowed to participate in the summary pro-
ceedings, the Cooke dictum is sound simply because there is no role
for counsel to play. On the other hand, if the contemnor has the right
to challenge the legality of a court order,10 1 to raise the question of his
mental capacity, 02 or to make a statement prior to sentencing,'0 3 the
assistance of counsel may be necessary for the effective exercise of these
rights. Milempa v. Rhay10 4 held that an ordinary criminal defendant's
right to counsel extends to the sentencing proceeding. Since allocution
prior to sentencing may provide the only chance for a summarily con-
victed contemnor to defend himself, his need for counsel at this point
is arguably even greater than that of the ordinary criminal defendant.
Given the decision in Mempa and the Court's emphasis in Groppi
on the importance of allocution in summary contempt proceedings, 1'
it is unlikely that the Court would fully embrace the Cooke dictum. 0
However, even if summary contempts were treated like other criminal
proceedings for the purpose of determining the contemnor's right to
counsel, that right would probably not apply in every case. Bloom v.
Illinois1°7 held that the due process right to jury trial in criminal
prosecutions is applicable to criminal contempts, but, as Bloom
pointed out, this right does not extend to petty offenses.10 8 The prac-
100. 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925).
101. See pp. 52-54 supra.
102. See p. 51 supra.
103. See pp. 55-57 supra.
104. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
105. See p. 57 & note 96 suPra.
106. But see Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33-48 (1976) (no constitutional right to
counsel in summary court-martial proceedings, even though they may result in thirty days'
confinement at hard labor). Observing that summary court-martials are speedy, informal
proceedings where "ft]he presiding officer acts as judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and defense
counsel," id. at 32, the Court in Middendorf based its decision in part on the ground that
summary court-martials, unlike civilian criminal trials governed by Argersinger, are not
adversary proceedings. Id. at 40-42.
Although summary contempts may be no more adversarial than summary court-
martials, two factors emphasized by Middendorf suggest that it should have little bearing
on the counsel issue in summary contempt cases. First, unlike a contemnor, one charged
with a military offense may refuse a summary court-martial in favor of a general court-
martial where he may be represented by counsel. ld. at 46-47. Second, although Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), characterized a contempt as "a crime in every fundamental
respect," id. at 201, Middendor! found that the military community presents unique con-
siderations not applicable to due process analyses in a civilian context, and that most of
the conduct punishable by summary court-martial is not a "'crime in the civilian sense of
the word." 425 U.S. at 38-39.
107. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
108. Id. at 210; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968); District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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tical effect of Bloom is to limit the potential penalty for summarily
convicted contemnors to the maximum penalty for petty offenses, and
in several cases the Supreme Court has focused on six months' im-
prisonment as the dividing line between petty and nonpetty offenses. 109
As a result of this penalty limitation, summary contempts presumably
are not serious offenses within the meaning of Gideon. Rather, the
controlling case would be A rgersinger, which requires that one charged
with a nonserious offense be given the right to counsel only if he is
actually imprisoned for the offense."10
The more difficult question is whether all summarily convicted con-
temnors sentenced to imprisonment must be afforded the right to
counsel. Dissenting from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's affirma-
tive answer to this question in Commonwealth v. Crawford, 1 Justice
Nix argued" 2 that the relevant precedents were not Gideon and
Argersinger but Gagnon v. Scarpellil3 and Wolff v. McDonnell,"
4
cases setting forth the due process requirements for probation revoca-
tion and prison disciplinary proceedings. Although the Supreme Court
conceded that these proceedings may result in the loss of liberty within
the meaning of the due process clause,"15 it held that the need for
counsel should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis."16
The primary reason for taking a similar approach in summary con-
tempt proceedings is that the need for immediate punishment may
preclude affording the contemnor the full benefits of the right to
109. E.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); see 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976) (petty offense defined as one for which
maximum statutor penalty does not exceed six months' imprisonment or $500 fine, or
both). If the legislature has prescribed a maximum potential penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment, its judgment that the offense is not petty is controlling. If, as is
the case with the federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976), there is no prescribed
maximum penalty, the characterization of the offense as petty or not petty depends on
the sentence actually imposed. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1974);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968). In this latter type of situation, if an
initial sentence of more than six months' imprisonment is imposed, the offense becomes
petty if the trial judge subsequently reduces the sentence to six months or less. Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974), criticized in Comment, Right to Jury Trial in ContemlPt
Cases: A Critical View of the Sentence Aggregation Rules in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania and
Taylor v. Hayes, 70 Nw. U. L. Rav. 533, 557-58 (1975).
110. See p. 57 supra.
111. 466 Pa. 269, 352 A.2d 52 (1976); see Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 411
(5th Cir. 1965) (suggesting right to counsel should always be afforded).
112. 466 Pa. at 80-86, 352 A.2d at 58-61 (Nix, J., dissenting).
113. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
114. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
115. Id. at 556-58; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
116. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973). For a response to Justice Nix's reliance on Wolff and Gagnon, see Common-
wealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269, 273-76, 352 A.2d 52, 55-56 (1974) (Eagen, J., concurring).
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counsel. It may not be possible to appoint counsel immediately for an
indigent defendant. Even if counsel is available in the courtroom, the
right to counsel for nonindigents includes the right to an attorney of
one's choice."l7 More importantly, the right to counsel includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel. 118 The necessity for summary
action, however, may preclude affording the attorney an adequate op-
portunity to prepare his case.
On the other hand, there are two inherent disadvantages in a flexible
approach to the counsel question. First, in every case in which the con-
temnor is denied counsel, he has a possible basis for appellate reversal
of his conviction. 119 Because there are relatively few summary con-
tempt convictions, 20 the potential burden on appellate courts from
litigation of this issue should not be substantial. The percentage of
reversals, however, may be high. Once a trial judge has decided to take
the extraordinary step of imposing criminal punishment without notice
and hearing, he is unlikely to perceive any need to permit counsel to
challenge his decision. In contrast, an appellate court, focusing on
Bloom's characterization of criminal contempt as a crime "in every
fundamental respect' 2 ' and Mempa's extension of the right to counsel
to sentencing, may be more willing to assume that counsel could have
been helpful to the contemnor.' 22
Regardless of how sensitive appellate courts are to the counsel
117. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). On the question whether indigents
should be entitled to the appointment of counsel of their choice, see Tague, An In-
digent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1974); 62 CALIF. L
REv. 512, 512-21 (1974).
118. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
119. The Supreme Court initially adopted a flexible rule for determining whether a
state criminal defendant charged with a serious offense had a due process right to counsel.
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Concurring in the decision to overrule Belts in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Justice Harlan observed:
In the first decade after Betts, there were cases in which the Court found special
circumstances [that would require the appointment of counsel] to be lacking, but
usually by a sharply divided vote. However, no such decision has been cited to us, and
I have found none, after... 1950. At the same time, there have been not a few cases
in which special circumstances were found ....
Id. at 350-51.
120. One study reports that in both state and federal courts between 1960 and 1972
there were only 72 summary contempt cases disposed of with published opinions. N.
DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 233-34. Apparently the survey was limited to
reported cases involving some form of disruptive behavior. The list of cases, id. at 416-17,
does not include, for example, Harris v. United States. 382 U.S. 162 (1965), discussed at
pp. 42-43 supra, or United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967), another recal-
citrant-witness contempt case. There are, however, relatively few recalcitrant witness cases
in any single jurisdiction. See Kuhns, suPra note 24, at 312-13 & nn.134-35.
121. 391 U.S. at 194, 201.
122. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351-52 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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issue, the second difficulty inherent in the flexible counsel rule is that
the need for counsel may not be apparent unless the defendant is
actually represented by counsel. For example, the trial judge may have
interpreted the offense as requiring a lesser degree of mens rea or ob-
struction than an appellate court would require.12 3 Counsel could
have raised these issues before the trial judge and perhaps even con-
vinced him that there was a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt under the proper standard. A counselless contemnor, however,
may be unaware of the issues, and a trial judge is not likely to articulate
the precise legal standard he is using. 124 In such a case, unless the de-
fendant's conduct was so innocuous that it was clearly noncontumacious
under the proper standard, an appellate court presumably would affirm
the conviction without knowing that the trial judge had misapplied the
law or that counsel could have been of assistance in bringing this fact
to light.12
5
Gagnon acknowledged that this type of problem can arise under a
flexible counsel rule.1 26 The Court, however, rejected this as a suf-
ficient basis for adopting an absolute right to counsel because it viewed
the due process rights of a probationer as more limited than those of a
defendant in a criminal prosecution.12 7 The due process rights of a
summarily convicted contemnor are also more limited than those of an
ordinary criminal defendant, and the necessarily limited role that
counsel can play in summary contempt proceedings may minimize his
opportunity to suggest defenses that would not otherwise be apparent.
On the other hand, the absence of a hearing that might reveal possible
defenses arguably increases the need for ensuring that the contemnor's
limited rights be exercised as effectively as possible.
In weighing the inherent inadequacies of a flexible counsel rule
against the potential adverse impact of an absolute right to counsel on
the effective exercise of the summary contempt power, several factors
suggest that the absolute rule would be preferable. Although the need
for swift punishment may preclude affording counsel an adequate op-
portunity to prepare a defense, the right to effective assistance of
counsel in summary contempt proceedings need not be evaluated in
123. See pp. 50-51 supra (discussion of mens rea requirement); p. 54 & note 80 suPra
(discussion of obstruction requirement).
124. See p. 70 infra.
125. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269. 281 (1912) (burden of
showing unfairness of lower court holding is on appellant and unfairness must be
established "not as a matter of speculation but as demonstrable reality").
126. 411 U.S. at 789.
127. Id.
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terms of the assistance required in ordinary criminal prosecutions.
Rather, the contemnor could be given the maximum right to counsel
consistent with the time constraints imposed by the summary process.
This approach would avoid the difficulties inherent in trying to decide
whether counsel would have been helpful to the contemnor. Moreover,
since a summarily punishable contempt must occur in the actual
presence of the court, there will probably be few instances in which it
will be necessary to delay the proceedings in order to provide counsel
for the contemnor. If the contemnor is a party in an ongoing proceed-
ing, he will probably already be represented by counsel. Similarly, a
recalcitrant witness may have anticipated a possible contempt citation
and secured counsel to urge that his testimony may not be compelled.
In those cases in which a contemnor does not have counsel, there may
be an attorney in the courthouse who can quickly be appointed to
represent him. 28 Finally, in cases in which it is impossible to secure
counsel immediately, the court could still punish the contemnor im-
mediately as long as the sentence did not include incarceration.
12 -
D. A Fair Tribunal
The right to be judged by a fair and impartial tribunal is one of the
most basic elements of due process.'30 Yet there is a potential for bias
or at least the appearance of bias in every contempt proceedifig because
the judge is considering conduct that allegedly constitutes an affront
to the institution he represents, if not to himself personally. As the
Supreme Court observed in Bloom v. Illinois:
Contemptuous conduct . . . often strikes at the most vulnerable
and human qualities of a judge's temperament. Even where the
contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequent-
ly represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference
with the judicial process or with the duties of officers of the
court.
13 1
128. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231, 1232 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd 421
U.S. 309 (1975) (lawyer present in courtroom attempted to represent defendant whose
counsel was absent).
129. See, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (contempt punished by fine);
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (contempt punished by probation).
The subsequent analysis will suggest that a trial court never need and never should
resort to summary penalties other than removal or incarceration to commence immediately
and to be served even when the court is in session. See pp. 85-86 & note 329 infra. Thus
in those cases in which it is not possible to provide counsel immediately for the con-
temnor, one would have to decide whether to forego summary punishment or to create a
limited exception to an otherwise absolute right to counsel rulc. This analysis, see p. 71
infra, suggests that such an exception may be appropriate.
130. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
131. 391 U.S. at 202.
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In nonsummary contempt cases, this problem can be minimized by
affording the contemnor the right to a jury trial before a judge who
had no actual involvement in the contumacious episode. In summary
contempt proceedings, however, the only checks against the judge's
potential bias are his own objectivity and careful appellate review. 132
Since only a judge who personally observes contumacious conduct can
punish it without notice and a hearing,13 3 any further guarantee of a
fair tribunal must come at the expense of the summary contempt
power.
In Sacher v. United States'3 4 a trial judge had summarily held several
attorneys in contempt at the conclusion of a long, bitter trial. 35 The
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, despite the fact that both the
contemnors' verbal attacks on the judge and his responses demon-
strated the judge's potential, if not actual, bias.'36 Only two years later
in Offutt v. United States,13 7 however, the Court relied on its super-
visory authority over lower federal courts 38 to reverse an attorney's
summary contempt conviction that had been imposed under similar
circumstances.' 3 9 Offutt characterized the trial judge as having "per-
mitted himself to become personally embroiled in the controversy,"
140
and emphasized that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'1
41
Two subsequent cases involving summary contempt judgments im-
posed at the end of a trial, Taylor v. Hayes'42 and Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania,43 held that due process considerations require adher-
ence to Offutt in state contempt proceedings. According to Taylor,
the inquiry must be "not only whether there was actual bias ... but
132. Appellate review may not always be an effective guard against judicial bias. See
p. 70 infra.
133. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
134. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
135. The trial involved alleged Smith Act violations by Communist Party leaders. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
136. See 343 U.S. at 33-39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 42-89 (appendix to dissent-
ing opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The majority did not specifically refute Justice Frank-
furter's characterization of the proceedings as demonstrating actual or potential judicial
bias. Rather, they began with the premise, conceded by the contemnors, that the trial
judge could have acted immediately after each contumacious episode to punish the de-
fendants. Id. at 7. The majority reasoned that merely delaying the summary adjudication
until after the trial could not prejudice the contemnors. Indeed, they suggested that delay
was desirable because the judge would not be as likely to be "smarting under the irritation
of the contemptuous act." Id. at 10-11.
137. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
138. See note 69 supra.
139. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented in Sacher, wrote the opinion for the Court, but
Offult did not specifically overrule Sacher.
140. 348 U.S. at 17.
141. Id. at 14.
142. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
143. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
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also whether there was such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of
bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating
the interests of the court and the interest of the accused."'144 This con-
cern with the appearance of fairness provides a sound theoretical basis
for prohibiting a potentially biased judge from convicting a contemnor,
but the manifestations of potential bias will vary in each instance.
Thus the Court's after-the-fact finding of embroilment in some cases
will be of limited assistance in dealing with others. 14
5
Indeed it may be impossible to formulate a generally applicable def-
inition of embroilment. As the Court in Offutt observed, "[t]hese are
subtle matters . .. , for they concern the ingredients of what con-
stitutes justice."' 4" Nonetheless, the Court's current ad hoc approach
to the problem has several serious deficiencies.' 47 The very subtlety of
the issue makes it a difficult one to resolve even on a case-by-case basis
and, like the flexible counsel rule, the present approach creates a
potential basis for appellate reversal.' 4s Moreover, just as the need for
counsel may not be apparent to an appellate court, 49 the extent of a
judge's bias may not be apparent merely from the record of the pro-
144. 418 U.S. at 501.
Taylor based its finding of embroilment primarily on the judge's actions. In addition
to stressing his "mounting display of an unfavorable personal attitude" toward the con-
temnor, id., the Court pointed out that the judge refused to permit the contemnor
to speak in allocution, see pp. 55-57 supra, imposed a sentence of over four years' im-
prisonment, later disbarred the contemnor, and refused to grant him bail pending
appeal. 418 U.S. at 502. In contrast, the judge in Mayberry was not "an activist seek-
ing combat," 400 U.S. at 465. He had been continually subject to vulgar and degrading
epithets, however, and the Court concluded that "a judge [so] vilified . . . necessarily
becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy." Id.
145. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964), decided before Mayberry but cited with
approval in Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501, illustrates this problem. During the course of a
criminal trial, Ungar, a prosecution witness, repeatedly rephrased questions and offered
gratuitous remarks despite admonitions from the trial judge. At the conclusion of the
trial, the judge, after notice and a hearing, found Ungar guilty of criminal contempt. In
rejecting Ungar's claim that Offutt entitled him to a hearing before a different judge, a
majority of the Court concluded that the judge had not "become embroiled in intemperate
wrangling with the petitioner." 376 U.S. at 585 (citation omitted). On the other hand,
Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Black and Goldberg, concluded
that the judge had become personally embroiled in the controversy and that his bias was
"apparent on the face of the record." Id. at 593-601 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The exchanges between the judge and contemnor in Ungar were less vituperative than
those in Offutt, Mayberry, and Taylor, but one would be hard-pressed to devise a work-
able formula that would clearly distinguish Ungar from the other cases. Cf. Nilva v. United
States, 352 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1957) (judge does not have to disqualify himself when con-
tempt does not arise from statements offensive to judge personally); Fisher v. Pace, 336
U.S. 155, 158-59, 163 (1949) (trial judge's mildly provocative language did not excuse de-
fendant's contempt).
146. 348 U.S. at 14.
147. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Termn, 85 HARv. L. REv. 40, 297-300 (1971).
148. See p. 60 & note 119 supra.
149. See p. 61 supra.
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ceedings. 150 Finally, it hardly satisfies the "appearance of fairness" to
grant the right to trial before another judge to the most abusive con-
temnors, while denying the same right to those whose contumacious
conduct is less patently offensive. Recognizing these problems and
observing that inquiry into a judge's potential bias is "unseemly, as
well as a poor use of time," the Michigan Court of Appeals in People
v. Kurz 51 held that except when immediate action is necessary, a
contempt must be adjudicated by a judge other than the one initiating
the charge.1 5
2
The only potential disadvantage of Kurz is that it may encourage
some trial judges to avoid the necessity of a hearing before another
judge by punishing contempts that occur in their presence immediately.
Rejecting a rule on the unsubstantiated assumption that judges will
try to subvert it, however, is at least as unseemly as inquiring into a
judge's bias on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the Kurz rule is unlikely
to add substantially to the incentive that already exists for a judge to
act immediately. Under the Court's embroilment rule, a contempt
judgment may be less likely to be reversed if the trial judge im-
mediately punishes the contemnor. In Mayberry, where the finding of
potential bias was based almost exclusively on the contemnor's conduct
toward the trial judge, r 53 the Court stated that a judge "cannot be
driven out of a case," and that the judge there "could, with propriety,
have instantly acted, holding petitioner in contempt."'1 4 Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania'3 provides a further incentive for immediate action.
Codispoti held that if a judge delays the contempt adjudication until
the end of a trial, the aggregate sentence for multiple acts of contempt
cannot exceed the maximum penalty for a petty offense 0 unless the
contemnor is granted the right to a jury trial.157 The Court, however,
rejected the proposition that this same limitation should apply if the
150. See p. 70 infra.
151. 35 Mich. App. 643, 192 N.W.2d 594 (1971).
152. Id. at 660, 192 N.V.2d at 603; accord, Wrollen v. State, 86 N.M. 1, 518 P.2d 960
(1974).
153. See note 144 sura.
154. 400 U.S. at 463. Even if a judge decides to act instantly or if he has not become
personally embroiled in the controversy, other factors may disqualify him from ad-
judicating a contempt. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (per curiam) (judge
disqualified because of involvement with contemnor on matters not relating to con-
tempt); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge who acts as one-man grand jury
cannot subsequently hold witness in contempt for giving false and evasive answers before
that grand jury).
155. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
156. See pp. 58-59 sufbra.
157. 418 U.S. at 515-17.
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punishment is imposed immediately after each contumacious act.3 8
Regardless of whether Kurz or Mayberry and Codispoti actually
encourage it, some contempts are punished immediately, and, as the
Court pointed out in Sacher, the potential for bias is greatest when
the judge is "smarting under the irritation of the contemptuous
act."' 5 9 There is no way to eliminate this problem without abolishing
the summary contempt power. The problem can be minimized, how-
ever, if the exercise of the power is strictly limited to those situations
in which immediate punishment serves some overriding purpose. The
analysis in Parts II and III will suggest that the likelihood of bias is
least in cases in which the need for immediate action is the greatest. 00
E. Substitutes for Procedural Regularity
The potential for judicial bias, the broad substantive definition of
contempt, and the absence of procedural safeguards available in
ordinary criminal prosecutions all contribute to the possibility that
the contempt power may be abused. The Supreme Court has frequently
acknowledged this possibility in both summary'' and nonsummary "
contempt cases, and from time to time has imposed limitations on the
contempt power that are designed to minimize its abuse., 3 This sec-
tion focuses on restrictions that tend to compensate for the absence of
procedural safeguards in summary contempt adjudications.
1. Penalty Limitation
The Supreme Court has characterized the right to a jury trial in
criminal cases as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge."'164 When it extended this right to criminal contemnors in
Bloom v. Illinois,10 the Court acknowledged the possibility of judicial
158. Id. at 517. For criticism of the Court's refusal to extend contemnors the right to
jury trial in this type of situation, see Note, Direct Criminal Contempt: An Analysis of
Due Process and Jury Trial Rights, 11 NEw ENG. L. REV. 77, 93-95 (1975); Comment, suPra
note 109, at 547-50.
159. 343 U.S. at 11.
160. See pp. 96-97 infra.
161. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975); Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888).
162. E.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227
(1945).
163. E.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), discussed at pp. 42-43 sutra;
In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945), discussed in note 180 infra; Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33 (1941), discussed in note 31 supra.
164. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
165. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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bias in all contempt proceedings 160 and specifically refused to exempt
summary contempts from the jury trial requirements. 10 The precedent
for the petty offense exception to the jury trial right'01 permitted the
Court to take this step without abolishing the summary contempt
power, but, as noted previously,'09 the effect of Bloom is to limit the
maximum incarceration after summary conviction to six months. Al-
though this limitation does not minimize the potential for bias, it at
least ensures that a contemnor will not suffer a serious penalty 70
without having been afforded the opportunity for a jury trial.
2. Substantive Limitations
In at least one case, In re Little,'7' the Supreme Court imposed a
substantive limitation on the contempt power when it would have been
preferable to dispose of the case on procedural grounds. 172 Little, the
defendant in a criminal trial, proceeded to represent himself after the
trial judge denied a motion for a continuance based on the fact that
Little's counsel was presently engaged in another trial. In his closing
argument, Little, claiming that he was a political prisoner, referred to
166. Id. at 202.
167. Id. at 209-10 (dictum).
168. See p. 59 & note 108 supra.
169. See p. 60 supra.
170. But see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (criminal contempt fine of $10,000
imposed against labor union proper despite denial of jury trial). Muniz is the only case
in which the Court has considered the circumstances under which i fine may render a
criminal contempt nonpetty and thereby require that the contemnor be afforded tile right
to a jury trial. Reasoning that a $10,000 fine is not necessarily a serious penalty for a large
union or corporation, the Court rejected the contemnor's argument that any fine over
$500 should be regarded as nonpetty. Id. at 476-77. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its
position that 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976), defining a petty offense as one for which the penalty
does not exceed six months' imprisonment or $500 or both, is not controlling for con-
stitutional purposes.
Implicit in the Court's emphasis on the defendant's status as a large union, 422 U.S. at
477, is the proposition that a $10,000 fine imposed on an individual is not necessarily
nonpetty. The Court, however, did not indicate whether it would adopt a specific mone-
tary limit or consider the contemnor's wealth in deciding whether a fine imposed against
an individual defendant is petty or nonpetty. Two subsequent circuit court decisions have
adopted the former approach. Douglas v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (interpreting Muniz as limited to multimember organizations and holding that
individual contemnor cannot be fined more than S500 without having been afforded right
to jury trial); accord, Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d
123, 128 (4th Cir. 1977) (dictum). But cf. Girard v. Coins, 575 F.2d 160, 163-65 (8th Cir.
1978) (individual fined more than $500 not necessarily entitled to jury trial, but when
fines imposed against individual contemnors range from .$2,500 to $10,000, contempts are
serious offenses).
171. 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam).
172. The following textual discussion is also generally applicable to Eaton v. City of
Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974) (per curiam), if that is a summary contempt case. See notes 19
8, 43 supra.
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the court as prejudiced against him.1'7 3 The trial judge summarily held
him in contempt for these statements. In a brief per curiam opinion
the Supreme Court held that "in the context of this case petitioner's
statements did not constitute criminal contempt."'174 The Court anal-
ogized the situation in Little to that in In re McConnell, 75 a case in
which it had held that an attorney's unfulfilled threat to continue a
line of questioning "unless some bailiff stops us"'176 did not constitute
contempt.1'7
7
The difficulty with relying on McConnell is that there the Court
was interpreting the scope of the federal contempt statute.' s7 In con-
trast, Little was a state contempt conviction. Unless the conviction
was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court should have been bound by
the state court's interpretation of its contempt power. Ensuring effective
advocacy may require some substantive due process restrictions on the
scope of contempt power, but the limited record available to an ap-
pellate court reviewing a summary contempt conviction hardly pre-
sents an adequate basis for imposing these restrictions. As Chief Justice
Burger observed in his Little concurrence:
A contempt holding depends in a very special way on the setting,
and such elusive factors as the tone of voice, the facial expressions,
and the physical gestures of the contemnor; these cannot be dealt
with except on full ventilation of the facts. Those present often
have a totally different impression of the events from what would
appear even in a faithful transcript of the record.'79
The transcript of the hearing on a contempt charge may elaborate on
these matters and give an appellate court a better basis for evaluating
the contemnor's conduct. Also, more detailed development of the
relevant events at the hearing would provide an appellate court with
173. 404 U.S. at 554.
174. Id. at 555.
175. 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
176. id. at 235.
177. Id. at 233-34. The Court held that the conduct was not proscribed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(1) (1976), set forth at p. 46 suPra, because it was not sufficiently disruptive to
constitute an obstruction of justice. 370 U.S. at 235-36.
178. In Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965), also relied on in Little, 404 U.S. at 556,
two attorneys were summarily held in contempt by a state judge for charging in a change
of venue motion that the judge was biased and had harassed and intimidated them. In
reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court noted that it was not improper to charge
bias in such a motion and that the words used were "in no way offensive in themselves,
and wholly appropriate to charge bias." 381 U.S. at 137. The Court, however, left open the
question whether the charges of bias, if proven to be false in an adjudicatory hearing,
could be punished as contempt. Id.
179. 404 U.S. at 556 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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an opportunity to focus specifically on the facts that justify or prohibit
treating the conduct as contempt. Even if a transcript of the contempt
hearing does nothing more than present a reviewing court with con-
flicting testimony about tone of voice, facial expressions, and physical
gestures, the contemnor will at least have had the opportunity to have
these "elusive factors" evaluated in an adjudicatory hearing. These
benefits could have been achieved and the contemnor's interest
adequately protected in Little if the Court had held, not that Little's




To facilitate appellate review,181 which is the most important exist-
ing safeguard against abuse of the summary contempt power, 8 2 most
180. A somewhat different but equally troublesome problem is presented by the
Supreme Court's explicit reliance on a procedural ground in In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224
(1945), to hold that perjury is not within the substantive scope of the federal contempt
statute. Although the contemnor had been granted a hearing, the case arose prior to
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), and the Court focused on the absence of jury trials
in contempt proceedings as the primary motivation for its holding, 326 U.S. at 227. Un-
less Bloom undermines Michael, it would seem to follow from the Court's jury trial
rationale that conduct proscribed by other criminal statutes should not be punishable as
contempt. The Court has never questioned Michael, however, nor has it extended the
jury trial rationale to other cases. Indeed, the proposition that conduct proscribed by
other criminal statutes can be treated as contempt is well-established. See, e.g., Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 173 (1956) (dictum) (noting passage of legislation specifying
that contempt sanctions as well as criminal sanctions can be applied to those who violate
surrender orders); United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000, 1001-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(summary contempt conviction for throwing water pitcher at prosecutor during trial for
robbery did not bar subsequent prosecution for assault with deadly weapon); United
States v. Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967)
(criminal contempt conviction for violation of securities laws after being enjoined from
further violations); 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1976) (contempt includes violations of criminal laws).
Although not articulated by the Court, there is a viable substantive basis for distinguish-
ing Michael from at least some other situations where conduct is both contumacious and
violative of an ordinary criminal statute. For example, in United States v. Rollerson,
449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where a criminal defendant was convicted of both contempt
and assault for throwing a water pitcher at the prosecutor, it is arguably appropriate to
view the contempt penalty as punishment for disrupting a judicial proceeding and the
assault penalty as punishment for attempting to cause personal injury to another in-
dividual. See id. at 1001, 1004; United States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). But see note 418 inIra. In contrast, contempt and perjury both serve the same gen-
eral purpose-proscription of activity that obstructs the administration of justice. Thus it
is unnecessary to resort to the contempt sanction to ensure the existence of a remedy
designed to punish the obstruction.
181. For a discussion of whether a summarily convicted contemnor has or should have
an absolute right to appellate review, see pp. 118-119 infra.
182. On several occasions the Supreme Court has suggested that appellate review is
an adequate safeguard. E.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) ("summary
convictions during trial that are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to
appellate review"); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1954) ("it is to be doubted
whether the profession will be greatly terrorized by punishment of some of its members
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jurisdictions require that the trial judge recite the relevant facts and
certify that he observed them in open court.8 3 Although the Supreme
Court has never held that due process considerations require such a
recitation, courts generally demand strict compliance with the recita-
tion requirement.18 4 Regardless of how rigorously the requirement is
enforced, however, appellate review cannot be an adequate substitute
for procedural protections in a summary contempt adjudication. First,
the accuracy of the judge's perceptions cannot be tested.'8s Second,
appellate courts tend to be primarily concerned with receiving a de-
tailed statement of the facts constituting the contempt.8 6 They may
not require, and the trial court judgment is not likely to contain, an
explicit statement of the legal standard for obstruction or mens rea
applied by the trial judge. 8 7 Third, as Chief Justice Burger observed
in Little, whether conduct constitutes contempt may depend on such
elusive factors as the contemnor's tone of voice or his physical ges-
tures.18 8 Since a transcript will be of little, if any, help in assessing these
factors, an appellate court must ultimately rely on the trial judge's
characterization of the events. There is no guarantee, however, that the
trial judge has been objective. Indeed, there is an inherent potential
for judicial bias,' 89 but unless the transcript happens to reveal that the
judge has become personally embroiled in the controversy, an ap-
pellate court will have no basis for assessing his objectivity. 190
II. The Need for Summary Punishment: The Pre-Wilson Case Law
Necessity can be both the justification for and a limitation on the
exercise of criminal contempt power. The need for immediate punish-
after . . . extended and detached consideration" by appellate courts); see AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS o, DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 13 (1970) (expression of confidence in appellate review as safeguard) [hereinafter
cited as TRIAL REPORT].
183. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1211 (West 1972); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1971); Pietsch v.
President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920
(1971); Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F.2d 843, 845 (3rd Cir. 1965).
185. See p. 50 & notes 53-54 suipra (even simple events can be misperceived).
186. See note 184 supra (citing cases).
187. Since the statutory requirement is usually only that of a statement of the facts,
the need for a specification of legal standards is usually not mentioned by courts or
commentators. See, e.g., Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1161 (1974); 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, 350-51.
188. See p. 68 & note 179 supra.
189. See pp. 62-63 supra.
190. To the extent that summary punishment is based on the need for immediate
action, see pp. 71-87 infra, reliance on appellate review to curb abuses of the con-
tempt power presents an additional problem. "The assumption that an appeal will be
taken contradicts the assumption that summary determination is essential." Hazard, Book
Review, 80 YALE L.J. 433, 439 (1970) (review and criticism of TRIAL LAWYEvRS REPORT, sItPra
note 182).
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ment in a particular case may outweigh the disadvantages of denying
notice and a hearing.191 On the other hand, the mere fact that the judge
personally observed the contumacious conduct should not be a suf-
ficient justification for summary punishment. The Supreme Court has
often stated that the contempt power should be limited to "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."' 192 It has relied on this
standard both to impose substantive limits on the contempt power 93
and to require notice and a hearing when the need for immediate
punishment is absent. 94 The Court, however, has not always dealt
satisfactorily with the relationship between necessity and summary
action. Nor has it carefully considered the type of necessity that should
justify summary punishment. The analysis in this part explores the
manner in which the Court has dealt with these problems in cases prior
to United States v. Wilson.1
95
A. The Relationship Between Necessity and Summary Action
There are two basic approaches in considering the extent to which
necessity justifies depriving a contemnor of procedural safeguards that
would be available to an ordinary criminal defendant. First, relying on
Bloom's characterization of criminal contempt as "a crime in every
fundamental respect,"' 90 one could begin with the premise that pro-
cedural regularity is the norm. Under this approach it would be proper
to deny a contemnor a particular procedural safeguard only if the
denial were necessary to avoid frustrating the objective that justifies
summary punishment. For example, the need for immediate incarcera-
tion might require that counsel be denied an adequate opportunity
to prepare a defense or even that the right to counsel be denied al-
together, if none were readily available.197 The mere fact that the
proceedings were in some respects summary, however, would not justify
departing from Argersinger's requirement that all persons sentenced
to prison are entitled to counsel. 98
Alternatively, one could view necessity as a general justification for
191. See pp. 92-97 infra.
192. The Court first used this phrase in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
231 (1821), a case dealing with the congressional contempt power. For references to the
"least possible power" doctine in judicial contempt cases, see, e.g., United States v. Wilson,
421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975); notes 193 & 194 infra (citing cases).
193. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945), discussed in note 180 si'Pra.
194. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965), discussed at pp. 42-43 supra.
195. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
196. 391 U.S. at 201.
197. See note 129 supra.
198. See p. 57 supra.
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summary action. Once the condition of necessity had been established,
the question would not be whether the denial of a particular pro-
cedural right is necessary, but rather what procedural protections are
essential to protect the contemnor's interests in an admittedly sui
generis o9 summary proceeding. For example, if counsel would not ap-
pear to be of value in a particular case or in summary contempt cases
generally, this would be a sufficient reason for denying that right.200
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Hayes201 adopted the latter ap-
proach for the purpose of determining due process limitations on the
summary contempt power. 02 The contemnor, an attorney, was sum-
marily held in contempt at the conclusion of a trial for his conduct
during the trial. The Court assumed that he, like the attorneys in
Sacher v. United States,203 could have been summarily convicted after
each incident of misconduct, but unlike Sacher, Taylor recognized that
"the usual justification of necessity . . . is not nearly so cogent when
final adjudication and sentence are postponed until after trial.112 0 4
Taylor held that the contemnor was entitled as a matter of due process
to "reasonable notice of the specific charges and an opportunity to be
heard in his own behalf." 20 5 The opportunity to be heard granted in
Taylor, however, may be nothing more than the right to allocution,
which had been denied by the trial judge in that case.20 The Court
emphasized that it was dealing only with "elementary due piocess pro-
tections," 20 7 and observed that a "full scale trial" might not be appro-
priate.20 8 Indeed, without specifically considering whether necessity
demanded any curtailment of the contemnor's procedural rights,200
199. See p. 41 & note 3 supra (citing cases).
200. Even if necessity is viewed as only a general justifying principle for summary
action, a rule mandating counsel in all cases where the contemnor is imprisoned would
be desirable for other reasons. See pp. 60-62 suPra.
201. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
202. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), appeared to take the former approach.
There the Court emphasized the lack of necessity for summarily punishing a recalcitrant
grand jury witness as the primary basis for requiring notice and a hearing under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 42(b), 382 U.S. at 164-65, even though there is likely to be little need in such a
case for the type of evidentiary hearing that the Court contemplated, see note 66 supra.
Harris, however, was based on the Court's interpretation of Rule 42, not due process. See
382 U.S. at 164-65.
203. 343 U.S. 1 (1952), discussed at p. 63 suPra.
204. 418 U.S. at 499.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 497.
207. Id. at 500 n.9.
208. Id. at 499.
209. Taylor offered only two reasons for not granting the contemnor a full-scale trial.
First, the Court observed that "[u~sually, the events have occurred before the judge's own
eyes, and a reporter's transcript is available." Id. at 499. These circumstances, however, do
not even obviate the need for an adjudicatory hearing, see pp. 49-55 supra, much less
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the Court rejected the suggestion that it was repudiating Sacher's
approval of post-trial summary contempt adjudications.10
The Taylor approach to the due process issue is unsatisfactory for
several reasons. In addition to being inconsistent with Bloom's
acknowledgment that criminal contempt is "a crime in every funda-
mental respect," 211 it ignores Bloom's recognition that the potential
for abuse of the contempt power creates a greater need for procedural
safeguards in contempt proceedings than in ordinary criminal prosecu-
tions.212 Although nothing prevents the trial judge from responding
to this problem by affording the contemnor additional procedural
safeguards not required by due process, reliance on the judge to
mitigate his own potential bias is hardly an adequate protection for
the contemnor. Moreover, in the absence of an affirmative constitu-
tional requirement of procedural regularity if summary action is not
necessary, even an unbiased trial judge may not appreciate the im-
portance of extending procedural protections to a contemnor. After
observing the contemnor's conduct and deciding that it warrants pun-
ishment, a judge is probably unlikely to question his own perceptions,
to recognize potential legal issues regarding the scope of the contempt
power, or to see the need to provide the contemnor with counsel.
Finally, unnecessary denial of procedural safeguards undermines the
very purpose for which the contempt power is exercised. The power
exists-indeed, is said to be essential-to maintain dignity and respect
for the courts.213 Dignity and respect, however, cannot be fostered by
the unnecessary curtailment of procedural rights. Rather, as Justice
Frankfurter observed in his Sacher dissent, "public respect for the...
judiciary is best enhanced ... by discouraging an assertion of power
which is not restricted by the usual demands of Due Process."214
provide a justification for dispensing with procedural regularity. Second, the Court noted
that immediate summary punishment is not to be encouraged, 418 U.S. at 500-01 n.9
(quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1952)), thereby implying that any
further restrictions on post-trial summary adjudications might encourage unwarranted
summary adjudications during trial. But see pp. 74-75 infra (this is not sufficient justifica-
tion for delaled summary punishment).
210. 418 U.S. at 500 n.9.
211. 391 U.S. at 201.
212. Id. at 202.
213. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
214. 343 U.S. at 41-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
208.09 (1968).
The deficiencies in the Taylor approach to the relationship between necessity and
summary action will also exist under the Bloom approach if courts are not careful to
ensure that the necessity for departing from procedural regularity actually exists in a
particular case. By the same token, the extent to which the Taylor approach will lead to
the unnecessary curtailment of procedural rights depends in large measure on how one
initially defines the necessity that justifies summary action. The proposition that necessity
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B. The Meaning of Necessity
Most summary contempt cases have involved disruptive or disrespect-
ful courtroom conduct,215 and prior to United States v. Wilson,210 the
Supreme Court focused exclusively on the need to maintain order as
the necessity that justifies summary punishment.217 This section ex-
amines the strength of that justification, first as it relates to the im-
position of summary punishment at the conclusion of a trial, and
second as it relates to the immediate imposition of a summary con-
tempt penalty.
1. Delayed Adjudication or Sentencing
The only justification offered by the Supreme Court for summary
adjudication at the conclusion of a trial is Sacher's suggestion that this
may restrain judges from acting immediately "while smarting under
the irritation of the contemptuous act."2-18 As was noted previously,
however, the Court's willingness to apply a stricter embroilment stan-
dard and its limitation on aggregating sentences in cases of delayed
adjudication already provide incentives for trial judges to punish im-
mediately. 21 9 In the absence of some compelling reason to believe that
the elimination of post-trial summary adjudication would substantially
increase the existing incentive for immediate punishment, 220 Sacher's
is only a general justifying principle for summary action implies that summary proceed-
ings may be appropriate regardless of whether necessity exists in a particular situation.
If the general justifying principle were found to exist only when the denial of an ad-
judicatory hearing is usually justifiable, the minimal rights extended to a contemnor
under the Taylor approach would tend not to constitute an unnecessary departure from
procedural regularity in most cases. See also p. 72 & note 200 supra (even if Taylor ap-
proach would not require affording contemnor right to counsel, this right should be
granted for other reasons).
215. See, e.g., notes 32-34 supra (citing cases).
216. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
217. E.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (dictum); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403
U.S. 212, 214 (1971) (dictum); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1971)
(dictum); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1965) (dictum); Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (dictum); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04 (1888). The
Supreme Court has not always demanded that this necessity exist. See Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), overruled, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164, 167 (1965).
218. 343 U.S. at 11.
The Court also observed that immediate adjudication would interrupt the ongoing
trial, ail,] tit ;umm:ar putnisliment of a contumacious attorney could leave the client
without representation. Even if only the adjudication were immediate, the Court pointed
out that the jurys knowledge of an attorney's contempt conviction could be prejudicial
to the client. Id. at 10. Although these are important reasons for foregoing immediate
punishment or adjudication, they are not justifications for delayed summary adjudication.
219. See pp. 65-66 supra.
220. Judges who prefer summary remedies for their own convenience might be
tempted to use immediate punishment after summary adjudication if the option of delayed
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judicial restraint argument is not a sufficient justification for de-
priving a contemnor of important procedural safeguards.221
In some cases a trial judge has acted immediately to adjudicate an
individual in contempt but then deferred imposition of the sentence
until the conclusion of a trial..2 22 As in the case of delayed adjudication,
the delay in sentencing demonstrates the absence of any necessity for
immediate punishment, but immediate adjudication coupled with the
certainty of subsequent punishment may deter an individual from
summary adjudication were removed. But this temptation will present a substantial
danger only if, as is presently the case, the concept of necessity does not limit the scope
of the summary contempt power to cases in which there is an overriding need for im-
mediate punishment. See pp. 76, 85-86 infra (despite current law, no need exists for im-
mediate punishment to deal with disruptive courtroom behavior). If the necessity that
initially justifies summary action were defined as suggested in Part III of this article,
see pp. 97-100 infra, the danger that eliminating post-trial summary adjudication would
result in unwarranted immediate summary adjudication and punishment would be sub-
stantially averted.
221. The only other "justification" for summary adjudication at the conclusion of a
trial would be to view the denial of procedural safeguards as a necessary punishment for
the contemnor's activity. See Harper & Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60
YALE L.J. 1, 39-41 (1951). The only penal objectives that could be served by summary
adjudication at this time, however, are retribution and deterrence of future misconduct
by the defendant and others. These objectives could adequately be served by a more severe
penalty imposed after a full adjudicatory hearing. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,
37 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 235. In-
deed, to the extent that unnecessary summary action contributes to disrespect for the
judiciary, see Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1954), summary adjudication at
the conclusion of the trial may undermine the deterrence objective. Moreover, if the denial
of procedural safeguards is a legitimate form of punishment, it would seem to follow that
the more serious the offense, the greater the justification for summary action. But "due
process of law has always tended in the other direction: the more serious the crime charged,
the more reason for making sure through meticulous judicial safeguards . . . that no
mistake is ultimately made." Harper & Haber, supra, at 41.
Despite the absence of necessity for summary adjudication at the conclusion of a trial,
the Supreme Court has made only two limited concessions to contemnors' interests in
procedural safeguards when adjudication is delayed until that time. Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488 (1974), ensures that the contemnor will have at least the rights to notice and
allocution, id. at 498-500 & n.9, and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), sug-
gests that the standard for determining whether the judge has become personally em-
broiled in the controversy may be more rigorously applied, id. at 463-64.
222. See Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161
(1974); MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 159 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
953 (1952). The due process right to allocution when summary adjudication is delayed
until the end of trial, see p. 72 supra; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-500 &- n.9
(1974), may not be applicable when only the sentencing is delayed. In Taylor, although the
trial judge characterized tile conduct as contumacious immediately after each disruptive
incident, id. at 490 & n.l, the Supreme Court couched its holding in terms of delayed ad-
judication, id. at 497 ("[I]t does not appear to us that any final adjudication of contempt
was entered until after the verdict [in the main trial] was ieturned.") Cf. Weiss v. Burr,
484 F.2d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974) (dictum) (strict embroil-
ment standard articulated in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), for cases of
delayed adjudication is not applicable to cases in which judge adjudicates contempt im-
mediately but defers sentencing).
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engaging in further contumacious activity during the trial.22 3 This
deterrence, however, can be achieved without the disadvantages of
summary adjudication. The threat of future punishment inherent in
a formal charge of contempt to be adjudicated at a later hearing would
be an equally effective deterrent if the severity of the threatened sen-
tence were sufficient to compensate for the risk that the contemnor may
be acquitted.
224
There are two potential disadvantages to relying on the threat of a
subsequent conviction as an alternative to summary adjudication for
preventing continued misconduct. First, in some instances the severity
of the threatened future sentence may not adequately compensate for
the contemnor's assessment of the likelihood of a subsequent acquittal.
When this occurs, the certainty of some punishment as a result of
summary adjudication may be a more effective deterrent. This justifica-
tion for summary adjudication, however, rests on the probably un-
realistic premise that judges can distinguish such a case from one in
which the contemnor is unwilling to alter his behavior regardless of
the consequences. 225 Moreover, there is no guarantee that summary
adjudication would be invoked only when the judge believes that it
would be a more effective deterrent than the threat of subsequent
adjudication. Indeed, the contrary is likely. The history of the sum-
mary contempt power is one of abuse, not of judicial restraint.2 2 The
223. See Harper & Haber, supra note 221, at 30. But see Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 449, 467 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (summary punishment not very useful in de-
terring one "bent on frustrating the particular trial or undermining the processes of
justice"; summary removal may be "the really effective remedy"). The interest in prevent-
ing continued misconduct may be especially acute when the contemnor is a litigant or
attorney whose removal would have substantial disadvantages. See pp. 84-85 infra.
224. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 235; Hazard, supra note 190, at 443.
225. Requiring trial judges to charge an individual with contempt before resorting to
summary adjudication would establish whether the threat of a future conviction would be
effective. Many people who would not be deterred by a formal charge of contempt, how-
ever, probably would also not be deterred by immediate adjudication. See p. 85 infra
(attorney or litigant who wants to cause mistrial or create substantial delay not likely to
be deterred even by immediate imposition of fine or jail sentence to be served only while
court not in session); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
226. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the summary contempt
power is subject to abuse, see, e.g., note 202 supra (citing cases), and, like other appellate
courts, see, e.g., In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Marshall,
451 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1972), it has been sensitive to this problem, see pp. 42-44 supra.
Trial judges, however, frequently abuse the power. The Report of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York on courtroom disorder observed:
The power to punish summarily tends to lead to severe and arbitrary punishment ....
In our analysis of the published cases of summary contempt from 1960 to 1972 we
found that of a total of seventy-two cases where the trial judge imposed summary
punishment, forty (more than sixty percent) were later reversed by an appeals
court .... In many of these cases, the arbitrariness of the judge's action is obvious.
In a case involving members of the S.D.S. in Chicago, the judge held all sixteen de-
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potential for abuse more than offsets the added deterrence that sum-
mary adjudication might provide in other cases.
The second problem with relying on the threat of subsequent ad-
judication to deter continuing misbehavior is a concomitant of its
potential effectiveness. In the absence of summary adjudication, a
judge may threaten severe future penalties in order to minimize the
possibility that contemnors will risk future acquittal..2 27 In most cases
the threat is likely to be effective, but at least a few individuals will
probably continue their disruptive behavior. In these instances, the
judge will have to carry out his threat in order for it to have credibility
in other cases. If the resulting sentences are primarily a manifestation
of the judge's unfulfilled deterrent purpose and do not sufficiently take
into account the countervailing interest of every individual in personal
liberty, 228 they may be disproportionately severe.
2 29
An initial difficulty with this concern is that it is simply not clear to
what extent sentencing practices would be affected by the unavail-
ability of summary adjudication with delayed punishment. 230 Even if
disproportionately severe sentences would result, however, there are
fendants in contempt for laughing at one of his questions ("Who is in charge of the
S.D.S.?") and sentenced them to ten days in jail.
N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supia note 7, at 233-34.-In contrast to its documented abuses
of the summary contempt power, the Report found that "there is no serious quantitative
problem of disruption in American courts." Id. at 6. Moreover, the reported cases probably
do not fully indicate the extent to which the summary contempt power is abused. See
p. 79 & note 236 infra (possible chilling effect of threat to use summary contempt power).
227. Retaining the summary contempt power for its value in persuading individuals to
forego further disruptive behavior, of course, would not prevent judges from using the
potentially more effective method of threatening severe sentences following a subsequent
adjudication. Eliminating the possibility of summary adjudication, however, may en-
courage such action. See note 230 infra.
228. See H. PACKER, THE LIMirrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 64-66 (1968); Allen,
Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226,
229-30 (1959).
229. See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414-20 (1978) (discussion of
goals of punishment). The penalty may be disproportionate in relation to penalties for
similar and more serious crimes, see, e.g., People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 176-78, 194
N.W.2d 827, 831-32 (1972), or it may be disproportionate in relation to the nature of the
conduct without regard to penalties for other crimes, see, e.g., State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75,
80-83, 270 A.2d 1. 4-5 (1970). A court may consider both types of disproportionality in
reaching a decision. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 425-29, 503 P.2d 921, 930-33, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 226-29 (1972).
The courts in Lorentzen, Ward and Lynch held that the penalties were so dispropor-
tionately severe that they constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The discussion of
disproportionality in this article is not intended to suggest that disproportionately severe
post-hearing contempt sentences would necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Nonetheless, the problem of dispro-
portionality should be a serious concern.
230. Although judges have often delayed adjudication until the end of trial even in the
face of extreme misconduct, see note 237 infra (citing cases), there are relatively few re-
ported cases in sMhich a judge has summarily held a disruptive individual in contempt
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compelling reasons for not permitting summary adjudication. The
disproportionality may be a manifestation of the judge's overcompensa-
tion for the absence of summary adjudication, rather than his attempt
merely to provide a deterrent equivalent to immediate adjudication..
2 31
An adequate and direct response to this problem would be to alleviate
the disproportionality through appellate reduction of the sentences23-
2
or, if the problem were pervasive, through legislative action.2 33 On the
other hand, a threatened sentence that merely compensates for the
deterrence that would have been gained by immediate adjudication
may itself be disproportionately severe. Even if this is true of threatened
sentences designed to deter continued disruptive behavior,2 34 however,
the agregate unjustified deprivation of liberty resulting from the
during trial and delayed sentencing. Thus, to the extent that the reported cases are
representative of trial judges' actions, they suggest that the unavailability of immediate
adjudication with delayed punishment as a deterrent would not affect existing sentencing
practices. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that judges more often have used
the threat of summary punishment to deter continued misconduct, and this article
recommends that the summary contempt power should never be available to punish in-
dividuals who disrupt courtroom proceedings. See pp. 85-86 infra. In most cases a
threatened penalty following a subsequent adjudication should not have to be substantially
greater than a threatened summary penalty in order to have the same deterrent force. See
note 231 infra. But see note 234 infra (when minimally disruptive conduct is involved,
threatened post-hearing sentence may have to be increased to compensate for contemnor's
belief that judge will not follow through with hearing for minor infractions); Spears, In-
troduction to Myers, The Curtailment of the Contempt Power of the Federal Judiciary, 17
S. TEx. L.J. 1, 1-4 (1975) (Adrian A. Spears, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
Western District of Texas, perceives unavailability of summary adjudication option as
severe limitation on ability to control courtroom behavior).
231. In a case of serious disruption that is clearly contumacious, the chance of an
acquittal following a subsequent hearing is probably slight. Thus, a threatened one-year
scntence woultd probably have at least the equivalent deterrent impact of immediate ad-
judication that could rcsult in only six months' imprisonment. A judge, however, may
overcompensate for the absence of summary adjudication, for example, by threatening to
impose a ten-year sentence if the disruption continues and the contemnor is subsequently
convicted. A one-)ear sentence for serious courtroom misconduct may not be dispropor-
tionately severe, but the same is not likely to be true of a ten-year sentence. Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 (1976) (maximum penalty of .s5,000 fine and three years' imprisonment for assaulting
federal officer or employee; maximum of S10,000 fine and 10 years imprisonment for as-
sault with dangerous weapon); 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976) (maximum penalty of S300 fine and
one year's imprisonment for obstructing process server); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) (maximum
penalty of S500 fine and five years' imprisonment for threatening or influencing juror or
witness).
232. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that appellate courts can and should
reduce unduly sesere contempt sentences. See Chcff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380
(1966); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1956); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S.
258, 304-05 (1947).
233. On the question whether such legislative action would constitute an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the judiciary's inherent contempt power, see Kuhns, supra note
24, at 496-500.
234. This may be true, for example, in cases of minimally disruptive conduct that
would wariant only a small fine or a feu days' imlyrisonment. A threatened post-hearing
sentence would have to compenmsate both for the greater likelihood of acquittal since the
conduct is not as obxiously contumacious and for the posibility that a judge, lespite his
threat, may not deem tile conduct to be serious enough to warrant the time and expense of
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imposition of such sentences is not likely to be as great as the aggregate
unjustified deprivation of liberty resulting from the availability of sum-
mary adjudication. The ease with which the summary contempt power
can be invoked and the potential for judicial bias present a substantial
risk of unduly severe summary sentences and wrongful summary con-
victions. 235 Moreover, there is a danger that an overbearing judge will
use the easily fulfilled threat of summary conviction to stifle conduct
that is in fact not contumacious.2 30 To the extent that post-hearing sen-
tences with the equivalent deterrent force of immediate adjudication
may be disproportionately severe, the solution is not to permit an equal
or greater evil, but rather to give up some degree of potential deter-
rence by limiting the severity of sentences imposed after a subsequent
adjudication.
2. The Alternatives to Immediate Punishment
The fact that trial judges have frequently delayed summary punish-
ment even in the face of extremely disruptive conduct - 7 casts doubt on
the Supreme Court's repeated assertion that immediate punishment is
necessary to deal with courtroom disruption.238 Moreover, there are
alternatives available to the trial judge that eliminate the need for im-
mediate punishment in such cases. Illinois v. Allen,239 a case involving
a disruptive criminal defendant, approved, in addition to criminal con-
tempt,2 40 binding and gagging, coercive civil contempt, and removal
a full adjudicatory hearing. As a practical matter, in cases of relatively minor misbe-
havior the contemnor's belief that a judge will not want to bother with a full scale ad-
judicatory hearing may well be correct. See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for
Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 956, 964 (1931). Thus the elimination of summary adjudica-
tion is more likely to lead to a decrease in the ability to deter marginally contumacious
behavior rather than to disproportionately severe sentences for such conduct. This should
be regarded as a benefit, not a loss.
235. See note 226 supra. Even if a summary contempt judgment is reversed before a
contemnor seves his sentence, the stigma of a conviction and the necessity for devoting
time and resources to the appellate process constitute infringements on one's interest in
liberty.
236. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 199-200; Alschuler, Courtroom
Miiconduct by Prowicutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629, 729-34 (1972); Schwartz,
supra note 38, at 132, 135; Note, supra note 38, at 951.
237. See, e.g., Ma)b erry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 455-63 (1971); In re Dellinger,
461 F.2d 389, 391-92, 402-65 (7th Cir. 1972).
238. See p. 74 supra.
239. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
240. Justice Black, the author of the Court's opinion, in the past had paid lip service
to but never specifically endorsed the exercise of summary criminal contempt power. See,
e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-75 (1948). Whether Allen approves summary criminal
adjudication is not clear. Initially Justice Black suggested that "citing or threatening to
cite a contumaious deftndant for criminal contempt might in itsclf he sufficient to make
a defendant stop interrupting a trial." 397 U.S. at 345. l'his statement appears to con-
temlate, oir at least is not inconsistent with, the view that the judge may formally charge
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from the courtroom. 241 Moreover, A len made it clear that these op-
tions were not exclusive and stressed that trial judges "must be given
sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. 2 42 The
following analysis explores the alternatives for dealing with disruptive
behavior and suggests that one of them-removal from the courtroom-
is always preferable to summary criminal punishment.
a. Binding and Gagging
As Allen recognized, binding and gagging has substantial disad-
vantages: it may prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury, and
the sight of a bound and gagged defendant is itself an affront to the
dignity of the court.243 Moreover, binding and gagging prevents the
party from taking advantage of one of the most important benefits of
remaining in the courtroom--consulting with counsel. 244 Nonetheless,
Allen concluded that "in some situations which we need not attempt
to foresee, binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most
reasonable way to handle a defendant."
2 45
Binding and gagging may usually, if not always, be less desirable
than summary punishment for criminal contempt.2 46 The Court's ap-
proval of a less desirable alternative, however, does not justify main-
taining summary punishment as a viable option. Given the inherent
disadvantages of binding and gagging, the situations that the Court did
"not attempt to foresee" should be limited to cases in which there is a
need for the defendant to remain in the courtroom. If this need ever
exists, a fortiori summary imposition of a jail sentence is undesirable,
and, as the subsequent analysis demonstrates, the immediate imposition
of a penalty, such as a fine, that permits the contemnor to remain in
the courtroom is never appropriate..
2 4 7
the defendant with contempt but that an adjudicatory hearing is required to establish
guilt. Later in the same paragraph, however, Justice Black observed, "criminal contempt
has obvious limitations. . [T]he defendant might not be affected by a mere contempt
sentence when he ultimately faces a far more serious sanction." Id. (emphasis added). This
statement may presume that summary adjudication is permissible, or it may be merely an
explanation that a formal charge of contempt may not by itself solve the disruption
problem. In any event, Justice Black did not explicitly authorize the immediate imposi-
tion of summary criminal punishment. Nonetheless, it is clear from other cases that this
option is available. See note 217 supra (citing cases).
241. 397 U.S. at 343-44. See generally Note, Illinois v. Allen: The Unruly Defendant's
Right to a Fair Trial, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 120 (1971).
242. 397 U.S. at 343.
243. Id. at 344.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. For the proposition that binding and gagging is never appropriate "even as 'a
last resort,'" see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 101.
247. See pp. 85-86 infra.
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b. Coercive Civil Contempt
Unlike the criminal contempt sanction, which is a fixed penalty im-
posed to punish past misconduct, a civil contempt sanction is de-
signed solely to coerce future behavior.248 The incarcerated contemnor
is said to carry the keys to the jailhouse door in his pocket:24 9 as soon
as he agrees to conform his conduct to the expected standards of be-
havior, he is entitled to be released. A llen suggested that the trial judge
could hold the defendant in civil contempt, incarcerate him, and stop
the trial until the defendant promised to behave.23
°
One difficulty with the civil contempt alternative in Allen 25 is that
it contributes to the problem that the exercise of summary criminal
punishment is designed to avoid-the disruption of an ongoing pro-
ceeding. -2 52 Witnesses may become unavailable,2- 33 and a lengthy delay
may violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial.254 Even if a judge
were willing to tolerate a substantial delay in pretrial proceedings, 55
discontinuing a trial for more than a few days would be inconvenient
for jurors, and the loss of continuity attributable to a lengthy delay
may necessitate a mistrial.
2 50
248. See Shillitani v. United States, 884 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966). A second objective of
civil contempt is to compensate parties for injuries suffered as a result of the violation of
a court order. When civil contempt is used for this purpose, the judgment is a fine pay-
able to the injured party. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). On the
objectives of the civil contempt power generally, see R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 49-67;
Dobbs, supra note 2, at 235-41.
249. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902); see R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at
58-61 (criticism of courts' use of "'carry-the-keys-to-his-prison'" expression).
250. 397 U.S. at 345.
251. Allen did not consider the possibility of a conditional jail sentence that would
be served only when the court is not in session or a fine that would be payable only in
the event of continued disruptive activity. In some cases this type of conditional sentence
might deter further misconduct, and it would not necessitate delaying the trial or remov-
ing the contemnor from the courtroom. Nonetheless, the reasons suggested subsequently
for rejecting unconditional summary criminal sentences that do not require immediate
incarceration are also applicable to conditional summary sentences of the same type. See
pp. 85-86 & notes 277-280 infra.
252. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, sulra note 7, at 104 (recommendation that coercive
sentence and delay should not extend beyond seven days).
253. Allen recogni7ed this problem when it cautioned that a defendant should not be
permitted to benefit from his own wrong by electing "to spend a prolonged period in
confinement ... in the hope that adverse witnesses might be unavailable after a lapse of
time." 397 U.S. at 345.
254. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, suPa note 7, at 104; Note, supra note 241, at 152-53.
255. See People ex rel. Shaker v. McGrath, 62 Misc. 2d 484, 309 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1970) (postponement of preliminary hearing until disruptive defendants, not granted
bail, agree to behave properl). The hearing in McGrath was postponed on February 25,
1970, and was not resumed until April 7, 1970. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
256. Cf. United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773, 775-77 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973) (trial judge declared mistrial over defendant's objection when
ke) prosecution witness became ill and would be unavailable for "one to two weeks or
more"; icprosecution not denial of double jeopardy since mistrial was '*manifest necessity"
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A lengthy delay would eliminate any need for immediate adjudica-
tion. Moreover, neither the "civil" label nor the fact that the sentence
is conditional eliminates the potential for abuse of the summary con-
tempt power. 257 A civil contempt adjudication that may result in a
lengthy period of incarceration should not be tolerated in the absence
of prior notice and a hearing.258
On the other hand, if the judge were willing to discontinue the
proceeding for only a few days, it might not be feasible to afford the
defendant prior notice and a hearing, and the brevity of the delay
would minimize the adverse impact of an erroneous summary adjudica-
tion.259 The possibility of only a short period of incarceration, how-
ever, undermines the claim that such a remedy is necessary to prevent
courtroom disorder. Before resorting to either removal or summary
criminal or civil contempt, the trial judge should explore less drastic
alternatives.260 For example, he could attempt to persuade the de-
fendant that his conduct was prejudicial to his own interests or, if that
failed, charge the defendant with criminal contempt and tell him that
the adjudication would take place at the end of the trial. The judge
within meaning of United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)); Loux v. United
States, 389 F.2d 911, 920-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867, 869 (1968) (when one of
three codefendants hospitalized during trial and other defendants objected to. request for
five-day continuance to determine whether hospitalized defendant could return, mistrial
declaration as to hospitalized defendant was "manifest necessity" within meaning of Perez);
Note, supra note 241, at 152-53 (defendant's right to speedy trial may rule out lengthy
delay during trial even if delay is caused by need to coerce proper behavior from
defendant).
257. See Note, Procedures for Trying Contempts in the Federal Courts, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 353, 356-57 (1959) (insofar as civil contempt sanction has coercive goal and is not
related to recovering -cost of making the complainant whole," it, like criminal contempt,
is "'analogous to a penal statute" with deterrence goal). See also note 226 suPra (abuse
of summary contempt power).
258. There is no right to a jury trial in civil contempt cases. Shilitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966); see Dobbs, supra note 2, at 231-33. Thus, in the absence of a
statutory penalty limitation, summary coercive imprisonment for disruptive behavior, at
least theoretically, could extend even beyond the six-month limitation on summary criminal
punishment. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. at 104.
259. Cf. p. 67 supra (existence of six-month ceiling on penalty in summary criminal
contempt cases limits potential impact of erroneous or biased result).
Allen's brief reference to coercive contempt, 397 U.S. at 345, does not address the ques.
tion whether summary imposition of such a penalty would be appropriate. But the answer
is probably affirmative. Although several courts have held that a civil contemnor is en-
titled to the same rights of notice and a hearing as a criminal contemnor, see note 73
supra, a disruptive defendant charged with criminal contempt is probably not entitled to
these rights. See note 217 supra (citing cases). Moreover, these is some authority for the
proposition that a civil contemnor is not entitled to notice and a hearing even in situa-
tions where a criminal contemnor would have those rights. See Jennings v. United States,
354 A.2d 855, 856 (D.C. 1976); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 55 (1959), overruled,
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
260. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF TIlE TRIAL
JUDGE § 6.3 (1972); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. at 95-98.
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could even delay the proceeding for a few days without holding the
defendant in contempt in the hope that upon reflection the defendant
would alter his behavior. In the event that these efforts fail or would
obviously be useless, it is unlikely that the defendant could be coerced
by a few days in jail.261
c. Bail Revocation
Trial judges sometimes have responded to a defendant's disruptive
behavior by revoking his bail120-- an action that is not likely to be
preceded by prior notice and a hearing.203 Regardless of the propriety
of summary bail revocation to ensure that a defendant will not flee the
jurisdiction or intimidate witnesses, 264 such an action should not be
considered an appropriate remedy for disruptive behavior. First, even
the use of nonsummary bail revocation for this purpose may be in-
consistent with the Eighth Amendment's proscription of "excessive
bail." 205 Second, there is no guarantee that the bail revocation would
261. If the judge does not specifically commit himself to only a brief delay, the coercive
impact of the sentence may be greater, but there is no guarantee that the sentence would
be a short one. At least in situations in which there is no jury that would be burdened
by delay, a judge may feel constrained to postpone the proceeding for more than a few
days in the hope that the contemnor will change his mind.
262. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1972); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 7, at 102-04.
263. See United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1961), approved in
Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961) (Harlan, Circuit J.); Carbo v. United
States, 288 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
7, at 105. But see United States v. Stroud, 474 F.2d 737, 738 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 930 (1973).
Several courts have held that summary bail revocation prior to trial violates due pro-
cess. E.g., Vacendak v. Indiana, 261 Ind. 317, 302 N.E.2d 779 (1973); Tijerina v. Baker, 78
N.M. 770, 438 P.2d 514 (1968). The right to bail prior to trial, however, may be more
extensive than the right to bail during trial. See United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442,
445 (2d Cir. 1961). But cf. Riggins v. State, 134 Ga. App. 941, 944, 216 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1975)
(convicted felon whose bail was revoked pending appeal entitled to "minimal due process
protections").
264. These are the traditional purposes for which bail has been required and some-
times denied or revoked. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951); United States v.
Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961); Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584
(D.C. 1974).
265. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII; see Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) ("Bail, of
course, is basic to our system of law, ...and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.") (citations omitted); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951) ("[A] person ar-
rested for a noncapital offense shall be admitted to bail . .. [which] serves as . .. as-
surance of the presence of the accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment.")
In Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967) (per curiam), defendant's bail had been
summarily revoked during trial because he was 37 minutes late for one court session. On
appeal he claimed that his incarceration had interfered with his right to counsel and op-
portunity to prepare a defense. Without considering the extent to which the bail revocation
actually impaired the defendant's right to counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the con-
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solve the disruption problem. Finally, and most importantly, summary
bail revocation is the equivalent of a summary contempt penalty,20
which, as the following analysis demonstrates, is an unnecessary and
undesirable means of controlling courtroom misbehavior.
20 7
d. Removal from the Courtroom
Of the alternatives approved in Allen, the one actually used by the
trial judge was removal from the courtroom. The Supreme Court,
emphasizing that the removal must be conditioned on the defendant's
future behavior,208 specifically rejected the claim that Allen's removal
violated his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses.20 9 There
is also ample precedent for removing disruptive spectators270 and more
limited but equally persuasive authority for the proposition that dis-
ruptive attorneys can be removed from the courtroom.
27'
Although removal accomplishes the objective of ending the disorder,
it has inherent disadvantages. The exclusion of an attorney may neces-
sitate a mistrial,27 2 and, despite its constitutionality, the exclusion of a
viction: "In these circumstances, the trial judge's order of commitment, made without
hearing or statement of reasons, had the appearance and effect of punishment rather than
of an order designed solely to facilitate the trial. Punishment may not be so inflicted. Cf.
Rule 42 of Fed. Rules Crim. Proc." Id. at 17.
One commentator has suggested that Bitter stands for the proposition that bail revoca-
tion cannot be used as a purely punitive measure. A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 72 (3d ed. 1976). There are, however, two equally plausible
alternative interpretations. First, the Court may have meant that the conduct was too
innocuous to warrant punishment of any kind. Cf. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697
(1974) (per curiam); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam); In re McConnell, 270
U.S. 230 (1962) (all reversing contempt convictions because conduct was not sufficiently
obstructive to constitute contempt). Second, the Court may have meant that unauthorized
absence from the courtroom is not punishable without notice and a hearing. Cf., e.g.,
United States v. Dalahanty, 488 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1973) (tardiness not punishable pursuant
to FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)).
266. Bail revocation conditioned on the defendant's future behavior would be the
equivalent of a civil contempt penalty. See note 251 supra.
267. See pp. 85-86 infra.
268. The Court also noted with approval that the trial judge had previously warned
the defendant that continued disruptive behavior would result in his removal. See note
40 supra.
269. 397 U.S. at 342-43.
270. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 250-53.
271. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612-13 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 156-59, 161-63 (1949); Laughlin v. Eicher, 145 F.2d 700, 702
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1944); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.5 (1972); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 7, at 407 n.97; TRIAL LAWYERS REPORT, supra note 182, at 14-15 (Principle VI(a)).
272. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1974) (trial judge removed attorney and
gave defendant options of (1) recess pending appellate review of propriety of removal,
(2) proceeding with co-counsel, (3) mistrial declaration; retrial following defendant's
selection of mistrial option not violation of double jeopardy); TRIAL LAWYERS REPORT,
supra note 182, at 17-18 (mistrial is "only solution which is fair" if attorney is removed and
no other attorney "is available to carry on after a reasonable continuance").
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litigant is prejudicial to his interests. In addition to the adverse impact
that it may have on the jury, removal inhibits the litigant's ability to
consult with counsel. 27 3 Furthermore, the power to remove an in-
dividual from the courtroom summarily, like the summary contempt
power, can be abused.
Despite these problems, removal not only eliminates the need for but
is preferable to immediate criminal punishment as a means for dealing
with disorderly courtroom conduct.274 Immediate incarceration pur-
suant to a summary contempt judgment involves removal from the
courtroom with all of its disadvantages, 75 and, at the same time, in-
carceration increases the degree of harm caused by an overzealous judge
who abuses his summary power. Even in the case of a disruptive at-
torney or litigant, where the adverse impact of removal on the con-
tinuing proceeding may minimize the potential for abuse, 276 there is
no countervailing interest that justifies the additional harm inherent
in immediate incarceration. The only benefit from such action would
be that other individuals may be deterred from engaging in similar
conduct. This objective, however, can be adequately achieved by the
imposition of a more severe penalty following a subsequent non-
summary adjudication.
277
The immediate imposition of a criminal penalty that does not re-
quire removal-for example, a fine or a jail sentence to be served only
when the court is not in session-may deter an individual from en-
gaging in further misconduct. In the case of a disruptive spectator,
however, simple removal would be an adequate and less drastic remedy.
And in the case of a disruptive attorney or litigant, where the need
for deterrence is greatest because of the disadvantages of removal, the
value of this type of sanction is likely to be minimal. If an attorney or
litigant perceives a mistrial or removal as something to be avoided, the
threat of removal and subsequent criminal punishment will probably
273. See Note, Guidelines for Controlling the Disruptive Defendant, 56 MiNN. L. REV.
699, 700-02 (1972); cf. Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1967) (per curiam) (bail
revocation "constituted an unwarranted burden upon defendant and his counsel in the
conduct of the case").
274. This disruption, however, does not have to go unpunished. At the time of his
removal or subsequently, the defendant could be formally charged with criminal con-
tempt. The trial on the charge could take place at a later date.
275. In the case of a disruptive criminal defendant, immediate incarceration for a fixed
term pursuant to a summary criminal contempt judgment would appear to be incon-
sistent with the requirement that a defendant's exclusion from the courtroom must
terminate when he agrees to behave properly, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
276. Judges have often permitted disruptive attorneys and litigants to remain in the
courtroom. See, e.g., p. 79 and notes 222 & 237 supra (citing cases where disruptive
litigants and attorneys were not removed).
277. Cf. note 221 supra (denial of procedural safeguards should not be used as punitive
device).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 39, 1978
be an adequate deterrent; if he is intent on disrupting the proceeding
in the hope of obtaining a mistrial or creating a substantial delay, the
perceived advantage of this tactic is likely to outweigh the force of any
deterrent sanction..2 " Finally, and most importantly, from the judge's
perspective the immediate imposition of a penalty that does not require
removal would have a minimal adverse impact on the ongoing proceed-
ing. As a result, the potential for abuse of the summary contempt
power 27 9 would remain virtually unchecked. 2 0
C. The Concern with Flexibility
Given the unsatisfactory nature of the disruption justification for
summary punishment and the Supreme Court's recognition that the
summary contempt power can be easily abused,2 8 ' it may seem anoma-
lous that the Court has continually reaffirmed the existence of that
power. Absence of criticism cannot be the explanation. A number of
commentators have questioned the propriety of summary punish-
ment.28 2 Nor can the long historical tradition behind the summary
278. This is most likely to be true of an unconditional criminal contempt fine, which
may be limited to .$500 by the extension of the jury trial right to criminal contempts. See
p. 67 & note 170 supra. A conditional civil contempt fine would not have to be so limited,
see note 313 infra, but it should be rejected as an acceptable coercive device even if there
were reason to believe that it might be effective. See note 329 infra.
279. See p. 76 & note 226 supra.
280. Even though removal from the courtroom is an adequate remedy for the im-
mediate problem created by disruptive behavior, there are two arguable bases not dis-
cussed in the text for retaining the power to punish summarily one who is removed from
a proceeding. Neither of them, however, is compelling.
First, an individual who has been removed from a courtroom might attempt to return to
continue his disruption. Rather than viewing such repetitive criminal activity as a justifica-
tion for summary punishment, this problem should be addressed in terms of the appro-
priate scope of pretrial release. See generally Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitution-
ality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. Rv. 1223 (1969); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
Second, trying the contemnor at a later date may have a disruptive impact on ongoing
judicial proceedings. If the judge before whom the contempt occurred is engaged in a
lengthy trial, he may be unable to conduct the contempt hearing within a reasonable
time without interrupting the trial. Assigning the contempt case to another judge would
not itself be difficult, and the previous analysis has suggested that this would be desirable
in all cases where immediate action is not strictly necessary. See pp. 64-66 supra. As-
signment of the case to another judge may not, however, solve the interruption problem.
The judge before whom the contempt occurred may have to be a witness at the contempt
hearing and this could require a delay in the case he is currently hearing, although not a
lengthy one. Moreover, the inconvenience to the judge or others involved in the case he
is currently hearing is no greater than the inconvenience caused by the requirement that
other witnesses put aside their normal obligations and give evidence in judicial proceed-
ings. See generally Report of the Special Connittee on the Propriety of Judges Appearing
as Witnesses, 36 A.B.A.J. 630 (1950).
281. See pp. 62-63, 66 & note 226 supra.
282. See, e.g., N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 226-30, 232-38; Sedler, sulnat
note 7. at 85-90; Note, supra note 57.
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contempt power2 3 account fully for the Court's failure to analyze
critically the need for its existence. Particularly in recent years, the
Court has extended procedural protections to individuals involved in
decisionmaking processes that traditionally have been carried out with
complete informality.
284
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for the Court's approval of
the summary contempt power is an overriding concern that trial judges
should have the power to respond adequately to the myriad types of
contumacious behavior that may confront them.28 5 The Court has
consistently stressed the importance of judicial flexibility in dealing
with contumacious conduct.28 6 Indeed, Allen approved the extreme
alternative of binding and gagging, even though the Court did not sug-
gest any situation in which this action would be preferable to the other
options it approved.
287
Although the analysis has already demonstrated that trial judges have
sufficient flexibility to control courtroom misconduct without resort-
ing to summary punishment,288 the summary contempt power tradi-
tionally has been used and justified almost exclusively as a device for
dealing with disruptive behavior.28 9 In the absence of some other
justification for summary punishment, it is reasonable to view the
Court's repeated dictum that such punishment is essential for main-
taining order 290 as a concern with flexibility in a broader sense-a
fear that abolishing the summary contempt power may prevent judges
from responding adequately to some unforeseen (but not necessarily
disruptive) type of contumacious conduct.
291
283. See Ex parle Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04 (1888); J. Fox, supra note 2, at 50-55; R.
GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 15-16.
284. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceed-
ings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings);
Morrisey v. Breiwer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation proceedings); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
285. To some extent the Court's approval of summary criminal punishment may result
from confidence in the fairness and objectivity of trial judges, see Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952), or an unwillingness to forego a convenient device for dealing with
affronts to judicial authority. The Court's recognition that the summary contempt power
can be abused and its own record of reversing convictions in recent years, see pp. 42-44 &
note 226 supra, howieer, cast doubt on these explanations for the continued existence of
the summary contempt power.
286. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971); Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 15 (1954); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1952).
287. See p. 80 supra (Allen makes clear that devices enumerated in case for dealing
with disruptive behavior are not exclusive; other devices may be ncLessary for trial judge
to deal with circumstances of particular cases).
288. See pp. 79-86 supra.
289. See p. 74 supra.
290. See note 217 supra (citing cases).
291. See Sedler, supra note 7, at 91. Indeed, the Court's reversal of summary contempt
convictions on relatively narrow grounds in cases like Harris, see pp. 42-43 and notes 15
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III. United States v. Wilson: A New Perspective on the
Summary Contempt Power
A. Background and Analysis
Relying on the 1965 decision in Harris v. United States,292 a series
of Second Circuit cases reversed summary criminal contempt convic-
tions of witnesses who refused to obey orders to testify during the
course of ongoing trials.2 93 The court, noting that the refusals were
orderly and polite, stressed the Harris dictum that summary punish-
ment should be reserved for extreme situations involving disruptive
behavior.
294
The most recent of these cases is United States v. Wilson.295 Wilson
and Anderson had been charged with the armed robbery of one bank
and Bryan and Anderson with the armed robbery of another bank.
Both Wilson and Bryan pleaded guilty and were awaiting final sen-
tencing -96 when they were called by the prosecution to testify in
Anderson's trial. After invoking the Fifth Amendment, they were
granted immunity297 and ordered to testify. When they refused, the
trial judge summarily held them in contempt. Subsequently the court
granted Anderson's motion for an acquittal on one charge, and the
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the other.298 The Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit and upheld Wilson's and Bryan's summary
contempt convictions.2 99
& 66, supra, Mayberry, see pp. 63-65 & note 144 supra, and Taylor, see pp. 72-73 supra,
may be attributable to a conscious decision to avoid facing the fundamental inadequacies
of the disruption rationale for summary punishment.
292. 382 U.S. 162 (1965), discussed at pp. 42-43 & note 66 supra.
293. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 309 (1975);
United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810
(2d Cir. 1967).
294. United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Pace, 371 F.2d 810, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).
295. 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
296. Wilson's sentence had been deferred and Bryan had received a provisional 25-
year sentence pending an evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1970) (repealed
1976). 488 F.2d at 1232.
297. See note 72 supra.
298. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 312-13 (1975). Anderson was subsequently
retried and convicted for the offense upon which the jury in the original trial was unable
to reach a verdict. Id. at 313.
299. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
Although they (lid not pursue the issue in the Supreme Court, id. at 311 11.3, Wilson
and Bryan urged before the Second Circuit, as an independent ground for reversal, that
the court order to testify was illegal. Since they had not been finally sentenced for their
involvement in the crimes with which Anderson was charged, they claimed that their
testimony might have adversely affected their sentences. Thus, they argued, the immunity
granted them pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976) was not coextensive with the
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1. The Emphasis on Trial Court Discretion
The refusals to testify in Wilson clearly fell within the express
language of Rule 42(a), which limits the judiciary's broad summary
contempt power only by requiring a judge to certify "that he saw or
heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed
in the actual presence of the court."300 At one point Wilson suggested
that this is "all that is necessary." 30 1 It seems clear from other portions
of the opinion, however, that the Court did not mean to imply that
inquiry into the necessity for summary action is never relevant. If it
had meant this, there would have been no need to distinguish Harris
on the ground that trial courts, unlike grand juries, do not have the
flexibility to interrupt ongoing proceedings in order to provide the
contemnor with notice and a hearing.30 2 Moreover, the Court suggested
that summary punishment may not be appropriate "where time is not
of the essence."303 Rather, Wilson's overriding concern appears to be
privilege against self-incrimination. Without deciding whether the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects a defendant against use of compelled testimony at sentencing, the Second Circuit
held that the contemnors had not "followed what we deemed [sic] to be proper procedure
in raising the issue of forbidden use." 488 F.2d at 1233. The court suggested that Wilson,
who was to be sentenced by the same judge who was presiding in Anderson's trial "should
. . have testified as ordered, but requested a different judge for sentencing." Id. Bryan,
who was awaiting sentencing by another judge "should have given evidence, then asked
that proper precautions be taken (e. g., sealing the record) to insure that [the sen-
tencing judge] would not be privy to the statements made under grant of immunity." Id.
To support this conclusion the Second Circuit relied exclusively on "the mandate of 18
U.S.C. § 6002 that 'tle witness may not refuse to comply with the order on tie basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination .... ' Id. This mandate, however, to be valid
must be based on the premise that the immunity granted to the contemnors is coextensive
with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 449 (1972).
Although Kastigar held as a general proposition that the use immunity granted by
§ 6002-6003 is coextensihe with the Fifth Amendment, it did not deal with the question of
how one ensures that immunized testimony will not be used in subsequent sentencing
proceedings. Assuming that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of compelled testimony
in these proceedings, see McCoR-ucK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENcE 256-57 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMCK], the alternatives suggested by the court may
not sufficiently protect the contemnors' Fifth Amendment interests. Since the contemnors'
testimony would hase occurred in a public trial, there would be no guarantee that the
judge who ultimately sentenced them would not have heard of and been influenced by
their testimony. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975) ("Compliance [with an
order to produce e~idenceJ could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot
alwa)s 'unring the bell' once the information has been released. Subsequent appellate
vindication (loes not necessarily have its ordinary consequence of totally repairing the
error."); ef. Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Prob-
leins in the lS'ahe of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REv. 470, 489-92 (1974) (discussion of whether
Fifth Amendment protects against threat of foreign prosecution, and if so, whether im-
munity is coexistensive with Fifth Amendment privilege).
300. Fro. R. CRu5i. P. 42(a).
301. 421 U.S. at 314-15.
302. Id. at 318-19.
303. Id. at 319.
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ensuring flexibility for the trial judge. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the summary contempt power can be abused, it concluded
that appellate courts "can deal with abuses of discretion without
restricting . . . [Rule 42(a)] in contradiction of its express terms, and
without unduly limiting the power of the trial judge." 30 4
There are two major difficulties with this approach to regulating
the summary contempt power. First, as this analysis has already pointed
out, appellate review is not an adequate substitute for procedural safe-
guards at the adjudicatory level, 0 5 and the judge's personal observation
of the contempt does not obviate the need for these safeguards. 300
Second, Wilson failed to articulate the content of its abuse-of-discre-
tion test.307 Prior experience with the summary contempt power,
particularly in disruption cases, demonstrates that trial judges often
are not sensitive to the proposition that the summary power should
be limited to the "least possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed."308 An unwillingness to articulate specific limitations and guide-
lines for trial judges to follow and appellate courts to enforce repre-
sents a substantial abdication of appellate responsibility to ensure that
the summary contempt power is not abused.
2. The Court's Justification for Summary Punishment
In addition its unwarranted emphasis on judicial discretion, Wilson
addressed itself briefly to the specific justification for summarily
punishing the witnesses' refusals to testify:
The face-to-face refusal to comply with the court's order itself
constituted an affront to the court, and when that kind of refusal
disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding, as it did here,
304. Id.
305. See p. 70 supra.
306. See pp. 49-54 supra.
307. For example, it is not unreasonable to read Wilson's broad language as a repudia-
tion of Harris's flat rule that summary punishment of a recalcitrant grand jury witness is
never appropriate. Cf. 421 U.S. at 321 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (although Wilson
does not specifically overrule Harris, Harris was wrongly decided and Court should con-
sider overruling it at some future date). Given the usual, if not inherent, absence of
necessity for summary action in such a case, however, it is unclear to what extent after
Wilson an appellate court should defer to the trial judge's discretion to invoke summary
procedures against a recalcitrant grand jury witness. The problem is further complicated
by the fact that Wilson's basis for distinguishing Harris does not support the proposition
that summary action was necessary in Wilson. The mere fact that trial courts "cannot be
expected to dart from case to case" or delay their proceedings while a contempt hearing is
held, id. at 318, should not be a sufficient justification for summary punishment. The
contempt hearing could simply be held before another judge at the first available time
after the witness has had an adequate opl)ortunity to prepare his defense.
308. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 20, 231 (1821); see note 226 supra.
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summary contempt must be available to vindicate the authority of
the court as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some
incentive to testify.300
The denial of fundamental procedural rights is never appropriate
merely to vindicate the authority of a court,3 10 and traditionally the
civil contempt power has been invoked to induce compliance with a
court order.31' Since the purpose of the civil sanction is coercive rather
than punitive, however, a civil contemnor's incarceration must termi-
nate when compliance with a court order becomes impossible.3 12 When
the trial is a relatively short one, a contemnor's realization that at most
he will have to spend only a few days in jail is not likely to act as much
of an incentive to testify. 13 In Wilson, according to the Supreme
Court,314 the trial judge avoided this problem by imposing the maxi-
mum criminal contempt penalty, six months' imprisonment, and at the
same time making it clear that he would consider reducing the sen-
tences315 if the witnesses testified.310
309. 421 U.S. at 316.
310. See p. 73 supra; cf. hote 221 supra (denial of procedural safeguards not appro-
priate as punitive device).
311. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966); United States v. UMW,
330 U.S. 258, 301-02 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-51
(1911).
312. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); Maggio v. Zietz, 333 U.S. 56,
74-77 (1948).
313. See United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1202 (2d Cir. 1973).
In lieu of conditional imprisonment, courts sometimes impose coercive fines in civil con-
tempt cases. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal
dismissed, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (fine of S150,000 for
each day that IBM refused to comply with discovery order); ef. United States v. UMW,
330 U.S. 258, 305 (1947) (fine of S2,800,000 unless union complied with injunction in five
days). But cf. pp. 113-18 inIra (case law uncertain as to propriety of jail sentence that
will commence only if contemnor does not comply with court order within specified time).
There is limited precedent for the use of such a sanction against an individual who re-
fuses to produce evidence. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d
543, 550-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (vacating judgment and remanding
on other grounds) (fine of S1,500 for each day that contemnor refused to produce sub-
poened documents before grand jury); United States v. Germann, 370 F.2d 1019, 1021
(2d Cir.), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 389 U.S. 329 (1967) (fine of $25,000 unless
contemnor appeared before grand jury by specified date plus .1,000 for each additional
day until contemnor appeared).
Although a conditional fine may be an effective coercive device in some cases, there
are substantial reasons for prohibiting summary imposition of such a sanction. See note
329 infra.
314. 421 U.S. at 312.
315. See FED. R. CRai. P. 35 (court may reduce sentence within 120 days of its
imposition).
316. The excerpts from the transcripts of the contempt proceedings available to the
Court do not support this statement. See Appendix at 19-20, 33-34, United States v. Wilson,
421 U.S. 309 (1975) (possibility of later sentence reduction suggested but no indication
given that compliance with court order would have bearing on decision). The judge's
only reference to coercing testimony came prior to Bryan's sentencing when Bryan was
not in the courtroom. Id. at 32. Moreover, whatever coercive impact the sentences may
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The Court had not previously suggested that the need to coerce
testimony from a recalcitrant witness could justify summary criminal
punishment, and none of the opinions in Wilson addressed the ques-
tion whether this need provides an independent justification for
summary punishment. By referring to the refusals to testify as "inten-
tional obstructions ... that literally disrupted the progress of the trial
and hence the orderly administration of justice,"317 the majority
seemed to be equating the conduct with the type of disruptive behavior
that has provided the traditional, but unsatisfactory, justification for
summary punishment. 318 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion did
not mention the coercion rationale,31 9 and Justice Brennan's dissent
focused on the nonviolent, respectful nature of the refusals as the basis
for urging that summary punishment was inappropriate.
320
B. Coercion as a Justification for Summary Punishment of a
Recalcitrant Trial Witness
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of every
witness's obligation to provide relevant evidence in judicial proceed-
ings.32 1 In Wilson, the refusal to testify led to the acquittal of a criminal
defendant, and, as the Court observed, "the same kind of con-
tumacious conduct could, in another setting, destroy a defendant's
ability to establish a case." 322 If there is no reasonable alternative to
summary coercive punishment, the magnitude of the potential loss to
a party seeking a recalcitrant trial witness's evidence is, arguably, a
sufficient justification for depriving the witness of prior notice and
a hearing.3 23 The analysis in this section suggests that in some cases
have had was undermined by the fact that their imposition was stayed pending appeal.
Id. at 19, 34; see Brief for Respondent (Wilson) at 14-15, United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S.
309 (1975). Even if the trial judge had acted as the Supreme Court claims he did, the fact
that Wilson and Bryan were already in custody as a result of their prior guilty pleas
would have minimized the coercive impact that the sentences might otherwise have had.
See p. 106 infra.
317. 421 U.S. at 315-16 (citations omitted); see note 80 suplra (discussing whether find-
ing of obstruction is prerequisite to summary punishment when contempt is for violation
of court order).
318. See pp. 70-79, 84-86 supra.
319. 421 U.S. at 320-22 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The opinion is limited to a
criticism of the Court's decision to overrule Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), in
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
320. 421 U.S. at 322-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972); Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
322. 421 U.S. at 316.
323. The remainder of this article discusses the propriety of utilizing summary punish-
ment to coerce testimonial evidence from a recalcitrant witness. The analysis is also ap-
plicable to situations in which a witness refuses to produce physical or documentary
evidence.
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summary punishment may be the only reasonable method for coercing
a witness's testimony, and that, at the very least, the coercion rationale
for summary punishment is preferable to the traditional disruption
rationale.
1. The Need for a Summary Remedy
The length of a trial or the nature of the legal issues raised by the
demand for a witness's evidence may eliminate any need for summary
action. If a witness is called early during a lengthy trial, summary
punishment could be avoided simply by scheduling a contempt hear-
ing before another judge after the witness has had an opportunity to
prepare a defense. In the event that he is found guilty, there would
still be ample time for his incarceration to have coercive impact.
Usually a trial will not be sufficiently long to permit this alterna-
tive.324 In these cases, however, it might be possible 'to delay the trial
until the witness has had an adjudicatory hearing. If the issues raised
by the witness's recalcitrance can be quickly resolved or if he has
anticipated and prepared for the contempt charge, the trial might not
have to be interrupted for more than a few hours.3 25 Such a short delay
to accommodate the contemnor's interest in an adjudicatory hearing
would be preferable to immediate punishment.320
On the other hand, there will be cases where substantially more time
is required for the thorough preparation, presentation, and considera-
tion of the issues. The Ninth Circuit has suggested, for example, that a
recalcitrant grand jury witness should usually have at least five days
to prepare for a hearing involving legal issues of "some complexity. '32
7
324. Even in a lengthy trial, a recalcitrant witness's testimony may be important as a
foundation for other evidence. Summary imprisonment, however, may not have an im-
mediate impact on the witness. If the most likely possibility is that the coercion may have
its desired impact but not in time to counteract the inconvenience of not getting the
evidence immediately, summary punishment may not be appropriate. Cf. pp. 106-08
infra (summary coercive sanctions should not be applied in some situations where likeli-
hood is low that such sanctions will succeed); pp. 109-11 infra (discussing situations in
which importance of evidence should outweigh factors such as low likelihood of successful
coercion in deciding whether summary coercive sanction should be permissible).
325. Cf. United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1202 (2d Cir. 1973) (in simple case, "no
sound reason why the hearing could not be held within a day or two of the witness'
refusal to obey the court's order"; since hearing in such case would probably require
only one or two hours, main trial "could be suspended with a minimum disruption to
the judicial process").
326. Moreover, in some situations, denying the contemnor an adequate opportunity to
explore the legality of the court order may undermine the coercive rationale for summary
punishment. A contemnor with a good faith belief that the order to testify is illegal may
be willing to risk a contempt conviction with the hope that it will be reversed on appeal.
A thorough examinatiol, of the basis for his claim at the trial court level may convince
him that success on appeal is unlikely and induce him to testify.
327. United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1973).
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A similar delay in a trial that would otherwise last only a day or two
would at best be extremely inconvenient for the other participants in
the proceeding. At worst, there is a possibility that during the delay
jurors or other witnesses would become unavailable?. 28
If for these reasons delay is not acceptable, one potentially effective
coercive device other than immediate incarceration is the threat of
future punishment. 329 Relying exclusively on this alternative, however,
is likely to lead to disproportionately severe sentences in some cases. 330
If a judge viewed immediate incarceration for up to six months as a
minimally sufficient coercive penalty, a threatened future sentence
might have to be substantially longer to compensate for the absence of
immediate incarceration. 31 Moreover, since a contemnor sentenced to
more than six months' imprisonment is entitled to a jury trial, the
threatened penalty would have to compensate for the possibility of a
subsequent acquittal. Thus, in at least some cases in which the threat
was not effective, it would be reasonable to expect a judge to impose
sentences ranging, for example, from two to four years. Indeed, there
is limited precedent for sentences of this length in recalcitrant witness
cases. 332 The maximum penalty for perjury, however, is five years' im-
328. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1975) (delay to afford contemnor
notice and hearing may be substantial and "'all essential participants in the trial may no
longer be available when [it) reconvenes").
329. In some cases the immediate imposition of a conditional fine may be a potentially
effective coercive device. Unlike summary criminal punishment, which has been limited
by the extension of the jury trial right to criminal contemnors, see pp. 66-67 & note
170 supra, however, there is no limitation on the amount of a conditional civil contempt
fine. As a result, there is a danger that in some cases the penalty for a contemnor who
does not purge himself will be disproportionately severe. See p. 77 supra; cf. pp. 95-96
infra (threatened future incarceration with equivalent coercive force of immediate in-
carceration likely to be disproportionately severe in some cases). More importantly, the
question whether a conditional fine is disproportionately severe in an individual case is
difficult to assess, particularly in a summary proceeding. At least in part, the determina-
tion should depend on the impact of the fine, which unlike the impact of imprisonment,
depends primarily on the financial resources at the contemnor's disposal. A further ques-
tion should be whether a heavy fine for continued recalcitrance would induce the witness
to commit perjury. See p. 95 infra. Finally, there is the difficult question whether or
at what point a fine becomes disproportionately severe without regard to the con-
temnor's wealth or the possible incentive to commit perjury. See note 229 supra. Regard-
less of the propriety of imposing conditional fines after notice and a hearing, the potential
for disproportionately severe fines coupled with the difficulty in assessing the dispropor-
tionality problem in individual cases should be a sufficient basis for rejecting summary
imposition of a fine as a coercive device.
330. See p. 77 supra.
331. On the other hand, the mere threat of even a short period of incarceration may
be a sufficient incentive to testify for some witnesses.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
931 (1977) (four-.car contempt penalty imposed on principal prosecution witness for re-
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prisonment and a $10,000 fine.33 3 Since proving perjury is more
difficult than establishing a simple refusal to answer,334 the possibility
of a severe sentence for refusing to testify would provide some witnesses
with an incentive to testify falsely.333 Yet it undoubtedly is better to go
without some evidence than to coerce false evidence.
Even apart from the desire to avoid encouraging false testimony, only
a sentence that is substantially less than the maximum penalty for per-
jury should be regarded as proportionate to the crime of refusing to
testify33 6 A recalcitrant federal grand jury witness cannot be incar-
cerated pursuant to a civil contempt judgment for more than eighteen
months, 337 and federal statutes proscribing the refusal to testify in
other contexts generally limit the period of imprisonment to no more
than one year.3 38  Moreover, although perjury has traditionally been
fusing to testify at trial after having testified before grand jury); United States v. DiMauro,
441 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1971) (three-year contempt penalty for refusal to testify before
grand jury).
333. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976).
The federal criminal statute that actually labels false swearing as perjury limits the
maximum fine to $2,000. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976). Section 1623 permits the greater fine
when the false swearing occurs in conjunction with court or grand jury proceedings. In
addition, § 1623 differs from § 1621 in that the former (1) eliminates the requirement that
the falsity be established by two independent sources, cf. Weiler v. United States, 323
U.S. 606 (1945) (falsity must be established by two sources to sustain § 1621 conviction),
and (2) permits conviction upon a showing that one of two inconsistent statements is
false without establishing which one is untrue.
334. Despite the relaxed evidentiary requirements of § 1623, see note 333 supra, the
prosecutor must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly made
a false statement, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1976), and that the false statement was material to
the investigation or trial, United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 327 n.6 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
335. The incentive to commit perjury would not be a significant factor in all cases.
For example, a reporter who refused to reveal a confidential source would probably re-
main silent rather than falsely identify his source, regardless of the penalty for refusing
to testify. Moreover, for some witnesses the possibility of a $10,000 fine in addition to
imprisonment may lessen the incentive to commit perjury. For others, however, the pos-
sibility of such a fine may be of little consequence.
336. But see United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 393 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977) (four-year contempt sentence).
337. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970); cf. Federal Grand Jury: Hearings on H.J. Res. 46,
H.R. 1227 and Related Bills Before the Subcomnzn. on innigration, Citizenship, and Int'l
Law of the Comin. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (consideration of proposals
to amend § 1826 by limiting period of confinement to six months); ABA SECTION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POLICY ON THE GRAND JURY, RECOMMENDATION No. 24 (1977) ("The
period of confinement for a witness who refuses to testify before a grand jury and is found
in contempt should not exceed one year.")
338. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1976) (maximum penalty of one )ear's imprisonment and
$1,000 fine for refusal to testify before congressional body); 10 U.S.C. § 847(b) (1976)
(maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment and $500 fine for refusal to testify before
court-martial, military commission, court of inquiry, or any other military court or board);
15 U.S.C. § 50 (1976) (maximum penalty of one jear's imprisonment and S5,000 fine for
refusal to testify before Federal Trade Commission).
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regarded as an extremely serious offense,339 the maximum penalty is
often not imposed.
340
The previous discussion of disruptive courtroom behavior argued
that appellate court or legislative action to eliminate disproportionately
severe sentences was preferable to permitting summary adjudication.
34'
For two reasons, however, this response is not as satisfactory for recal-
citrant witness cases. First, at least in some recalcitrant witness cases, a
post-hearing sentence that is merely the equivalent of six months' im-
prisonment in its coercive power will be disproportionately severe.3 42
Therefore, eliminating both summary punishment and disproportion-
ately severe sentences in recalcitrant witness cases would result in the
loss of some degree of coercion. Given the importance of securing
relevant testimony from all witnesses, 343 this is not a loss to be taken
lightly.344 Second, the summary contempt power is not as likely to be
abused in recalcitrant witness cases. 345 The court order to testify
identifies clearly the nature of the conduct that becomes the subject of
the contempt conviction, 346 and establishing a simple refusal to obey
the order is not likely to involve factual disputes that could properly
be resolved only in an evidentiary hearing.3 47 More importantly, when
the refusal to testify is not accompanied by disruptive behavior or
339. See United States v. Levy, 533 F.2d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1976) ("perjury is one of the
most serious offenses known to the law"); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL I-Aw 453-55 (2d ed. 1969).
340. See, e.g., Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 333 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1125 (1975) (three years' imprisonment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623); United
States v. Rook, 424 F.2d 403, 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966 (1970) (three years'
imprisonment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621).
341. See pp. 77-79 & notes 227-36 supra. The earlier discussion referred to sum-
mary adjudication and threatened post-hearing sentences as alternative methods for de-
terring an individual's continued misconduct. The discussion here refers to those devices
as methods for coercing testimony. The shift in terminology is merely a concession to the
traditional rhetoric about the contempt power. Courtroom disruption is treated as
criminal contempt, and specific deterrence (i.e., deterring the defendant from engaging in
further similar conduct) is usually recognized as one of the objectives of criminal punish-
ment. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 61, at 22. On the other hand, refusing
to testify is often treated as civil contempt, the sole objective of which is to coerce com-
pliance with the order to testify. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70
(1966). For the purposes of the present discussion and the previous discussion at pp.
77-79, the terms deterrence and coercion are interchangeable.
342. As in the disruption situation, there is also a danger that disproportionately
severe sentences will result from a judge overcompensating for the lack of the immediate
punishment option as a deterrent. See p. 78 & notes 231-34 supra.
343. See p. 92 supra.
344. Cf. note 234 supra (unavailability of summary adjudication to deter marginally
contumacious conduct would not be undesirable).
345. Cf. p. 76 & notes 235-36 supra (substantial possibility for abuse of summary con-
tempt power in disruption cases).
346. Cf. p. 47 supra (need for prior warning in order for contemnor to know what
conduct judge views as contumacious).
347. See note 66 supra.
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disrespectful language,348 there is less danger that the trial judge will
become personally embroiled in the controversy.349
2. A Pragmatic Defense of Wilson's Coercion Rationale
The proposition that the need to coerce testimony from a recalcitrant
witness may be a sufficient justification for summary punishment is
not beyond criticism. The need to challenge the legality of a court
order, 50 to present evidence of mental incapacity,3 1 to speak in allocu-
tion, 352 and to have the assistance of counsel5 3 is as great in a case like
Wilson 354 as in any contempt case. Moreover, there may be few cases in
which threatening a future sentence that is not disproportionately
severe,355 delaying the trial,335 or scheduling a contempt hearing before
another judge5 7 is not a reasonable alternative to summary punish-
ment. A trial judge may prefer the convenience of the summary remedy
even when it is not necessary, however, and an appellate court would
probably be reluctant to regard his decision as an abuse of discretion."' s
This potential for unnecessary summary action arguably outweighs the
value of retaining immediate incarceration as a coercive device for the
perhaps limited number of cases in which its use would be appro-
priate.35
9
Nonetheless, there will be some cases in which immediate imprison-
ment is the most reasonable means of attempting to secure possibly
348. For a discussion of the situation where a refusal to testify is accompanied by
disruptive or disrespectful behavior, see pp. 111-13 infra.
349. Cf. pp. 62-64 suPra (possibility of bias when judge becomes personally embroiled
in controversy).
350. See pp. 52-55 suPra.
351. See p. 51 supra.
352. See pp. 55-57 supra.
353. See pp. 57-62 sukra.
354. In Wilson, the contemnors were given the right to raise mitigating circumstances
prior to sentencing, 421 U.S. at 312, and there was some indication that the primary motive
for Wilson's refusal to testify was loyalty to codefendant Anderson rather than a good faith
belief that the court order was illegal, see 488 F.2d at 1233 nA. Moreover, the Second
Circuit had little difficulty in concluding that the court order was legal, id. at 1232-33.
Nonetheless, the contemnors at least had a colorable claim that the order to testify violated
their Fifth Amendment rights, see note 299 supra, but the trial judge denied their request
for a continuance to study the matter, 421 U.S. at 312 nA. Furthermore, codefendant Bryan
was not represented by his own counsel, 488 F.2d at 1234, and despite some evidence of
Wilson's psychological difficulties, the trial judge did not pursue the question of Wilson's
mental capacity, see id. at 1234-35.
355. See note 331 supra.
356. See p. 93 supra.
357. See p. 93 suf~ra.
358. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975).
359. Taking this position would probably necessitate making a choice between per-
mitting disproportionately severe sentences or foregoing some degree of coercion. See pp.
95-96 supra.
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critical evidence from a recalcitrant trial witness, whereas invoking the
summary contempt power is never appropriate to coerce proper be-
havior from, or to punish, an individual who physically disrupts court-
room proceedingA6 ° Thus, to reject the coercion rationale for sum-
mary punishment of a recalcitrant trial witness is tantamount to saying
that the summary contempt power should be abolished or at least
reserved for some unforeseen types of contumacious conduct. Regard-
less of the merits of this position, it is not acceptable to the Supreme
Court. Wilson stands for the proposition that the summary power is
firmly entrenched as an acceptable device for dealing with at least some
instances of contumacious behavior. The task at hand, therefore, is to
provide the most acceptable framework for the exercise of that power.
The most important step toward the accomplishment of this objective
is to recognize that one can safely abandon the disruption rationale and
still maintain that there is a legitimate role for the summary criminal
contempt power.
C. Limitations on the Coercion Rationale for Summary Punishment
Before summary punishment can be invoked for coercive purposes,
there should be an overriding, immediate need to coerce the con-
temnor to behave in a particular manner and an absence of less severe
alternative means to accomplish this objective.36I Perhaps thd only type
of conduct for which such punishment may be appropriate is the re-
fusal : 62 of a witness to provide evidence in a civil or criminal tria'
03
360. See pp. 74-79, 85-86, 96-97 supra.
361. Like the interest in coercing proper behavior from an individual who physically
dji-lttpt (outlooln Ilo(eedings. the interest in coercing an individual to refrain from
s)mbolic acts such as refusing to rise when a judge enters the courtroom, see, e.g., In re
Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972), should not justify summary punishment. In the event
that the threat of a later contempt judgment is not a sufficient specific deterrent, the
symbolic protester, like the disruptor, can be removed from the courtroom. See generally
pp. 84-86 supra. If the protester is a party to the action and removal seems too harsh,
or if he is a witness whose presence is needed in the courtroom, the symbolic gesture can
simply be tolerated. The court can still function efficiently, and the subsequent punish-
ment of his conduct, if indeed it constitutes a contempt, see United States v. Snider, 502
F.2d 645, 660 (4th Cir. 1974) (mere failure to rise is not contempt), should be a sufficient
deterrent to others.
362. Although evasive testimony has sometimes been equated with a refusal to respond,
see note 77 suPra, a coercive sanction should probably not be used against a witness who
the judge thinks is evasive. The imposition of a coercive sanction in such a case creates
the danger that the witness will be induced to say i hat he believes the judge wants to
hear rather than what may in fact be true. See In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 823-24 (3d Cir.
1941); cf. Ex parle Hudgings. 249 U.S. 378 (1919) (perjury is not civil contempt). But see
Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.), vacated a5 ,utoot, 340 U.S. 898 (1950)
(civil contempt judgment for evasive testimony upheld).
363. Prior experience demonstrates the absence of necessity for immediate punishment
of a recalcitrant witness in nontrial settings. For example, witnesses appearing before
administrative bodies commonly have the right to appeal court orders to produce
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when there is an immediate need364 for the evidence and when a
sufficiently coercive, threatened future sentence would be dispropor-
tionately severe.303 Limiting the summary contempt power to only
these cases, however, would be inconsistent even with the Court's pre-
Wilson concern with flexibility.300 There may be unforeseen situations
in which the use of an immediate coercive sanction is necessary. Rather
than attempting to anticipate such situations, the analysis here will be
limited to a consideration of additional factors that should restrict the
summary incarceration of recalcitrant trial witnesses. In the event that
a need for immediate coercive punishment arises in another setting, the
principles discussed here should be helpful in evaluating the propriety
of such action.30 7
evidence before they can be held in contempt for their recalcitrance. See Penfield Co. v.
SEC. 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768 (1944); Jaffe, The Judicial En-
forcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REv. 865, 870-71 (1963). Although there
may be undesirably long delays in the enforcement of administrative orders for other
reasons, see Bartosic, Labor Law Reform-the NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REv.
647, 650-55 (1970) (institutionalized delay is major obstacle to vigorous Taft-Hartley en-
forcement), this right of appeal does not appear to have created an intolerable burden
on the administrative process.
A similar right to appeal the legality of a court order is usually not available to grand
jury witnesses. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 553 (1971); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974)
(immediate appellate review available if "the traditional contempt avenue to immediate
appeal is peculiarly inappropriate due to the unique situation in which the question
arises"). Several courts, however, have held that a grand jury witness charged with
coercive civil contempt has the same right to prior notice and a hearing that Harris man-
dates for grand jury witnesses charged with criminal contempt. See note 73 supra (citing
cases). Because a grand jury has the flexibility to call early in its term witnesses it believes
will be recalcitrant, there should be ample time for a coercive penalty, imposed after
notice and hearing, to have its impact. Even in those cases where the witness is called
shortly before the grand jury plans to adjourn, it may be possible to extend the grand
jury term. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 3333(e) (1976). Alternatively, the witness could be
called before the next grand jury at the beginning of its term.
364. See pp. 92-94 supra. If the witness refuses for the first time to answer questions
on cross-examination, summary coercive punishment may not be necessary. The judge
could merely exclude from evidence the prior direct examination, see McCoRMICK, suPra
note 299, at 44-45, or, if the witness is a party in a civil action, enter a judgment against
him. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 160 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
365. See pp. 94-96 supra.
366. See p. 87 & note 286 supra (citing cases).
367. Regardless of whether the coercion rationale for summary punishment ultimately
replaces the disruption rationale, as it should, or merely becomes an additional basis for
summary punishment, its potential limits deserve exploration. Even if the Supreme Court
is unwilling to restrict the summary power beyond the express language of Rule 42(a), see
United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315 (1975), the factors considered in this section
should have a bearing on how a trial judge exercises his discretion and perhaps on how
an appellate court evaluates his exercise of discretion. Moreover, state courts, in in-
terpreting the scope of their own contempt powers and the requirements of state con-
stitutional provisions, are free to impose restrictions that go beyond those mandated by
the federal constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal contempt
power. See State v. R'-o-de- 4Q6 P.2d 925, 935-36 (Alaska 1971) (right to jury trial in all
criminal contempt cases unless penalty is fine of SIO0 or less). See generally Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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1. The Existence of a Court Order
Usually a specific order to produce evidence will precede any at-
tempt to hold a recalcitrant witness in contempt. For example, if the
witness initially claims that his testimony is privileged, the trial judge
either will accept the claim and excuse the witness or, after rejecting
the claim, will order the witness to testify.368 In the event of continued
recalcitrance, the basis for the contempt judgment would be the refusal
to obey the court order.369
An alternative theory for holding a recalcitrant witness in contempt
would be to view the refusal, even in the absence of a court order, as
misbehavior that obstructs the administration of justice.370 No court
has suggested that in the absence of a court order a witness's good faith
claim that he may legally refuse to testify constitutes contumacious
misbehavior, and at least one court has specifically held that a good
faith claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege is not misbehavior that
obstructs justice. 371 A bad faith claim of privilege or the failure to
offer any legal basis for the refusal, however, may constitute such
misbehavior.
372
The substantive criminal law does not usually consider a good faith
but erroneous belief in the legality of one's conduct a defense.373 Thus
the reason for not treating a good faith refusal to provide evidence as
contempt in the absence of a court order must rest on the premise that
a court order serves some unique function in recalcitrant witness cases.
Although it is seldom specifically articulated,3 7 4 that objective appears
to be ensuring that the witness has an opportunity to test the legality
of his claim before being subjected to the risk of a criminal convic-
tion.375 An ordinary criminal defendant usually does not have a similar
368. See Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 216 (lst Cir. 1954).
369. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976), quoted in note 29 supra.
370. See id. § 401(1), quoted at p. 46 supra.
371. Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 214-15 (1st Cir. 1954); see Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41, 50 (1959), overruled in Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965)
(recalcitrant grand jury witness was not guilty of contempt until judge ordered him to
testify and he refused).
372. Evasive or inconsistent testimony, which courts have equated with the refusal to
testify, see note 77 suPra, has been punished as contempt in the absence of a court order.
See Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960).
Contra, Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219, 222 (1st Cir. 1954) (alternative holding);
Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 214-15 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum).
373. See IV. LXFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 61, at 362-65.
374. But see Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 214 (1st Cir. 1954).
375. The fact that this judicial determination will often not be immediately appeal-
able, see note 363 supra, may help explain why courts have been more willing in recal-
citrant witness cases than in other cases to consider the illegality of the order as a defense
to a contempt charge, see note 71 supra. See generally Kuhns, supra note 24, at 504-08 &
nn.112, 114, 116.
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opportunity for a prior judicial determination of the legality of his
conduct,376 but he at least has the option to refrain from engaging in
the questionable conduct.377 In contrast, the recalcitrant witness, by
virtue of the demand for his evidence, must either act in a manner
that he believes may not be required by law or risk punishment.
378
If prior determination of the legality of a witness's good faith refusal
to testify is to be meaningful, there must be an adequate opportunity
for him to prepare and present legal arguments to the trial judge.
Granting this opportunity to a recalcitrant trial witness may be in-
consistent with the need for an immediate coercive penalty. Even if
the witness is not given sufficient time to prepare legal arguments,
however, the requirement of a court order should focus the judge's
attention at least momentarily on the legality of the demand for
evidence. Since the witness will not have the opportunity to present his
legal claim at the time of the summary contempt adjudication, this
minimal safeguard against an unwarranted conviction should be a
prerequisite to summary punishment.
This same requirement should exist even if the judge is convinced
that the refusal to answer is not based on any good faith legal claim.
The relatively simple act of ordering the witness to testify will avoid
the potential collateral inquiry on appeal into whether the refusal was
in fact in good faith. 379 Moreover, the 6rder will make clear both to
the witness and to the appellate court precisely what was required of
the witness and what the basis was for the contempt judgment. Without
such an order in a situation in which the recalcitrant witness manifests
some disrespect for the judge, it may not be clear whether the punish-
ment is for refusing to answer or for behaving disrespectfully. 3 0 Only
the former objective should justify summary punishment.
376. See Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1490 (1967).
377. The option may not be meaningful, however, if the proscribed conduct is not
clearly defined. See id. at 1491-96.
378. A recalcitrant witness before a congressional committee may face this dilemma.
See Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 212 (Ist Cir. 1954). Similarly, the dilemma may
exist for an individual who can be punished for his failure to act in other contexts.
Usually, however, a legal duty to act does not exist independently of some more general
course of conduct in which an individual has chosen to engage. For example, the decision
to drive an automobile may impose a duty upon one to report his involvement in an
accident. See Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 599-600 (1958). In those "rare
instances [when] a duty is geared by an event entirely unconnected with the activity of the
defendant"--for example, a duty to aid a stranger in distress, id. at 599-there is not likely
to be an opportunity, as there is in recalcitrant witness cases, for prior judicial considera-
tion of the legality of the particular omission.
379. Cf. p. 60 supra (flexible right-to-counsel rule may create issue for collateral in-
quiry on appeal); p. 64 subra (personal embroilment standard may create potential for
appellate reversal).
380. See pp. 111-13 infra.
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2. The Anticipation of Recalcitrance
In Wilson if the prosecutor reasonably believed that the witnesses
would testify, the brevity of the trial may have justified summary
punishment3sl On the other hand, if the prosecutor knew that the
witnesses would not testify, he could have taken steps that would have
minimized the adverse impact of, or eliminated the need for, summary
proceedings during the trial. The failure to take these steps arguably
should have a bearing on the appropriateness of summary punishment
in a given case.
One way to minimize the deficiencies of summary contempt proceed-
ings would be for the party seeking evidence from a potentially recal-
citrant witness to notify the witness in advance of trial that his evidence
would be sought. For example, ten days' notice should give the witness
an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel and explore the possible
legal objections to the request for his evidence. Even if the contempt
proceeding were relatively summary, the witness would at least be able
to evaluate the legality of his position and prepare possible defenses to
suggest to the trial judge.
Instead of merely giving notice to the potentially recalcitrant witness,
it would be possible in many cases to attempt to coerce his testimony
prior to trial. In civil cases the witness can be deposed. In. criminal
cases in which, as a practical matter, recalcitrant witness problems are
more likely to arise, the deposition alternative may not be available,8 "
but it may be possible to call a potentially recalcitrant prosecution wit-
ness before a grand jury. Recalcitrance in a deposition or before a
grand jury could be treated as contempt.38 3 Since there would be no
immediate need for the evidence, the contempt proceeding would not
have to be summary.3
8 4
381. See pp. 93-94 supra (summary punishment may be necessary in recalcitrant witness
cases when delaying trial is unacceptable).
382. compare FED. R. CRIMT. P. 15(a) (depositions allowed only in specified circum-
stances) with FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (depositions made easily available). See generally 1 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PPCTICE & PROCEDURE § 241 (1969 & Supp. 1978); Comment, Dep~ositions
as a Mfeans of Criminal Discovery, 7 U.S.F. L. Rcv. 245 (1973).
383. If the deposition is taken in conjunction with a civil action, a court order to
testify must precede the contempt adjudication. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (b); 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 382, § 2282 at 757, § 2289 at 790-91 (1970). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure do not deal specifically with the problem of a witness who refuses to
answer questions in a deposition. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; see 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976). The
reason for requiring a court order in the case of a recalcitrant trial or grand jury witness,
see pp. 100-01 supra, however, is equally applicable to the case of a recalcitrant deponent.
384. In addition to avoiding the necessity for summary punishment, this course of
action would give the party seeking the evidence an opportunity to evaluate whether to
pursue the case to adjudication. For example, if Wilson and Bryan had been held in con-
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In the event that the contemnor yields to the coercion and agrees to
testify prior to the trial, there is no guarantee that he will also testify in
the trial. In many jurisdictions, however, his pretrial statements would
be admissible in the event that he refused to testify at trial.3 8; In juris-
dictions that would not admit the prior statements, it would be
possible to hold the witness in contempt again for his refusal to testify
at the trial.380 Even if the proceedings were summary the second time,
the legal issues would most likely be the same as those in the prior
contempt proceeding. Thus the summary nature of the proceedings
probably would not be as prejudicial as they otherwise might be.
Despite the advantages of pretrial proceedings to coerce evidence and
the relative ease with which a potentially recalcitrant witness could at
least be notified that his evidence would be sought at trial, a general
rule requiring a party to take either of these steps when dealing with
a potentially recalcitrant witness would be undesirable.387 One dif-
tempt for refusing to testify before a grand jury, and if, despite the coercive contempt
penalty, they remained adamant in their refusals, the prosecutor could reasonably have
assumed that he would not have the benefit of their testimony at Anderson's trial. Both
to conserve his own resources and to maintain a high conviction rate, he might have
decided to forego Anderson's prosecution unless there had been sufficient other evidence
to warrant a conviction.
Another advantage of trying to elicit evidence from a recalcitrant witness prior to trial
is that there will be a longer period of time during which the coercive sentence can in-
fluence the witness. If the contempt judgment is not entered until the witness has refused
to testify at trial, the brevity of the trial may leave the witness with only a day or two to
decide whether his continued recalcitrance is worth six months' incarceration. In contrast,
the recalcitrant grand jury witness can purge himself of the contempt at any time prior
to the end of the grand jury term. For example, if the term extended for six months after
the contempt judgment, he could agree to testify and be released from prison at any time
during those six months: a witness who had already endured four or five months of
imprisonment might be unlikely to yield to the coercion of only an additional month or
two in prison, but a witness who remained firm in his refusal after only a few days of
incarceration might well change his mind after several weeks.
385. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(2), (b)(l). See generally Mc-
CORMucK, sulra note 299, at 612-13. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)
(Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses may not bar admission at trial of
witness's testimony at preliminary hearing).
386. See Second Additional Grand Jury Empanelled for the September 1971 Term v.
';!,,, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2,
at 240-41. But cf. pp. 106-07 infra (summary contempt adjudication inappropriate if
witness has recently failed to yield to prior coercive sanction); S. 3274, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); H.R. 1277, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (witness held in contempt for refusing
to testify cannot subsequently be held in contempt for further refusals to testify about
same transaction).
387. The following textual discussion raises problems applicable to both the notice
and the pretrial testimony options. There is a further consideration applicable only to
the latter option. Prosecutors have sometimes used the contempt power against recalcitrant
witnesses as a device for punishing politically unpopular beliefs. See Alexander v. United
States, 181 F.2d 480, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1950) (Denman, C.J., supplemental opinion). Although
requiring prosecutors to seek pretrial testimony from potentially recalcitrant witnesses
would not necessarily contribute to this type of abuse of the contempt power, it would
proxide the abuse, when it occurs, with the guise of legitimacy.
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ficulty with such a rule is that there may be legitimate reasons for
waiting until the trial to confront the potentially recalcitrant witness.
For example, a party may fear that detailed pretrial examination or
prior notice of the specific information that will be sought will provide
the witness with an opportunity to testify evasively at trial. Yet, if the
pretrial questioning is only very general, it may not reveal whether the
witness will be recalcitrant when more specific questions are asked at
trial. Similarly, prior notice that does not specify what information will
be sought from the witness may not give him an adequate basis for
preparing legal objections to the request for his evidence.
Additional difficulties arise from the fact that, regardless of how
precisely one attempts to define "potential recalcitrance," neither
litigants nor courts have the expertise to predict accurately whether a
witness will refuse to provide evidence. If this uncertainty leads courts
to accept most claims that the party desiring particular testimony ex-
pected it to be forthcoming at trial, a requirement of notifying poten-
tially recalcitrant witnesses or seeking to elicit evidence from them prior
to trial will have little value. On the other hand, if courts tend to re-
frain from summarily punishing recalcitrant trial witnesses who have
not received prior notice or whose evidence has not been sought in
pretrial proceedings, parties will presumably attempt to protect them-
selves from the potential loss of trial evidence by engaging in the
required pretrial procedure when the likelihood of recalcitrance is only
slight. The requirement of a pretrial attempt to coerce evidence would
burden courts with unnecessary proceedings, be costly to litigants, and
create inconvenience for nonrecalcitrant witnesses who would be forced
to testify twice. Even if a potentially recalcitrant witness only had to be
notified in advance that he would be asked to produce evidence, the
specificity necessary to make the notice meaningful might impose a sub-
stantial burden on the party seeking the evidence. 3ss Moreover, given
the relatively few witnesses who are in fact recalcitrant3s 9 and the
probability that some of these witnesses will know in advance of trial
what evidence will be sought,a90 the requirement is likely to have little
utility in the long run.
388. The burden would be greatest in those cases where there is a danger that detailed
prior notice of the information to be elicited at trial will permit a witness to testify
evasively. The party seeking the evidence would have to weigh the risk of this possibility
against the risk of losing the benefit of a summary coercive remedy and draft the notice
carefully enough to minimize both problems.
389. See Kuhns, supra note 24, at 312-13 nn.134-35.
390. Witnesses whose potential recalcitrance could be most clearly and easily demon-
strated would be those who affirmatively stated prior to trial that they would refuse to
testify. A person who is in a position to make such a statement is likely to be aware of his
situation as a potential witness and thus would probably not need any advance notice to
prepare his defense.
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Finally, in those cases in which no action has been taken in anticipa-
tion of the witness's recalcitrance, inquiry into whether any such action
should have been taken may substantially delay the trial. Since the
justification for summary punishment is the need to coerce testimony
without interrupting the trial for an adjudicatory hearing, a lengthy
inquiry into the reasons for not anticipating the witness's recalcitrance
would undermine the very values that summary punishment seeks to
preserve.
Nonetheless, the failure to anticipate a trial witness's recalcitrance
should not be completely irrelevant in considering whether summary
punishment is appropriate. If a witness has affirmatively stated prior
to trial that he will refuse to provide evidence or if he has refused to
provide evidence in a pretrial proceeding and has not been subjected to
a contempt adjudication, the potential for recalcitrance at trial is clear
and can be demonstrated quickly and easily. In this situation, the party
seeking summary coercive punishment for the witness's recalcitrance at
trial should have the burden of establishing that his failure to pursue a
coercive remedy earlier was reasonable. 391
A party could meet this burden by showing, for example, that before
the trial he reasonably believed the witness's testimony would not be
necessary or that from a tactical standpoint it would have been un-
reasonable to give the witness the advantage of prior exposure to a
probing examination.3 92 It should take only a few minutes to present
these matters to the court, and since the potential for recalcitrance
will have been clearly manifested by the witness's prior conduct, it is
reasonable to expect the party seeking the evidence to be prepared im-
mediately to offer his explanation for not trying to coerce the testimony
earlier. In the absence of such a showing, acceptance of the initial
recalcitrance followed by an invocation of the summary contempt
power during the trial constitutes an unnecessary deprivation of pro-
cedural protections for the witness.393
391. Even this limited requirement for seeking pretrial testimony may give the ap-
pearance of legitimacy to abuses of the contempt power. See note 387 supra (discussing
use of contempt power to punish politically unpopular beliefs). The importance of pro-
cedural regularity in contempt proceedings, see p. 97 supra, should justify taking such a
risk.
392. If the witness's initial recalcitrance were based on a Fifth Amendment claim, the
failure to grant the witness immunity prior to trial should be regarded as per se reason-
able. A prosecutor may be engaged in plea bargaining with several prospective witnesses
and hope that he can obtain the necessary evidence without granting immunity to anyone,
or at least not the witness in question. Even if a prosecutor knows in advance that he will
grant immunity to a witness who claims the Fifth Amendment, he should not be forced
to take this step before it is absolutely necessary.
393. It is not likely that a judge will deny a party's request for a pretrial coercive
sanction. See Kuhns, supra note 24, at 512. Theoretically, however, the decision to initiate
criminal contempt proceedings rests with the court, not the aggrieved party, see id. at
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3. The Likely Impact of a Coercive Sentence
A premise underlying the imposition of every purely coercive sen-
tence is that the contemnor will-or at least may-yield to the coercion.
If this premise is incorrect, the sentence, regardless of its initial pur-
pose, is in fact punitive.394 Since it is never necessary to convict a con-
temnor summarily solely for noncoercive, punitive purposes, knowledge
that a contemnor will not yield to coercion should preclude the
summary imposition of a contempt sentence.
Just as it is impossible to predict whether a witness will in fact be
recalcitrant, it is also impossible to know in advance whether a recal-
citrant witness will yield to the coercive impact of a contempt sentence.
Given this uncertainty, the fact that at least some witnesses agree to
provide evidence after being incarcerated, 395 and the absence of rea-
sonable alternatives for obtaining the witness's evidence, it is probably
reasonable to presume that most witnesses will yield to the coercion. In
some cases, however, the factual basis for making this presumption will
be extremely weak. This is likely to be true in at least three types of
situations. First, a recalcitrant witness who is currently incarcerated or
about to be incarcerated for a substantial period of time on another
charge is not likely to be influenced by the possibility of an additional
six months' imprisonment. 390 Second, in the absence of a specific basis
494-95, and the same may be true with regard to coercive civil contempts. See Penfield
Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 592 (1947) (judge's failure to grant requested coercive sanction
was abuse of discretion). But see MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149, 154 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
The possibility that a judge may deny the request for a pretrial coercive sanction raises
the question of whether the wrongful denial of such a request should preclude summary
punishment during the trial. Since the rationale for requiring a party to seek a potentially
recalcitrant witness's testimony prior to trial is to minimize the witness's loss of important
procedural rights, it arguably should not matter whether the failure to pursue a pretrial
remedy is attributable to a litigant or a judge. On the other hand, a party who has made
a good faith effort to secure the testimony prior to trial-particularly if he is a criminal
defendant, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 (1973) (state murder con-
viction reversed because application of restrictions in Mississippi rules of evidence violated
due process right to fair trial by preventing defendant from calling and cross-examining
certain witnesses)-arguably should not be denied the opportunity to coerce testimony at
trial merely because a judge erroneously rejected his earlier request for a coercive sanction.
394. See In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (1976); Catena v.
Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 229, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975).
395. See, e.g., [19 73 ] N.J. CO.rs'N OF INVESTIGATION ANN. REP. 8-9.
396. See In re Maguire, 571 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1978) (contempt weapon "drastically
blunted when the defiant witness is already incarcerated for a long period"). If a contempt
sentence is imposed in this type of situation, its limited coercive impact will be maximized
by postponing or interrupting the contemnor's other sentence. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); Martin v.
United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975). But cf. In re
Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 84-90 (2d Cir. 1978) (federal court has no power to interrupt state
court sentence while recalcitrant federal grand jury witness serves civil contempt sentence).
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for a contrary belief, it is reasonable to assume that a witness who has
recently resisted a coercive contempt sanction will not yield when a
second coercive sanction is imposed. Third, a witness who bases his
recalcitrance on some strongly held moral or political belief will
probably not yield to a coercive sentence. For example, a reporter is




The existence of these factors can be quickly demonstrated to the
trial judge. When any of them exists, the party seeking the evidence,
as a prerequisite to summary punishment, should have the burden of
showing that there is nonetheless a reasonable basis for believing that
the witness will yield to the coercive pressure of a contempt sanction.
Since there is probably little likelihood that the witness will yield to
coercion in these situations, the burden should be a heavy one. Meet-
ing the burden, however, should not require the lengthy presentation
of evidence, for this would undermine the initial rationale for sum-
mary punishment-the need for a speedy remedy to prevent interrup-
tion of the trial. An affidavit,. or perhaps even an oral statement from
the party seeking the evidence, should be an adequate method of meet-
ing the burden. If the party asserts, for example, that the witness had
previously provided or agreed to provide the evidence, this should be
a sufficient showing to permit summary coercive punishment.
It is important to note several characteristics of a rule that would
prohibit summary punishment when there is little likelihood that a
witness will yield to coercion. First, the existence of one of the three
factors mentioned earlier need not and should not be viewed as the
exclusive basis for placing a special burden on the party seeking the
evidence, 95 One common explanation for refusing to provide evidence
is fear of physical retaliation,; 99 and in at least some cases this fear will
undoubtedly be sufficient to overcome the coercive pressure of a con-
tempt sentence.4 0 0 Since it will usually be difficult to estimate a fearful
witness's susceptibility to coercion, a purported fear of physical retalia-
tion probably should not be sufficient to require the party seeking tile
397. See, e.g., In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (1976). For a
collection of scholarly opinions and empirical studies supporting the proposition that
reporters will rarely yield to the coercive impact of incarceration, see Eckhardt & McKey,
Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co.: Substantive and Remedial Aspects of First Amend-
merit Protection for a Reporter's Confidential Sources, 14 IDAHo L. REv. 21, 61 n.258
(1977).
398. See Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 229, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975).
399. See, e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 (1961).
400. On the question whether fear of reprisal constitutes a defense to a charge of
contempt, see note 66 supra.
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evidence to show a likelihood that the coercive sentence will have its
desired impact. Nonetheless, the witness's association with organized
crime coupled with evidence that other similarly situated witnesses
have not responded to a coercive sentence or that prior intimidation of
the witness and his family has occurred may suggest that the witness
will not yield to coercion. 40 1 When because of such fear, or other factor,
it appears likely that the witness cannot be coerced, the trial judge
should exercise his discretion to forego summary punishment.
Second, there will continue to be an empirical basis for evaluating
and revising the types of factors that should require a party to show that
coercion is likely to be effective. Recalcitrant witness problems occur
much more frequently in the grand jury setting, where the witness is
entitled to notice and a hearing. 40 2 In these cases it is arguably permis-
sible to impose a coercive sentence without inquiring into its likely
impact. Even if the witness remains recalcitrant, incarceration after
notice and a hearing can be viewed as appropriate punishment for the
refusal to obey the court order.
40 3
Finally, and most importantly, precluding summary punishment
when a trial witness is. unlikely to yield to coercion provides neither an
excuse for illegal conduct nor a substantial incentive for witnesses to
assert that they are not susceptible to coercion. The recalcitrant trial
witness can always be held in criminal contempt after notice and
a hearing.40 4 This opportunity for subsequent criminal punishment
would adequately vindicate the authority of the court, and the witness's
knowledge that he may be subjected to such a penalty should minimize
any incentive to exaggerate the extent of his conviction not to testify
at trial.
401. Cf. Catena v. Seidl, 68 NJ. 224, 230, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975) (after over five years
of incarceration pursuant to civil contempt judgment for refusing to testify about or-
ganized crime, contemnor released because there was no substantial likelihood that further
incarceration would have coercive impact).
402. See note 73 supra (citing civil contempt cases); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S.
162 (1965) (criminal contempt).
403. The proposition that a civil contempt sanction can be justified as criminal punish-
ment is inconsistent both with the traditional rhetoric that civil contempts are wholly
coercive and with the denial of the right to jury trial to civil contemnors. See Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1966). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the same conduct may lead to both coercive civil and punitive criminal contempt
sanctions, see Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1957), and there is ample precedent
for imposing criminal contempt sanctions against recalcitrant witnesses. See, e.g., Harris
v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971).
Thus, even if a judge's primary objective is coercive, the likelihood that this objective
cannot be achieved should not be a sufficient reason for prohibiting incarceration follow-
ing notice and a hearing. It may, however, be a sufficient reason to limit the amount of
imprisonment that can be imposed. See note 443 infra (use of limitation on penalties as
way to deal with possible tendency of coercive civil contempt sentences to result in dis-
proportionately severe punishment).
404. See United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1971).
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4. The Importance of the Evidence
It would be consistent with the necessity rationale for summary
punishment to require the party seeking evidence from a recalcitrant
witness to show that the evidence was critical, or at least more than
marginally relevant, to his case.405 It may be difficult, however, -to
evaluate the importance of the witness's evidence until other evidence
has been received, and by then it may be too late for a coercive sanction
to be of any value. Moreover, except in situations when the evidence
is clearly of only marginal value, it may be difficult to evaluate the
party's representation that the evidence is likely to be important with-
out a time-consuming hearing. For these reasons, a court should be
reluctant to forego a coercive contempt penalty solely because the
recalcitrant witness's evidence may not appear to be critical to the case.
The apparently noncritical nature of the evidence should not, however,
be completely irrelevant. It will often be difficult to establish clearly
the existence of one of the previously mentioned factors that should
preclude summary punishment. 40 Yet a colorable showing that sum-
mary punishment may be inappropriate coupled with the fact that its
potential benefit is likely to be marginal should be a sufficient reason
to forego the summary remedy.
The more difficult question is the extent to which the critical nature
of the evidence should be considered as a factor favoring summary
punishment. On the one hand, it may be unrealistic, and perhaps un-
desirable, to require that judges always ignore this factor. For example,
even the slight possibility of obtaining evidence against an allegedly
dangerous terrorist might justify summary punishment of a critical
eyewitness who is not likely to testify because of threats to his family.
On the other hand, permitting reliance on the importance of the
evidence to justify summary punishment could undermine the previ-
ously suggested limitations on the use of the summary sanction. There
will prolbably be few cases in which the evidence is only marginally
relevant,40 7 and some judges may tend to be less concerned with a
recalcitrant witness's procedural rights than with seeing that their
orders are obeyed and that relevant evidence is forthcoming.
405. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1965).
406. For example, there may be some doubt about whether the party seeking the
evidence acted reasonably in not pursuing a pretrial remedy, see p. 105 supra, or whether
a witness's fear of retaliation is sufficiently strong to overcome the impact of a coercive
sanction, see pp. 107-08 sulra.
407. In a criminal case, the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence on his
behalf, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973), or the prosecutor's heavy
burden of proof, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970), is likely to reinforce the
view that the recalcitrant witness's evidence is significant.
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To maintain the viability of the previously suggested limitations on
summary punishment, judicial consideration of the critical nature of
the evidence should be restricted in the following manner. If there is
no need for summary adjudication because the trial is sufficiently long
to afford the witness a hearing, the importance of evidence should not
be a reason for permitting summary punishment. 40° In all other cases,
the importance of the evidence should not be a factor favoring summary
punishment, unless the case has some overriding social significance. 40 9
The prosecution of terrorists or a mass murderer who had been
threatening the community might fit within this category, but the more
usual civil or criminal case would not.
4 10
Although these restrictions on the consideration of the critical nature
of the evidence are severe, they should not be a substantial impediment
to the goal of obtaining relevant evidence. The unavailability of sum-
mary punishment would not preclude using the threat of future pros-
ecution as a coercive device.41' Moreover, the question of whether to
consider the critical nature of the evidence, and hence the suggested
restrictions, would arise only after the judge is convinced that one of the
factors precluding summary punishment might be applicable. Most
trials are sufficiently short to preclude even a colorable claim that there
would be enough time to grant the witness a hearing, and the situa-
tions in which it would arguably be reasonable to pursue-a pretrial
coercive remedy are extremely limited. 412 There is only one type of
408. Similarly, the importance of the evidence should not be a reason to forego
specifically ordering the witness to testify. See pp. 100-01 supra. This is a simple re-
quirement that call be met without incurring any substantial delay in the proceedings.
409. One might argue that there should be an additional restriction. The clearly un-
reasonable failure to pursue a pretrial coercive remedy against a critical witness is more
inexcusable than failure to do so against a noncritical witness. Indeed, the apparently
noncritical nature of the evidence ma) be a basis for concluding that the failure to pursue
such a remedy was reasonable. If the requirement is to be meaningful it must be applied
in critical witness situations generally, and perhaps it should be applied even if the case
has particular social significance. The greater importance of the evidence in a case of
overriding social significance, however, should be sufficient to justify this limited excep-
tion to the pretrial coercive remedy requirement.
410. Reasonable people may disagree about the overriding social significance of a
particular case, just as they may disagree about whether one of the previously suggested
limitations on summary punishment exists. The possibility for disagreement, however, does
not diminish the importance of making decisions about the propriety of summary punish-
ment in light of the criteria suggested in this article. Indeed, more rigid and precise
restrictions on summary punishment, although perhaps less susceptible to varying interpre-
tations, would tend to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's concern with the need for
judicial flexibility in dealing with contumacious conduct. See pp. 86-87 sup ra.
411. The threat of a future sentence that is not disproportionately severe will probably
not be as effective a coercive device in some cases as immediate incarceration. See pp.
94-96 supra. Nonetheless, it may be an adequate coercive device in cases where the
reason for foregoing summary punishment is the unreasonable failure to pursue a pretrial
remedy rather than the likelihood that the witness will not respond to the coercion.
412. See p. 105 supra.
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situation that may arise with any frequency in which the restrictions
suggested here would preclude summary punishment to obtain critical
evidence: when the case does not have some overriding social signif-
icance and the witness has demonstrated that a coercive sanction is not
likely to be effective. If such a witness were summarily held in con-
tempt, he would probably have only a few days to decide whether to
yield to the coercion. 413 The possibility that a witness firmly com-
mitted to his recalcitrance will respond in such a short period of time,
even to a conditional six-month sentence, is probably so remote that
the importance of the evidence should not provide a general over-
riding justification for summary punishment.
5. The Disruptive Witness
The fact that a recalcitrant witness accompanies his refusal with
disruptive behavior or insulting remarks to the judge in no way
minimizes the need for a coercive sanction. It does, however, increase
the potential for judicial bias.414 Presumably an unbiased judge would
initially impose a six-month sentence 15 in order to maximize the
coercive impact of the contempt sanction, but even if the judge is not
biased, summary conviction of a disruptive witness may create the
appearance of bias.416 Moreover, there are at least two ways in which
a witness's misbehavior may improperly influence the judge. First, the
judge may give less serious consideration than he otherwise would to
the witness's claims that the underlying court order is invalid or that
one of the factors previously discussed should prevent the imposition
of summary punishment. Second, in the event that the incarcerated
witness agrees to comply with the court order, the judge may be less
willing to reduce the sentence to the time already served.417 If the sen-
tence is not so reduced, however, the contempt judgment, regardless of
its initial coercive purpose, results in the unwarranted summary im-
position of a purely punitive sentence.418
413. If there were a substantially longer period of time, there would be no need for
summary punishment in the first place.
414. See pp. 62-65 supra.
415. See pp. 58-59 supra.
416. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1971); Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
417. See p. 91 supra.
418. The summary imposition of a coercive penalty probably would not preclude the
subsequent imposition, after notice and a hearing, of a punitive penalty for the disruptive
behavior. See United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Rollerson the
court rejected a defendant's double jeopardy claim, see U.S. CONST. amend V, that his
summary contempt conviction for throwing a water pitcher at the prosecutor prevented
his prosecution for assault on a federal officer. The court noted that strict application of
the "same evidence test," see Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911), for double
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Since the witness could be punished for his disruptive behavior after
notice and a hearing, eliminating summary punishment in cases where
the witness is disruptive would not provide a significant incentive for
recalcitrant witnesses to behave improperly.419 Nonetheless, both the
party seeking the evidence and the integrity of the fact-finding process
itself would suffer if an otherwise necessary coercive sanction were
precluded merely because of the fortuity that a witness's refusal was
accompanied by disruptive or disrespectful conduct. Although the
potential for bias cannot be eliminated, speedy appellate review would
jeopardy would not bar the two prosecutions, but it did not rest its decision on this
ground. 449 F.2d at 1003. Instead, the court focused on the purpose of the double
jeopardy clause as protecting against " 'the harrassment of successive trials," id. at 1004
(quoting and adding emphasis to United States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)), and held that "the [summary] contempt proceeding did not amount to a separate
hearing or proceeding of the kind which invokes the Double Jeopardy Clause." 449 F.2d
at 1004-05.
The only difficulty with Rollerson is that a second purpose of the double jeopardy
clause is to prevent multiple punishment for the same conduct. See, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The court apparently felt it was unnecessary to address
this problem since it "found persuasive the observation that contumacious conduct in
court can be an offense against the court's jurisdiction as well as an offense against the
laws of the United States." 449 F.2d at 1004 (citing United States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp.
361, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)). This observation suggests an analogy to the "dual sovereignty"
doctrine, which permits both a state and the federal government to punish the same
conduct. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); see United States v. Wheeler, 98 S.
Ct. 1079, 1086-91 (1978) (Indian tribe is separate sovereignty from United 'States; thus
prosecution by both tribe and United States does not violate double jeopardy clause). The
Supreme Court, however, has held that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not permit both
a state and a political subdivision of the state to punish the same conduct. Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Moreover, dictum in Bloom v. Ilinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968),
casts doubt on the viability of the proposition that a court's interest in punishing con-
tumacious behavior is distinct from the state's interest in enforcing its substantive criminal
law. Id. at 201. See People v. Gray, 69 111. 2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797 (1977) (where defendant
was tried, convicted, and punished for contempt after notice and hearing for violating
protective order of court, later prosecution for battery and attempted murder of wife was
barred by double jeopardy clause).
Even if the dual sovereignty analogy in Rollerson is sound, it would not be applicable
to the disruptive recalcitrant witness. Both the initial coercive criminal sanction and the
subsequent punitive sanction would be for contempt of court. Nonetheless, it may still be
possible to justify imposition of both criminal contempt sanctions without resorting to a
narrow application of the same evidence test. Rollerson's holding that a summary ad-
judication is not the type of proceeding that invokes the double jeopardy prohibition
against multiple trials is sound, and there is substantial authority for the proposition that
the same conduct can result in both coercive civil and punitive criminal penalties. See,
e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947). This latter precedent may be
sufficient to overcome any double punishment claim.
Despite its possible legality, the imposition of both a summary coercive sanction and a
subsequent punitive sanction against a disruptive witness would be undesirable. If the
witness's conduct is so outrageous that foregoing subsequent punishment seems intoler-
able, his behavior is likely to be an indication that a coercive sanction will not be effective,
see pp. 106-08 supra, or that there is an issue regarding his mental capacity that can
be adequately explored only in an adjudicatory hearing, see p. 51 supra. On the other
hand, if a summary sanction is warranted, the witness's anticipation of future punish-
ment, regardless of whether he testifies, would tend to undermine its coercive value.
419. See pp. 75-76, 84-86 supra.
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be a preferable 420 and less drastic remedy for possible bias in the dis-
ruptive witness situation.42 1
IV. Two Modest Proposals
A. The Need for an Explicitly Conditional Criminal
Contempt Sentence
A recalcitrant trial witness should automatically be entitled to re-
lease from incarceration if he agrees to comply with the court order at
any time during the evidentiary stage of the trial.4 22 For the trial judge
to state only that he will consider reducing the sentence if the witness
agrees to provide the evidence, as the judge in Wilson did,42 3 is in-
adequate for two reasons. First, as previously noted, the failure to re-
lease the contemnor who purges himself of the contempt results in an
unwarranted, summarily imposed punitive sentence. Second, the
coercive impact of the sentence is likely to be diminished if the witness
is not assured that compliance with the court order will result in his
freedom. Unfortunately, a trial judge, at least in the federal system, may
not be able to impose a six-month criminal sentence that will auto-
matically terminate if the witness complies with the court order.
In Shillitani v. United States,424 two grand jury witnesses, Pappadio
and Shillitani, after having been granted immunity, refused to obey
the court's order to answer questions. After a hearing both witnesses
420. The previous analysis pointed out that appellate review does not adequately
protect against potential abuses of the contempt power. See p. 70 supra. Appellate
review is offered here as an acceptable remedy for potential judicial bias only because in
some cases there may be no reasonable alternative to summary punishment for coercing
testimony from a recalcitrant trial witness.
421. Since coercion is the only legitimate objective of the summary sanction, an
appellate court, in addition to examining other possible indications of bias, should con-
sider carefully whether the trial judge manifested a coercive purpose in imposing the
sanction. The judge's failure to communicate to the contemnor that the sanction is solely
coercive or, in the event that the contemnor testifies, the judge's failure to release him
immediately should be a sufficient basis for reversal.
422. In some cases the automatic release arguably should not be immediate. For
example, it may be appropriate to impose a conditional six-month sentence that would
terminate immediately if the witness testified within 24 hours and would extend for one
week after the witness testified if he obeyed the court order before the end of the trial
but after the 24-hour period had lapsed. Although the certainty of some additional im-
prisonment would diminish the coercie value of the sentence for the witness who did
not testify immediately, this type of sentence may be desirable to maximize the incentive
for speedy compliance with the court order in situations where the witness's testimony is
important as a foundation for other evidence. On the other hand, permitting this type of
sentence creates the danger that some judges may deny the contemnor immediate release
for noncoercive, punitiie reasons. See p. 112 supra.
423. 421 U.S. at 312. But see note 316 supra.
424. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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were held in contempt and given two-year jail sentences.425 The sen-
tences were conditioned upon further order of the court.42 6 The
Second Circuit, in affirming the convictions, 427 interpreted Shillitani's
sentence as entitling him to immediate release from imprisonment if he
purged himself of the contempt.42 8 The Supreme Court gave the same
construction to the conditional language in both sentences.429 Although
the parties, the trial judge, and the Second Circuit all assumed that the
contempts were criminal, 430 the Supreme Court, focusing on the trial
judge's coercive objective and the conditional nature of the sentences,
held that they were in fact coercive civil contempts. 431 The grand jury
term had expired,432 and since a civil contempt penalty cannot extend
beyond the time when compliance with the court order becomes im-
possible,433 Shillitani and Pappadio were entitled to be released from
imprisonment.
W'ilson's recognition of the coercive justification for summary crim-
inal punishment suggests that Shillitani may not prohibit an explicitly
conditional, summary criminal contempt sentence. Indeed, if Shillitani
were applicable to summary contempts, the trial judge's suggestion in
Wilson that he would consider reducing the sentences if the witnesses
testified arguably should have been sufficient to categorize the con-
tempts as civil. Furthermore, it is arguable that Shillitani was more
concerned with unwarranted fixed criminal penalties than with condi-
tional criminal penalties. The Shillitani Court, assuming that civil
contempt was a less onerous remedy than criminal contempt, 434 stated
in dictum that a trial judge "should resort to criminal sanctions only
after he determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be
inappropriate. 43 5 There was no indication in Shillitani that the time
remaining in the grand jury term would not have been sufficient for a
completely conditional sentence to have its desired coercive effect. Even
425. The Supreme Court had not yet extended the right to jury trial to criminal con-
tempts carrying sentences greater than six months. See pp. 66-67 & note 69 supra;
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
426. 384 U.S. at 366, 368.
427. United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated, Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); United States v. Shillitani, 345 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated,
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
428. 345 F.2d at 294.
429. 384 U.S. at 368 n.3.
430. See id. at 369.
431. Id. at 368.
432. Id. at 372.
433. Id. at 371-72.
434. The assumption is not necessarily correct. In at least one instance a recalcitrant
witness remained incarcerated for more than five years pursuant to a civil contempt judg-
ment. See Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 343 A.2d 744 (1975).
435. 384 U.S. at 371 n.9.
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if the term were about to end, the witnesses could have been called
early in the term of the next grand jury. Therefore, there was no neces-
sity for a two-year criminal sentence in the event that the contemnors
remained recalcitrant.4A6 In contrast, as the Court observed in Wilson,
the brevity of the trial would have limited the maximum possible civil
contempt sentence to only a few days' imprisonment.
437
On the other hand, the civil contempt/criminal contempt distinction
traditionally has applied to both summary and nonsummary con-
tempts. 438 Thus, Wilson's affirmance of the criminal contempt judg-
ment may mean either that the Court did not view coercion as the
overriding objective in Wilson4 39 or that it is appropriate to impose a
summary criminal contempt penalty for coercive reasons as long as the
fixed sentence is not explicitly conditioned on the witness's failure to
purge himself of the contempt.
The difficulty in determining whether Shillitani precludes all fixed
criminal contempt sentences with a purge clause is compounded by
the Court's failure to articulate its objections to this type of sentence;
440
436. Two other factors, neither of which casts doubt on the propriety of explicitly
conditional criminal sentences, may help explain the Court's conclusion that the con-
tempts were civil. First, by the time the case reached the Court, there was substantial
confusion over the nature and purpose of the sentences. The trial judge did not explicitly
condition the two-year terms on the contemnors' agreement to testify, 384 U.S. at 366, 368,
and the Second Circuit's construction of Shillitani's sentence "to mean that defendant has
an unqualified right to release from imprisonment once he obeys Judge 'Watt's order,"
345 F.2d at 294 (emphasis added), is anomalous. Use of the present tense implies that
Shillitani would be entitled to release if he agreed to testify at any time during the two-
year period of incarceration. Unless there happened to be a subsequent grand jury in-
vestigating the same matters, however, his testimony would be useless after the grand jury
term had expired. The term of the grand jury before which Shillitani and Pappadio were
ordered to testify had expired in March, 1965, 384 U.S. at 372, and the Second Circuit
decisions affirming the contempt judgments were not rendered until after that date.
Pappadio v. United States, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated. Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966) (decided May 24); Shillitani v. United States, 345 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.
1965), vacated, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (decided May 18). Given the
Court's premise that civil contempt is a less onerous sanction than criminal contempt, see
p. 114 supra, it is not surprising that it resolved this confusing situation by treating the
contempts as wholly civil.
Second, on the same day that it decided Shillitani, the Court, relying on its supervisory
power, see note 69 supra, announced that federal criminal contemnors could not be sen-
tenced to more than six months' imprisonment without having been given the right to a
jury trial. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (plurality opinion of Clark, J.).
Since the contempt sentence in Cheff had been only six months, the Court affirmed the
conviction. The Court was able to avoid dealing with whether this newly announced rule
required reversal of the contempts in Shillitani by labeling them as civil.
437. 421 U.S. at 317 n.9.
438. See McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 63-65 (1939) (nonsummary civil con-
tempt); Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921, 922, 924-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965) (summary civil contempt). Both McCrone and Giancana were cited in
Shillitani to illustrate the nature of civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt. 384 U.S. at 370.
439. See p. 92 supra.
440. Occasionally courts have imposed coercive civil contempt sentences that will auto-
matically terminate prior to the time when compliance with the court order becomes im-
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however, there would appear to be only one possible objection. Even if
a fixed sentence is explicitly conditional, some contemnors will prob-
ably not yield to the coercion,441 and, as was noted previously, 44 2 a
fixed sentence based solely or primarily on a coercive objective may be
disproportionately severe. 443 If one fears that judges would tend to
possible. See, e.g., In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1975) (civil contempt sentence for
refusing to testify before grand jury to last until (1) witness agrees to testify, (2) grand
jury term ends, or (3) six months have elapsed, whichever occurs first). Noting that this
type of sentence would be of benefit to a recalcitrant witness, Shillitani observed that "it
raises none of the problems surrounding a judicial command that unless the witness
testifies within a specified time he will be imprisoned for a term of years." 384 U.S. at
370-71 n.6. The Court, however, did not indicate what these problems were. Rather, the
Court merely cited Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960), a case approving the type
of sentence that Shillitani found troublesome. See note 443 infra.
441. See pp. 106-08 supra.
442. See pp. 77, 92-94 supra.
443. Justice Black may have been concerned with disproportionality when he dissented
from the approval of a fixed sentence with a purge clause in Reina v. United States, 364
U.S. 507 (1960) (two years' imprisonment if witness does not provide evidence within 60
days), a case decided prior to Shillitani. Assuming that there was no justification for
further punishment in the event that the witness purged himself of the contempt, Justice
Black argued that the imposition of a fixed sentence at the time of the contempt ad-
judication constituted punishment for an act that had not yet been committed-the failure
to provide evidence within the time left for compliance with the court order. Id. at 515-16
(Black, J., dissenting).
In the event that a witness refuses to testify, there may be a legitimate basis for sub-
sequent criminal punishment. For example, if he had only a month within which to obey
the court order and if he refused to do so, one month's imprisonment may be viewed as
an inadequate punishment. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 75 (1957). If the judge
in this type of situation imposed a fixed six-month sentence with a purge clause to ensure
that the punishment would be adequate in the event of continued recalcitrance, Justice
Black's characterization of punishing future conduct seems appropriate. The fact that a
sentence can be described in this manner should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
it is improper. A fixed period of imprisonment that will be served in its entirety only if
the defendant breaches established conditions for early parole could just as readily be
regarded as punishment for future conduct, but this type of conditional fixed sentence
may be desirable. See N. MoRius, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 34-36, 39-40 (1974). More
importantly, if a fixed sentence were imposed solely to increase the coercive impact of
incarceration, the punishment for future conduct characterization would be no more (or
less) appropriate than it would be as applied to a normal coercive civil contempt sanction.
Rather, for both types of purely coercive sentences the characterization is relevant only in
relation to the problem of disproportionality. Regardless of whether the length of
potential imprisonment pursuant to a coercive sanction is determined by the fixed portion
of a conditional criminal sentence or by the time remaining for compliance with a court
order under a normal civil contempt sentence, the extent of coercive pressure and the
deprivation of liberty imposed in the event that the contemnor does not yield to the
coercion should depend in part on the gravity of the harm caused by the recalcitrance.
If the harm is viewed as the refusal to testify on a specified occasion without regard to the
ramifications of continued recalcitrance, conditional imprisonment that can last only a
few months may be disproportionately severe. Such imprisonment, however, may not be
disproportionate-or at least not as disproportionate-when one considers the sanction in
relation to the greater harm caused by continued recalcitrance throughout the proceeding.
If one is troubled by the characterization of purely coercive sentences as punishment for
future conduct, there are three possible responses. First, one could eliminate coercive
contempt sentences altogether. This, of course, would eliminate the one arguably
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impose disproportionately severe fixed conditional sentences, it may be
desirable to eliminate this option altogether rather than to rely on
legislative or appellate court action,444 which might not be forthcom-
ing,445 to eliminate the disproportionality. 446
Regardless of the merits of this position in other contexts, it is not a
sufficient basis for prohibiting explicitly conditional fixed sentences in
the limited type of situation that justifies summary coercive punish-
ment in the first place. 447 The fixed portion of the sentence would
make the contempt criminal rather than civil,448 and the extension of
the due process jury trial right to criminal contempts limits the period
legitimate justification for summary punishment and, in some cases, perhaps deprive a
party of critical evidence. See pp. 92, 96-99 supra. Second, one could refuse to impose a
coercive penalty at least in those situations where the contemnor is unlikely to yield
to the coercion. Regardless of whether this limitation should exist in all cases, the
analysis has already urged that it be imposed on summary coercive punishment. See pp.
106-08 supra. Third, recognizing that both criminal and civil coercive sentences may
result in disproportionately severe punishment, see Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844,
846 (9th Cir. 1955), modified, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Note, supra note 257, at 356-57, one could
limit the severity of coercive sentences, see p. 78 supra, or at least grant civil con-
temnors the same procedural rights applicable to criminal contemnors. Compare Shillitani
v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966) (no right to jury trial in civil contempt cases)
with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1966) (due process right to jury trial in criminal
contempt cases where sentence indicates offense is not petty). For present purposes, it is
sufficient to note that a six-month conditional sentence for a recalcitrant trial witness is
not likely to be disproportionately severe, see p. 118 infra, and that a summarily con-
victed trial witness who is given such a sentence would at least be granted the procedural
rights due to other summarily convicted criminal contemnors.
444. See pp. 77-78 supra.
445. Compare United States v. Patrick, 543 F.2d 381, 393 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977) (refusal to reduce recalcitrant trial witness's four-year criminal con-
tempt sentence) with pp. 94-96 supra (sentence of four years for refusal to testify should
be regarded as disproportionately severe).
446. The best solution to this problem would be a statute permitting conditional fixed
sentences of a limited duration. Cf. MICH. COMe. LAws ANN. § 767-19c (Supp. 1978) (re-
calcitrant grand jury witness can be imprisoned for one year and fined up to $10,000; if
witness agrees to purge himself of contempt, court shall order recalling of grand jury, and
if witness purges himself, commutc tLhC sentence). The penalty limitation would minimize
the danger of disproportionately severe sentences, and the use of conditional fixed sen-
tences would enhance uniformity in the treatment of similar cases. For example, the need
for evidence from a grand jury witness ordered to testify eight months before the grand
jury term will expire may be just as great as the need for evidence from a witness who
had been ordered to testify two months earlier. Under existing federal law, however, the
fortuity of the time remaining in the grand jury term, if that time is less than 18 months,
see p. 95 supra, determines the maximum imprisonment pursuant to a civil contempt
judgment. Thus one witness would be subjected to an eight month coercive sentence
and the other to a ten month coercive sentence. But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 3333(e) (1976)
(defining special grand juries and specifying that such grand juries may be extended 18
months beyond their original term; under special circumstances set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3333(e), extension may exceed 18 months).
447. See pp. 98-99 supra.
448. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 383-84 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
Shillitani and concurring in Chefr).
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of incarceration to six months' imprisonment.44 9 Given the importance
of coercing possibly critical evidence from a witness, 450 a six-month
sentence for continued recalcitrance should not be regarded as dis-
proportionately severe in most cases.45 1 Indeed, a federal grand jury
witness's civil contempt sentence can extend for eighteen months.452
Rather the problem is that in the absence of an explicitly conditional
six-month penalty, there is no guarantee that the trial judge will
exercise his discretion to reduce the sentence to the time served if the
contemnor purges himself.453
It would be desirable to adopt either by statute or court rule a
provision that required, or at least permitted, trial judges to make fixed
sentences explicitly conditional in summary criminal contempt cases
involving recalcitrant trial witnesses. In the absence of such a statute
or rule, the Supreme Court should indicate at the earliest available
opportunity that conditional fixed sentences are appropriate in these
cases. In the meantime, trial judges should go as far as their reading of
Shillitani or relevant state precedents permits in impressing upon sum-
marily convicted trial witnesses the coercive nature of their sentences.
B. The Need to Minimize the Impact of Wrongful Incarceration
The scope of review and the procedure for obtaining appellate re-
view in criminal contempt cases vary among jurisdictions. Some juris-
dictions treat criminal contempts as ordinary criminal convictions for
the purposes of appellate review . 4 Others, focusing on the sui generis
nature of contempts, have special rules for the review of criminal con-
tempt convictions.4; 5 Regardless of the treatment of nonsummary con-
tempts, a summarily convicted contemnor should have the right to full
449. See pp. 66-67 supra. The subsequent analysis suggests that summarily incarcerated
contemnors should have the right to speedy appellate review. See pp. 120-21 infra. If this
proposal is adopted, the length of incarceration for wrongfully convicted contemnors will
be kept to a minimum.
450. See p. 92 supra.
451. One might regard a six-month sentence as disproportionately severe if the
evidence were only marginally relevant. Cf. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166-67
(1965) (grand jury witness's evidence may be "'so inconsequential . . . [and] the fear of
reprisal so great that only nominal punishment, if any, is indicated"). The analysis has
already suggested, however, that the noncritical nature of the evidence, as well as the
likelihood that the witness will not yield to a coercive sanction, are factors that should
limit the availability of summary punishment. See pp. 106-09 supra.
452. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970).
453. See p. IU. supra.
454. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
740 (1945); United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 139 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1943).
455. See, e.g., Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962
(1975); Edmunds v. Chang, 365 F. Snpp. 941 (D. Hawaii 1973), rev'd on other grounds.
509 F.2d 39 (9th Cii.), cert. dcnied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
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review of his conviction by at least one appellate court. As noted in
Part I, the absence of procedural safeguards at the adjudicatory phase
makes appellate review the most important safeguard against abuses of
the summary contempt power.
456
The discretionary power to grant bail pending appeal4ai may elim-
inate the problem of temporary wrongful incarceration for the in-
dividual whose conviction is ultimately reversed. In the limited situa-
tion where the previous analysis suggests that summary punishment
may be justifiable, 45 however, release pending appeal would under-
mine the sanction's primary value-the coercive force of immediate
incarceration. 459 Thus, in those cases in which summary imprisonment
is arguably necessary to coerce compliance with a court order and in
which the judge makes it clear that he will release the contemnor if the
contemnor purges himself of the contempt,460 bail pending appeal
should be the exception and not the norm.461 In order to obtain release
pending appeal, the contemnor in such a case should be required to
make at least a colorable showing that the court order was illegal or
456. See p. 69 supra.
457. See United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971); Note, Post Conviction Bail: The Application of an Unjust and Outmoded
System-A Case for Reiorn, 15 N.Y.L.F. 889, 889 (1969) (in most jurisdictions, decision to
admit defendant to bail pending appeal "rests in the ... realm of judicial discretion").
Compare ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 5.1-5.2
(1968) (for determining pretrial release judge should use presumption that defendant is
entitled to release on his own recognizance) with ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS § 2.5 (1970) (for determining release pending appeal burden is
on appellant to show that no substantial risk exists that lie "will not appear to answer the
judgment" following conclusion of appellate proceedings and that he "is not likely to
commit a serious crime, intimidate witnesses or otherwise interfere with the administra-
tion of justice").
458. See pp. 98-99 supra.
459. Indeed, without immediate imprisonment, it would be difficult to justify summary
punishment in the first place. If the sentence were stayed, the certainty of imprisonment
in the event of an unsuccessful appeal would provide some incentive for the contemnor
to obey the court order. A threatened post-hearing sentence probably would not, however,
have to be substantially longer than a stayed summary sentence to have the equivalent
coercive force. See note 230 supra. Thus a primary basis for permitting summary coercive
punishment-the probable disproportionality in some cases of a post-hearing sentence that
compensated for the absence of immediate punishment, see pp. 94-96 supra-would be
severely eroded if the coercive contempt sentence did not have to be served immediately.
460. See pp. IfH, !'. upra.
461. If the trial judge does not clearly indicate that the sentence is coercive, or if the
case does not fall within the limited range of situations in which summary punishment is
an arguably necessary coercive device, see pp. 74-79, 84-86 sup~ra (summary punishment
not necessary to coerce proper behavior from person who disrupts courtroom proceed-
ings); pp. 98-99 supra (summary punishment may be necessary in some recalcitrant
trial witness cases), the contemnor's right to release pending appeal should be governed
by the same standards applicable to the pretrial release of an ordinary criminal defendant.
See note 265 supra. Although technically the summarily convicted contemnor cannot claim
the "'presumption of innocence," see Note, sura note 457, at 916-18, his incarceration
pending appeal, like the pretrial incarceration of an ordinary criminal defendant, results
in imprisonment without an adequate opportunity to address the charges against him.
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that one of the previously suggested limitations462 on summary coercive
punishment is applicable to his case.
Whenever a summarily convicted contemnor is denied bail pending
appeal, he should have the right to speedy appellate review in order
to minimize the possibility of unwarranted imprisonment.40 ^ Federal
legislation governing appellate review of civil contempt judgments in
recalcitrant witness cases requires that an appeal from the witness's
order of confinement for civil contempt must be disposed of within at
most thirty days of the filing of an appeal.464 A similar rule should be
adopted for appeals from orders of confinement in summary criminal
contempt cases, 465 and the failure of an appellate court to comply with
the rule should result in the contemnor's release.
466
462. See pp. 98-113 sut4ra.
463. Cf. Note, supra note 257, at 359 (recommendation that there be expedited appeal
of all contempt judgments).
464. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) (1970).
465. The expedited appeal requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) has led some courts to
give a civil contemnor's legal arguments less than full and complete consideration. See In
re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975); In re Reed, 448
F.2d 1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972). Since there are relatively
few contempt cases in any jurisdiction, however, see note 120 supra, the extent to which the
expedited appeal requirement places a substantial burden on conscientious appellate
courts is questionable.
If § 1826(b) does create an undue burden for appellate courts, it would be preferable to
amend that statute rather than to deny summarily convicted criminal contemnors a
speedy appeal. Since the need for prompt appellate resolution of the legal issues is greatest
when an incarcerated contemnor has not been afforded an adjudicatory hearing, one
could deny expedited appeals to civil contemnors who had an adequate opportunity to
present their legal claims to the trial judge. See note 73 supra. The number of expedited
appeals from summary criminal contempt judgments could then be kept at a minimum
simply by not using the summary remedy-or at least by not requiring pre-appeal in-
carceration following summary adjudication-in cases involving disruptive courtroom be-
havior.
Even with only a limited number of expedited appeals, there may be cases where the
parties are unable to prepare their legal arguments in a short enough time for appellate
courts to give the issues full consideration. To alleviate this problem, it may be desirable
to permit the contemnor to waive the time limitation, or to set forth the time limitation
in terms of the various stages of the appellate review process rather than as a single limita-
tion running from the time the contemnor files his notice of appeal. For example, the
expedited appeal rule might require that the record be transmitted to the appellate court
within 10 days after the filing of the notice of appeal with the trial court, cf. FED. R. APP.
P. 11(a), (d) (record to be transmitted within 40 days unless court lengthens or shortens
time), that the appellee file and serve his brief within 10 days after the contemnor has
filed and served his brief, cf. FED. R. APP. P. 31(a) (appellee to file and serve brief within
30 days after appellant serves his brief), and that the appellate court dispose of the matter
within 10 days after the filing and service of the appellee's brief. This type of rule would
ensure that each participant in the appellate process has a reasonable opportunity to con-
bider and address the issues. At the same time, the absence of a special rule limiting the
period within which the contemnor must file his brief would permit him some flexibility
in weighing the importance of speedy appellate disposition against the possible need for
additional time to prepare his legal arguments.
466. An incarcerated civil contemnor whose appeal is not disposed of within the 30-day
period mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) is entitled to be released at the end of the 30-day
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To some extent an expedited appeal requirement would lessen the
impact of a summarily imposed coercive sentence. A trial witness who
knows that he may be released within thirty days will be less likely to
testify than one who has no assurance of speedy appellate review. Most
trials are relatively brief, however, and summary coercive punishment
may not be justified if the trial is lengthy.4 6 7 Thus, a recalcitrant trial
witness will probably have to decide whether to testify before his ap-
peal is heard.468 For most witnesses, the possibility of release within
thirty days would probably not be a sufficient reason to risk the cer-
tainty of six months' imprisonment in the event that the conviction is
affirmed.4 69 Moreover, if a witness makes it clear that he expects to be
vindicated by an appellate court and will testify if, but only if, the
contempt judgment is affirmed, the trial judge retains the option of
delaying the trial and requesting that the appeal be given immediate
attention. The interest in minimizing incarceration following unwar-
ranted summary convictions outweighs the probably inconsequential
loss of coercive power that would result from an expedited appeal rule.
period. See, e.g., Melickian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416, 419-20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 986 (1977); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1972). Courts have
reached differing conclusions, however, on the question whether the release should be
absolute or merely temporary until the appeal is disposed of. For a collection of the cases,
see Melickian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416, 417-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986
(1977).
467. See p. 93 supra.
468. In contrast, a recalcitrant grand jury witness held in civil contempt pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1826 would have to risk only 30 days' imprisonment for the possibility of
appellate vindication. If the judgment were affirmed, he could decide immediately to
purge the contempt.
469. The primary factor in deciding to take this risk will probably be the contemnor's
assessment of the likelihood that an appellate court will reverse the conviction. In cases
where the contemnor is willing to risk six months' imprisonment and his prediction of
appellate vindication turns out to be correct, the expedited appeal rule would simply be
encouraging otherwise legal action. It would be likely to have a substantial detrimental
impact only in cases where the contemnor miscalculates the probability that his conviction
will be reiersed, a problem that can be minimized by the sound advice of counsel. See
generally pp. 57-62 sulra (discussion of right to counsel in summary contempt cases).
The magnitude of the risk also will depend in part on whether the appellate court is
likely to dispose of the matter within thirty days and whether the court's failure to do so
would entitle the contemnor to unconditional release or only temporary release in the
event that the conviction is ultimately affirmed. If the likelihood of the court's failure to
dispose of the matter promptly remained constant, a rule mandating unconditional release
would increase the incentive to risk six months' imprisonment. On the other hand, a rule
mandating unconditional release may encourage appellate courts to dispose of appeals
within the prescribed time and thereby minimize the incentive to risk six months'
impisonment.
Regardless of how one resolves the conditional/unconditional release issue in the civil
contempt context, see note 466 supra, the primary consideration in the trial witness con-
text should be reducing the incentive to risk a six-month sentence, insofar as that incen-
tive does not depend on the probability of prevailing on appeal. A trial witness held in
criminal contempt, unlike a grand jury witness held in civil contempt, will probably have
only a few dass to decide whether to testify. Therefore it is more important in the case
of the trial witness to maximize the immediate coercive impact of the sentence.
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Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt adequately with the
summary criminal contempt power, its pre-Wilson decisions resulted in
significant limitations on the exercise of the power. Indeed, an attorney
for the contemnor in Taylor v. Hayes,470 one of the most recent pre-
Wilson cases, has commented that in arguing the case to the Court it
"seemed propitious to revive the challenge to the constitutionality of
the summary contempt power itself."47' Taylor did not address the
challenge, nor did it provide any justification for permitting the cur-
tailment of procedural safeguards when an attorney's contempt ad-
judication is delayed until the end of a trial.47 2 Nonetheless, by re-
quiring that the contemnor in such a case is entitled at least to notice
of the charge and some opportunity to be heard,473 Taylor was con-
sistent with the trend toward a narrowing of the scope of the summary
power.
Several commentators have suggested that Wilson represents a sub-
stantial step back from the Court's restrictive view of the summary
contempt power in earlier cases.474 Whether this assessment turns out
to be correct will depend in large measure on how both trial and ap-
pellate judges react to Vilson's statement that "the courts of appeals
* . . can deal with abuses of discretion without restricting . . . [Rule
42(a)] in contradiction of its express terms.' 475 For the most part, the
reported cases citing Wilson have not departed from the limitations on
the summary power developed prior to Wilson.470 Several of these
470. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
471. Sedler, supra note 7, at 74.
472. See p. 72 supra.
473. 418 U.S. at 498-50.
474. See 13 A.m. CR155. L. REv. 271, 280 (1975); 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 747, 757-78 (1977); cf.
Note, supra note 158, at 82 (although Wilson is distinguishable on its facts, it may
represent retreat from Harris line of cases).
475. 421 U.S. at 319. See pp. 89-91 supra.
476. E.g., United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1248 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversal of
summary contempt conviction imposed at conclusion of trial for witness's failure to testify
during trial; Wilson cited for proposition that summary contempt power is available
"only where there is 'compelling reason for an immediate remedy.' "); Krueger v. State,
351 So. 2d 47, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (reversal of attorney's contempt conviction
for remarks made in allegedly disrespectful manner; Wilson relied on to support )rop-
osition that there was "no need for summary action in this instance"). But see McDonald
v. State, 321 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel. Spencer v. Howe, 30 Or.
App. 25, 566 P.2d 190 (1977) (both upholding immediate summary contempt consic-
tions of recalcitrant trial witnesses without suggesting that contempt penalties were
or should have been imposed to coerce testimony). At least one court prior to l171son,
however, had upheld a noncoercive summary contempt conviction for a witness's refusal
to testify in open court. Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 388 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 846 (1972).
122
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cases, however, have relied in part on Wilson to affirm immediate
summary punishment for disruptive courtroom behavior .477 Although
this is not a departure from the Court's pre-Wilson dictum 47 8 or the
holdings of other courts,4 7 9 it represents, as this article has attempted
to demonstrate, an unnecessary and undesirable use of the summary
contempt power. The most important feature of Wilson, although it
was not stressed by either the majority or the dissent, is its coercion
rationale, which provides an alternative, independent basis for summary
criminal punishment.
477. E.g., Pennsylania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 522 F.2d 498,
509 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 67 (1977) (summary contempt adjudication of attorney
for overzealous advocacy); In re Nesbitt, 345 A.2d 154, 155 (D.C. 1975) (same).
478. See note 217 supra (citing cases).
479. E.g., notes 32 8- 33 supra (citing cases).
The Yale Law Journal













James F. Strnad II


















Secretaries to the Editors M. Olive Butterfield, Pamela Willmott
Student Contributors to This Issue
William W. Chip, Transfers of Copyrights for Security Under the New
Copyright Act
Eric M. Freedman, The United States and the Articles of Confedera-
tion: Drifting Toward Anarchy or Inching Toward Commonwealth?
John J. Kulewicz, Equal Representation of Party Members on Political
Party Central Committees
Michael G. Starr, The Mental Hospitalization of Children and the
Limits of Parental Authority
124
